Rattanavong v. Warden FCI Sandstone
- Jeffrey Bryan
- 0:25-cv-01003
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 5
In Rattanavong v. Warden FCI Sandstone, Judge Jeffrey M. Bryan dismissed with prejudice a federal prisoner's petition seeking early release based on earned time credits, ruling that a 1998 immigration court removal order makes him ineligible for those credits under federal law.
Federal prisoners who are subject to final immigration removal orders and seeking to apply First Step Act earned-time credits toward early release from federal custody.
What happened
In Rattanavong v. Warden FCI Sandstone, Buon Rattanavong, a prisoner at FCI Sandstone in Minnesota serving a 240-month sentence for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, filed a petition asking the court to order the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to apply First Step Act time credits (earned time credits that can reduce a prisoner's sentence) to his sentence, which he argued should result in his immediate release. The BOP had refused to apply those credits, saying that Rattanavong was subject to a final order of removal from the United States — an immigration court order directing that he be deported — and that federal law bars applying such credits to prisoners under such orders. Rattanavong argued that because his home country, Laos, has no deportation treaty with the United States, any removal order should not affect his eligibility for the credits since he cannot actually be deported there.
A magistrate judge (a judge who assists the district court) reviewed the petition and recommended dismissing it, finding that federal law, 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(E)(i), flatly bars time credits for any prisoner subject to a final removal order, with no exception for countries lacking deportation treaties. Rattanavong objected, arguing first that there was insufficient evidence of a removal order in the record and second that a 2001 court filing had vacated any prior removal order. In response, the government produced a 1998 immigration court order directing Rattanavong's removal, along with a declaration from an immigration enforcement officer confirming its authenticity.
Judge Jeffrey M. Bryan overruled both of Rattanavong's objections and dismissed the petition with prejudice, meaning Rattanavong cannot refile this same claim. The court found that the 1998 removal order was genuine and still in effect, because the 2001 document Rattanavong cited vacated only civil document fraud penalty orders — not the removal order itself — and therefore Rattanavong remains subject to a final order of removal that makes him ineligible for First Step Act time credits under federal law.
The detailed version
- Rattanavong v. Warden FCI Sandstone, File No. 25-CV-01003 (JMB/LIB), United States District Court, District of Minnesota
- Jeffrey M. Bryan, United States District Judge
- July 23, 2025
Background
Petitioner Buon Rattanavong is serving a 240-month sentence at FCI Sandstone, Minnesota, following a conviction in the Western District of Missouri for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine (United States v. Vong, No. 06-CR-0408). His projected release date is May 2026. He filed a pro se (self-represented) petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which allows federal prisoners to challenge the execution of their sentences.
The Claim
Rattanavong sought application of First Step Act time credits (FTCs) — earned-time credits that federal prisoners can accumulate through participation in approved programs and that can be applied to reduce the time they must serve in custody. The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) refused to apply FTCs to his sentence on the ground that Rattanavong is subject to a final order of removal under immigration law. Rattanavong argued that because Laos (his country of origin) does not have a deportation treaty with the United States, the removal order is effectively unenforceable and should not bar application of his FTCs.
Magistrate Judge's Recommendation
United States Magistrate Judge Leo I. Brisbois issued a Report and Recommendation (R&R) on April 3, 2025, recommending dismissal of the petition. The R&R concluded that 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(E)(i) — which expressly provides that a prisoner 'is ineligible to apply time credits . . . if the prisoner is the subject of a final order of removal under any provision of the immigration laws of the Immigration and Nationality Act' — renders Rattanavong categorically ineligible for FTCs. The R&R further found that the statute contains no exception for prisoners whose countries of origin lack removal treaties with the United States.
Rattanavong's Objections
1. Evidentiary objection: Rattanavong argued the record before the magistrate judge contained insufficient evidence establishing that he was subject to a removal order, and that the magistrate judge should have required the government to produce such documentation before issuing the R&R. 2. Vacatur objection: Rattanavong argued that a 2001 filing in his immigration proceedings vacated any prior removal orders, citing a document at Doc. No. 10-1.
Court's Analysis
The court conducted de novo (independent, from the beginning) review of the portions of the R&R to which Rattanavong objected, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and applicable procedural rules. The court also applied the principle that filings by self-represented litigants are construed liberally.
Objection 1 — Evidentiary sufficiency: In response to Rattanavong's objection, the government submitted supplemental evidence: (a) a BOP case manager declaration attaching a December 1998 immigration court order signed by an Immigration Judge directing Rattanavong's removal from the United States, and (b) a declaration from United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Supervisory Detention and Deportation Officer Peter Fellenz averring that the December 1998 order is a true and correct copy of the removal order. The court held that local rules permit consideration of supplemental record evidence during de novo review of an R&R and that no legal authority required the magistrate judge to compel production before issuing the R&R. The court found the December 1998 order to be a valid final order of removal, overruling this objection.
Objection 2 — Vacatur: Fellenz's declaration explained that the 2001 notice of vacatur filed by Rattanavong vacated only '274C Orders' — penalty orders issued when an immigration judge finds a person engaged in document fraud — and did not affect the December 1998 removal order, which was issued at the conclusion of removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. The face of the vacatur document itself confirmed that it applied only to orders arising from 'the Service's implementation of the civil document fraud provisions of section 374C of the Immigration and Nationality Act,' not to removal orders. The court concluded that the evidence compelled only one conclusion: Rattanavong remains subject to a final order of removal.
Legal Conclusion: Because Rattanavong is subject to a final order of removal, the court agreed with the magistrate judge that 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(E)(i) renders him categorically ineligible for First Step Act time credits. The court noted that Rattanavong did not object to — and thus did not contest — the magistrate judge's legal interpretation of § 3632(d)(4)(E)(i), nor did he offer any legal authority supporting his theory that the absence of a deportation treaty creates an exception to the statute.
Disposition
The court overruled Rattanavong's objections, adopted the R&R, and dismissed the petition with prejudice (barring refiling of the same claim). Judgment was ordered entered accordingly.
Reviewer note from the AI+
Read the full 5-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.