Pyron v. Johnston
- Jeffrey Bryan
- 0:24-cv-04051
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 22
In Pyron v. Johnston, Judge Jeffrey M. Bryan dismissed all claims brought by four self-represented civilly committed sex offenders who alleged that restrictions on their use of JPay entertainment devices at the Minnesota Sex Offender Program violated their constitutional rights under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
Individuals civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP) who use or wish to use JPay entertainment devices and services, and potentially other civilly committed persons who bring constitutional claims about institutional restrictions on electronic devices and communications.
What happened
In Pyron v. Johnston, four men civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP) in Moose Lake, Minnesota — Allen L. Pyron, Raymond L. Semler, Joe Bellanger, and Thomas Bolter — sued several MSOP officials and JPay LLC, a private company that provides pay-to-play entertainment devices and services to people in institutions. The plaintiffs complained that MSOP's policies restricted their JPay devices in ways that inmates at Minnesota Department of Corrections (DOC) facilities did not face: they could not send or receive two-way emails, could not use newer MP3 player models, could not keep devices they had purchased while at the DOC, and some purchased music content (such as three songs from a Taylor Swift album) was censored. They sought money damages and a court order requiring MSOP to give them the same JPay access that DOC inmates receive.
The court analyzed the claims against the MSOP officials (the 'State Defendants') and against JPay separately. As to the State Defendants sued in their official capacity for money damages, the court found that the Eleventh Amendment — which generally shields states from being sued for money in federal court — barred those claims. As to the State Defendants sued individually, the court found the complaint failed because it did not allege specific unconstitutional actions by each individual defendant; federal civil rights law under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not allow liability based simply on someone's supervisory role. On the remaining official-capacity claims for injunctive relief, the court found no plausible constitutional violation: the First Amendment does not give confined individuals a right to purchase electronic devices of their choosing or to access all email features, and courts have previously found that MSOP's limits on computers and internet access raise no constitutional concern; the one content-based restriction (the blocked Taylor Swift songs) was not a substantial enough burden because the plaintiffs admitted they could buy the full album elsewhere; the Fifth Amendment due process claim failed because that amendment applies only to federal government actions, not state actors; the Fourteenth Amendment due process claims failed because there is no protected property right to possess particular electronics in a treatment facility; and the Equal Protection claim failed because MSOP clients and DOC inmates are not 'similarly situated' groups — they are held under different legal frameworks for different purposes. As to JPay, the court found it is not a government actor and that the plaintiffs' own complaint consistently attributed the restrictive policies to the MSOP, not to JPay, meaning JPay could not be held liable under § 1983.
Judge Jeffrey M. Bryan granted both motions to dismiss — from the State Defendants and from JPay — ending the case. Because all claims were dismissed, the plaintiffs' separate motion for a temporary restraining order to prevent removal of JPay kiosks from the facility was denied as moot (meaning there was no longer a live case to support it). The opinion does not indicate whether the dismissal is with or without prejudice, though the court entered final judgment.
The detailed version
- Pyron v. Johnston, File No. 24-CV-04051 (JMB/ECW), United States District Court, District of Minnesota
- Jeffrey M. Bryan
Parties
- Plaintiffs (self-represented): Allen L. Pyron, Raymond L. Semler, Joe Bellanger, and Thomas Bolter — four individuals civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP) at its Moose Lake, Minnesota facility. - State Defendants: Nancy Johnston (MSOP CEO), Terry Kneisel (Facility Director, Moose Lake), Sue Johnson (Special Services Program Manager), Kevin Moser (former Facility Director), and Dale Stevens (Acquisition Management Specialist/Buyer, Department of Administration), sued in both individual and official capacities. - Private Defendant: JPay LLC, a Florida-based company that provides pay-to-use entertainment and communication devices to people in institutions.
Background
The MSOP is a Minnesota state program that provides sex-offender treatment to individuals civilly committed as sexual psychopathic personalities or sexually dangerous persons, operated under the Minnesota Department of Human Services (now 'Direct Care and Treatment' as of July 1, 2025). Since approximately 2014, MSOP has contracted with JPay to provide MP3-player-style devices enabling pay-to-use services including music, email, e-books, movies, and educational content. The Contract was renewed through approximately 2020.
Plaintiffs alleged MSOP policies restricted their JPay access in four ways: (1) only one-way email (clients could receive email only from pre-approved contacts, not send freely); (2) prohibition on newer MP3 player models using lithium batteries, leaving clients stuck with older models that wear out and cannot be replaced, with funds of approximately $6,000 invested by Pyron and Semler becoming inaccessible; (3) individuals transferring from DOC custody to MSOP (like Bellanger and Bolter) cannot keep their DOC-purchased JPay devices or content and must purchase new MSOP-compliant devices; and (4) some purchased music content is censored (e.g., three of twenty-three songs on a Taylor Swift album are completely blocked). Meanwhile, plaintiffs alleged, DOC inmates receive full JPay functionality including two-way email. Plaintiffs raised these concerns with MSOP officials on numerous occasions without resolution.
