Myers v. Itasca County HRA
- John Tunheim
- 0:24-cv-01395
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 7
In Myers v. Itasca County HRA, Judge Tunheim granted summary judgment in favor of the Itasca County Housing and Redevelopment Authority and its employees, ruling that plaintiff Tricia Marie Myers waived her right to an informal hearing before her Section 8 housing vouchers were terminated for drug use when she explicitly stated in writing that she did not need or want such a hearing.
Individuals who receive federally funded Section 8 housing vouchers administered by local housing authorities, particularly those who have been notified of voucher terminations and offered informal hearings. This ruling illustrates that explicitly declining an offered hearing in writing — even while protesting the underlying decision — may constitute a waiver of the right to challenge that termination in court on due process grounds.
What happened
In Myers v. Itasca County HRA, Tricia Marie Myers sued the Itasca County Housing and Redevelopment Authority (HRA) and three of its employees, claiming they violated her constitutional right to due process when they terminated her Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program benefits. The HRA terminated her vouchers in early 2024 after she admitted to illegal drug use following a December 2023 arrest. Myers argued she never had a proper opportunity to challenge that termination before it took effect.
The detailed version
Case: Myers v. Itasca County HRA, Civil No. 24-1395 (JRT/LIB), U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota. Judge: John R. Tunheim, United States District Judge. Decided: August 19, 2025.
Background
Plaintiff Tricia Marie Myers, proceeding pro se (representing herself without an attorney), received Section 8 Housing Choice Vouchers (federally funded housing assistance) administered by the Itasca County Housing and Redevelopment Authority (HRA) beginning in October 2022. The HRA is named along with three employees — Diane Larson, Carrie Schmitz, and Kenda Roddenberg — sued in both their official and individual capacities.
There were two separate termination actions. First, in November 2023, the HRA notified Myers it planned to terminate her vouchers for failing to report increased household income. Myers was offered and accepted an informal hearing on January 9, 2024, which resulted in a settlement: she could keep her vouchers but had to repay excess benefits received.
Second, on January 31, 2024, the HRA notified Myers it was terminating her vouchers effective February 29, 2024, because she had admitted to illegal drug use in a post-Miranda statement (a statement made after being read her legal rights) following a December 2023 arrest. The HRA again offered Myers an informal hearing, with a deadline of February 14, 2024, to request one. On February 9, 2024, Myers wrote a two-page letter protesting the termination but stated, 'I do not need to be heard further on this issue nor do I request an informal hearing.' On February 28, 2024 — after the deadline — Myers wrote again asking for 'a hearing for termination ASAP,' but the HRA did not hold one because the deadline had passed.
Separately, a fire occurred in Myers's unit on January 6, 2024, and her landlord filed an eviction notice five days later citing lease violations. The HRA was not a party to the lease and took no adverse action related to the fire.
Claims
Myers sued under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause (procedural due process — the right to notice and a hearing before the government takes away a protected benefit) and alleged an equal protection violation. She raised three main due process arguments: (1) the hearing officer in the first (income-related) termination proceeding was not neutral/impartial; (2) she never waived her right to a hearing on the drug-use termination; and (3) the HRA separately violated her adult son's due process rights by not providing him individualized notice and a hearing opportunity.
Ruling on Summary Judgment
The court applied the standard that summary judgment is proper when no genuine dispute of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a)).
1. First termination / biased reviewer claim: The court found no evidence supporting Myers's claim that the hearing officer was not neutral. Federal regulations (24 C.F.R. § 982.555(e)(4)(i)) give the HRA broad authority in selecting a reviewer. More importantly, Myers had entered into a settlement agreement resolving that dispute, and the court held she waived her right to seek judicial relief on that termination by signing the settlement.
2. Second termination / waiver of hearing: The court held that Myers's February 9, 2024 letter constituted a clear and explicit waiver of her right to an informal hearing. The letter's subject line read 'Termination of Assistance,' it opened by referencing the notice about termination of her rental assistance, and its content addressed the drug-use termination at issue. The court rejected Myers's argument that the letter referred to her son's matters rather than her own. Because the HRA provided her a proper opportunity to be heard and she declined it, no due process violation occurred. Her later (February 28) request came after the deadline and was not honored.
3. Adult son's due process rights: The court found that federal HUD (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development) regulations require notice and hearing opportunities to be provided to 'a participant family,' not separately to each household member. Myers received that notice and could have raised her son's concerns — and indeed did so in this litigation. No separate due process violation occurred as to the son.
4. Equal protection claim: Dismissed with no analysis because Myers provided no substantive factual or legal basis for it, and the court declined to construct the argument for her.
Additional Motions
Myers had separately sought a preliminary injunction to stop state court criminal proceedings she claimed were retaliation for this lawsuit, which the court had previously denied (Myers v. Itasca Cnty. HRA, No. 24-1395, 2025 WL 1285991 (D. Minn. May 2, 2025)), in part because the state courts were not parties to this case. Myers moved to reconsider that denial; the court denied the reconsideration motion as moot given the grant of summary judgment.
Orders
(1) Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 53] GRANTED. (2) Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider [Docket No. 51] DENIED as moot. Judgment to be entered for Defendants.
Reviewer note from the AI+
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