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U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
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Substantive rulingFiled July 23, 2025

Boggis v. City of Moorhead

Judge
Jeffrey Bryan
Docket
0:22-cv-02576
Court
U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
Pages
11
Civil RightsSection 1983Qualified ImmunityFourth Amendment
In one sentence

In Boggis v. City of Moorhead, Judge Jeffrey M. Bryan granted summary judgment in favor of all defendant officers and the city, ruling that Officer Hanson was shielded from liability by qualified immunity on the federal civil-rights claim and by official immunity on the state assault and battery claims after he tackled and seriously injured plaintiff Todd Boggis in an apartment hallway in 2019.

Who this affects

People who allege police officers used excessive force against them in Minnesota or the Eighth Circuit, particularly in situations where the person was moving toward bystanders or not complying with officer commands; also law enforcement officers and municipalities facing civil-rights and state tort claims arising from use-of-force incidents.

What happened

In Boggis v. City of Moorhead, plaintiff Todd Boggis sued Moorhead Police Officer Jonathan Hanson and several other officers and their employer under both federal civil-rights law (42 U.S.C. § 1983) and Minnesota state law, alleging that Hanson used excessive force when he tackled Boggis in an apartment building hallway on November 3, 2019. The takedown left Boggis with a fractured femur, an injury he says has required multiple surgeries, left him unable to walk without assistance, and causes him daily pain. Boggis argued that the tackle violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable force and constituted assault and battery under state law.

On the federal claim, the court analyzed whether Hanson was protected by qualified immunity — a legal doctrine that shields government officials from lawsuits unless they violated a right that was 'clearly established' at the time of the conduct. The court found that existing case law in the Eighth Circuit actually supported Hanson's actions: prior decisions had repeatedly upheld officer takedowns of suspects who disobeyed commands to stop or who appeared to pose a threat to nearby bystanders. Because Boggis ran toward a group of bystanders (including a woman with whom he had just exchanged heated words) and ignored Hanson's commands to stop, the court concluded that a reasonable officer in Hanson's position would not have known the tackle violated any constitutional right. On the state assault and battery claims, the court applied Minnesota's 'official immunity' doctrine, which similarly protects officers exercising discretionary judgment from suit unless they acted with willful malice. Finding the state and federal analyses essentially parallel, the court held that Hanson did not violate a 'known right' and was therefore immune from the state tort claims as well, and that the city shared that immunity.

Judge Jeffrey M. Bryan granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on all remaining claims and dismissed the case without prejudice. Boggis had already conceded before the ruling that two of his five original counts — a § 1983 claim against officers other than Hanson and a negligence claim — should be decided in the defendants' favor, narrowing the court's analysis to the excessive-force, assault, and battery claims against Hanson.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Boggis v. City of Moorhead, File No. 22-CV-02576 (JMB/LIB)
Court
U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota
Judge
Jeffrey M. Bryan
Date
July 23, 2025

Background

On November 3, 2019, Officers Jonathan Hanson and Tanner Hennen responded to an apartment complex in Moorhead, Minnesota, after a 911 caller reported that two apparently intoxicated men had been fighting in a hallway. Upon arrival, the officers found Todd Boggis seated on the hallway floor with three other residents. Boggis was visibly agitated, demanded Hanson's badge number and training credentials, and described having been attacked by other residents. When a bystander sarcastically disputed his account, Boggis began running down the hallway toward the group of bystanders. Hanson ordered him to stop. Boggis did not comply. Hanson testified he feared Boggis would harm the bystanders, ran after him, wrapped his arms around Boggis's midsection, and brought him to the floor, falling on top of him in the process. Boggis maintains he was running toward his apartment door, which was in the same direction.

Boggis suffered a fractured right femur. He testified that he has required multiple surgeries, cannot walk without assistance, and experiences daily pain.

Boggis filed suit on October 14, 2022. His original five-count complaint included: (Count I) a § 1983 excessive-force claim against Hanson; (Count II) a § 1983 claim against other officers; (Counts III & IV) state-law assault and battery claims against Hanson; and (Count V) a negligence claim against responding officers. Before the court ruled, Boggis conceded that discovery supported summary judgment against him on Counts II and V. The court therefore analyzed only Counts I, III, and IV.

Legal Standards

Summary judgment (a ruling without a trial) is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute of material fact — meaning no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party on the evidence presented. The court views all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party (here, Boggis).

Count I: § 1983 Excessive Force / Qualified Immunity

Qualified immunity protects government officials from § 1983 liability unless (1) the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) that right was 'clearly established' — meaning prior legal authority placed the constitutional question 'beyond debate' — at the time of the violation. Courts may address either prong first.

The court accepted, for purposes of argument, that the Fourth Amendment generally protects individuals from unreasonable force. However, it ruled that Boggis failed to satisfy the second prong: he did not identify caselaw clearly establishing that the specific use of force here — a tackle of a running, non-compliant individual who appeared to pose a threat to bystanders — was unconstitutional.

To the contrary, the court identified several Eighth Circuit precedents that supported Hanson's conduct, including: - Hosea v. City of St. Paul, 867 F.3d 949 (8th Cir. 2017): affirmed a tackle maneuver where the officer reasonably believed the plaintiff threatened a nearby individual and the plaintiff had disobeyed commands. - Ehlers v. City of Rapid City, 846 F.3d 1002 (8th Cir. 2017): upheld a takedown where the plaintiff ignored commands and continued walking past the officer. - Additional cases including McDaniel v. Neal, Kelsay v. Ernst, and Ledbetter v. Helmers.

Boggis cited Stockton v. Auren, 2008 WL 1994992 (D. Minn. 2008), a district court decision that denied summary judgment on excessive-force claims arising from an arm-bar takedown. The court distinguished Stockton because in that case the plaintiff had remained docile throughout the encounter, never attempted to flee, and posed no apparent threat — the opposite of what the record showed here. The court further noted that caselaw prohibiting force against non-threatening suspects does not clearly establish the law governing force against suspects who are threatening.

Because Boggis could not point to authority placing the constitutional question beyond debate, Hanson was entitled to qualified immunity, and the court granted summary judgment on Count I.

Counts III & IV: State Assault and Battery / Official Immunity

Under Minnesota law, police officers are immune from state tort claims arising from discretionary official duties unless they acted 'willfully or maliciously.' 'Malice' in this context is defined objectively as the 'willful violation of a known right,' not merely subjective bad intent.

The parties agreed Hanson's takedown was a discretionary act. The court found that the state official-immunity analysis mirrors the federal qualified-immunity analysis in this context, citing Yang v. City of Brooklyn Park and several other authorities. For the same reasons that Hanson did not violate a clearly established federal right, he did not violate a 'known right' under state law. Accordingly, official immunity barred the assault and battery claims against Hanson.

Because Hanson was immune, the City of Moorhead was also immune from vicarious liability for Hanson's actions under established Eighth Circuit and Minnesota precedent.

Disposition

The court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment on all remaining counts and dismissed the action without prejudice.

Reviewer note from the AI+
The court's order says the case is dismissed 'WITHOUT prejudice,' which is unusual for a grant of summary judgment on the merits — typically a merits ruling results in dismissal with prejudice. This may be a clerical error in the order, or it may be intentional. The opinion does not explain the choice. Reviewers should flag this for attention. Additionally, the opinion spells the second officer's last name inconsistently ('Hennan' in some places, 'Hennen' in others); this summary uses both spellings as they appear in the text.
The authoritative version

Read the full 11-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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Boggis v. City of Moorhead · Court, Explained