Bryant v. Rice
- John Tunheim
- 0:24-cv-03687
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 9
In Bryant v. Rice, Judge Tunheim dismissed with prejudice the claims of three Liberian nationals who argued that the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) used the wrong—and stricter—legal standard when reviewing their applications to adjust immigration status under the Liberian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act.
Liberian nationals who applied or may apply for adjustment of immigration status under the Liberian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act (LRIF) and who have been found inadmissible based on prior fraud or misrepresentation in immigration proceedings. This ruling confirms they must satisfy the stricter waiver standard under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)—showing extreme hardship to a qualifying U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse or parent—rather than the broader humanitarian waiver standard under 8 U.S.C. § 1159(c).
What happened
In Bryant v. Rice (Civil No. 24-3687), three Liberian nationals—Theophilus LC Bryant, Fanta Bamba, and Yei Gbalazeh—applied to adjust their immigration status under the Liberian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act (LRIF), a law that created a pathway to permanent residency for certain Liberians who had lived continuously in the United States since November 20, 2014. USCIS determined that each applicant was inadmissible because they had previously committed fraud or made willful misrepresentations in seeking immigration benefits. USCIS then told the applicants they could seek a waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i), which requires showing that denial of admission would cause 'extreme hardship' to a qualifying U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse or parent. The plaintiffs instead argued that a different, more forgiving waiver provision—8 U.S.C. § 1159(c), which applies in the refugee adjustment context and allows waivers for humanitarian purposes or the public interest—should have been used.
The plaintiffs sued USCIS and its Minneapolis Field Office Director Steven G. Rice, claiming that applying the stricter § 1182(i) standard violated the Administrative Procedure Act (the federal law governing how agencies must act). The central dispute was purely legal: which waiver standard applies to LRIF applicants? The plaintiffs pointed to structural similarities between the LRIF and the refugee adjustment statute, and to legislative statements about the LRIF's humanitarian goals. The government responded that USCIS had used the correct standard, and both sides agreed that resolving this question would decide the entire case.
Judge Tunheim granted the defendants' motion to dismiss and dismissed the case with prejudice, meaning the plaintiffs cannot refile the same claims. The court found that the LRIF is completely silent on waivers and does not reference § 1159 or its waiver provision at all. The court noted that Congress has in the past explicitly incorporated the § 1159(c) waiver standard into other country-specific immigration statutes when it intended that standard to apply, and its failure to do so in the LRIF signals a deliberate choice. The court also observed that other federal courts have upheld the use of § 1182 waivers under similar country-specific statutes. Accordingly, Judge Tunheim concluded that USCIS correctly applied the § 1182(i) waiver standard, and because the plaintiffs' entire case rested on the argument that the wrong standard was used, their claims necessarily failed.
The detailed version
- Bryant v. Rice, Civil No. 24-3687 (JRT/ECW), United States District Court, District of Minnesota
- John R. Tunheim, United States District Judge
- August 4, 2025
Parties
- Plaintiffs: Theophilus LC Bryant, Fanta Bamba, and Yei Gbalazeh, Liberian nationals represented by Wilson Law Group. - Defendants: Steven G. Rice, Field Office Director, Minneapolis District of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), and USCIS itself, represented by the U.S. Department of Justice.
Background and Facts
All three plaintiffs applied for adjustment of status (a process by which a person already in the United States applies to become a lawful permanent resident) under the Liberian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act (LRIF), enacted as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-92. The LRIF allows certain Liberian nationals continuously present in the United States since November 20, 2014, who are otherwise admissible, to apply for adjustment of status. USCIS found each plaintiff inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i)—the provision barring admission to anyone who sought immigration benefits through fraud or willful misrepresentation. USCIS directed each plaintiff to seek a waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i), which requires demonstrating that denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to a qualifying U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse or parent. The plaintiffs instead applied for waivers under 8 U.S.C. § 1159(c), the waiver provision applicable to refugee adjustment of status, which is broader—allowing waivers 'for humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public interest.' USCIS denied all three applications.
Legal Claims
Plaintiffs filed suit under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the federal statute governing agency conduct, arguing that USCIS's application of § 1182(i) rather than § 1159(c) was contrary to law. They sought declaratory relief (a court declaration establishing the correct legal standard). Both sides agreed that the single question of which waiver standard applies was dispositive of the entire case.
Standard of Review
The court applied the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for a motion to dismiss: whether the complaint states a plausible claim for relief, accepting all factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs' favor, but not accepting bare legal conclusions as facts. The court cited Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
Statutory Analysis
The LRIF is silent on which, if any, waiver provision applies to inadmissibility grounds. Because the text does not resolve the question, the court looked to statutory structure and legislative history.
Statutory Structure: Section 1159(c) on its face limits its application to individuals 'seeking adjustment of status under this section'—meaning the refugee adjustment provision—and the LRIF neither incorporates nor cross-references § 1159. The court acknowledged structural similarities between the LRIF and § 1159 (both exempt certain inadmissibility grounds, impose similar eligibility restrictions, and retroactively date lawful status), but found those similarities insufficient to import the § 1159(c) waiver. Critically, Congress has previously incorporated the § 1159(c) standard explicitly into other adjustment statutes—e.g., the Adjustment of Status for Certain Polish and Hungarian Parolees, Pub. L. 104-208—demonstrating it knows how to do so when it intends that result. The court found the omission in the LRIF deliberate. The court also noted that the Ninth Circuit in Bueno-Fernandez v. Mukasey, 273 F. App'x 687 (9th Cir. 2008), held § 1159(c) does not apply under the Cuban Adjustment Act, and that courts in Frech v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 491 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2007) (Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act), and Alexis v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 431 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2005) (Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act), have upheld § 1182 waivers under analogous country-specific statutes, suggesting § 1182 functions as the default where a country-specific statute lacks an express waiver provision.
Legislative History: The court acknowledged the LRIF's humanitarian purpose—providing relief to Liberians who had lived in the United States under temporary protections such as Deferred Enforced Departure (DED), which historically did not impose inadmissibility consequences for fraud. However, the court reasoned that even a humanitarian statute can apply a stricter waiver standard if Congress chose not to include an explicit broader one. The court also noted that the LRIF was intended to create something new—a pathway to permanent residency and citizenship that DED did not offer—rather than merely codify DED. Congress's failure to codify DED's fraud-related inadmissibility exclusion was treated as further evidence of intent to default to the § 1182(i) waiver standard.
Holding
The court held that USCIS correctly applied the § 1182(i) waiver standard to the plaintiffs' LRIF applications. Because the plaintiffs' entire legal theory depended on the applicability of § 1159(c), and the court found no statutory basis for that position, their claims necessarily failed. The court granted defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and dismissed the complaint with prejudice (permanently barring refiling of these same claims).
Order
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Docket No. 11] is GRANTED. The Complaint [Docket No. 1] is DISMISSED with prejudice. Judgment to be entered accordingly.
Reviewer note from the AI+
Read the full 9-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.