Claims
All claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (the federal civil rights statute allowing suits against government actors for constitutional violations). Alleged violations: - First Amendment (freedom of speech and association) - Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause - Fourteenth Amendment substantive and procedural due process - Fifth Amendment due process Plaintiffs sought money damages and injunctive relief (ordering full JPay access comparable to DOC inmates). They also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) to prevent removal of JPay kiosks from the facility.
Legal Standard
The court applied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief. All factual allegations are accepted as true; only claims that are plausible on their face survive. Self-represented parties' pleadings are held to a less stringent standard but the court will not rewrite them or create claims not presented.
Ruling on State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
Eleventh Amendment: The Eleventh Amendment bars federal suits against states (or officials sued in their official capacity) for money damages unless the state waives immunity. Minnesota has not done so. All official-capacity claims for money damages were dismissed on this basis. Official-capacity claims for injunctive (prospective) relief were not barred and proceeded to merits analysis.
Individual-capacity claims — personal involvement: Section 1983 does not allow liability based on supervisory responsibility alone (no vicarious liability). Each defendant must have personally participated in the constitutional violation or failed to train/supervise in a way that caused the violation. The court found: - Johnston: Only alleged to have signed a June 2018 communications notification policy; plaintiffs did not allege this policy itself was unconstitutional, and no other specific wrongdoing was alleged. - Johnson, Kneisel, Moser: Only alleged to have attended meetings where clients raised JPay concerns; no allegations they took any unconstitutional action at or after those meetings or had the ability and obligation to remedy the situation. - Stevens: Alleged to have signed the 2014 JPay contract on behalf of the state; not alleged to have created the MSOP policies limiting client access. All individual-capacity claims dismissed for failure to sufficiently plead personal involvement.
First Amendment (official-capacity injunctive claims): The court applied a four-factor test for institutional restrictions on civilly committed individuals' First Amendment rights: (1) rational relationship to legitimate institutional/therapeutic interests; (2) availability of alternative means to exercise the right; (3) impact of accommodation on the institution; (4) availability of simple alternatives. The court noted that civilly committed persons have greater rights than prisoners but less than free citizens, and restrictions constitute a constitutional violation only if they amount to punishment. - Email/MP3 device restrictions: Court found no First Amendment right to purchase electronic devices of one's choosing. Prior Eighth Circuit and District of Minnesota cases (e.g., Senty-Haugen, Banks v. Jesson) have held MSOP's limits on computers, email, and internet do not raise constitutional concerns. Restrictions on non-lithium devices and DOC-to-MSOP device transfers are content-neutral. Dismissed. - Music censorship (Taylor Swift songs): Court acknowledged this appears content-based and implicates First Amendment protections. However, plaintiffs failed to allege a substantial restriction — their own complaint states they can purchase the full album at Walmart. Court also noted prior approval of MSOP's limits on sexually suggestive content as rationally related to therapeutic and security interests. Dismissed.
Fifth Amendment due process: The Fifth Amendment applies only to the federal government, not state actors. All defendants here are state actors or a private company contracting with the state. Dismissed.
Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process: Requires a protected life, liberty, or property interest. No federal or state law creates a property right for MSOP clients to possess specific electronics or purchased digital content. Dismissed.
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process: Only violated by conduct that 'shocks the conscience' — behavior so brutal and offensive it violates traditional notions of fair play and decency. Plaintiffs alleged no such conduct. Dismissed.
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection: Requires that similarly situated individuals be treated alike. Where no suspect class or fundamental right is involved, rational basis review applies. Court found MSOP clients and DOC inmates are not similarly situated: DOC houses persons serving criminal sentences; MSOP houses and treats civilly committed sex offenders under different legal authority and for different purposes. Court also noted that even if they were similarly situated, plaintiffs alleged no invidious discriminatory purpose — they conceded the restrictions stem from MSOP's therapeutic and security concerns about the specific population it serves. Dismissed.
Ruling on JPay's Motion to Dismiss
Section 1983 liability requires that the defendant be a state actor (government body or official) or fall within a narrow exception for private parties who act jointly with the state. JPay is a private company. The exception applies when: (1) the state delegated a traditionally exclusive government function to the private party; (2) the private party willfully participated in joint activity with the state; or (3) there is pervasive entwinement between the private entity and the state. Merely contracting with the state is not sufficient.
The court found plaintiffs' own complaint consistently attributes all restrictive policies to the MSOP/State Defendants, not to JPay. Plaintiffs alleged that 'JPAY implemented what MSOP Defendants wanted,' and the complaint does not allege JPay directed or designed any of the challenged policies. The allegation that JPay acted 'in conjunction' with the State Defendants was deemed a legal conclusion unsupported by factual allegations. JPay does not control which devices are permissible in which facility. All § 1983 claims against JPay dismissed.
Ruling on TRO Motion
Plaintiffs' TRO motion seeking to prevent removal of JPay kiosks from the MSOP facility was denied as moot because all underlying claims were dismissed.
Final Order
1. State Defendants' and JPay's Motions to Dismiss (Doc. Nos. 57, 74): GRANTED. 2. Plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. Nos. 24, 26): DENIED as moot. Judgment ordered to be entered accordingly.
Reviewer note from the AI+
Read the full 22-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.