Court, Explained
U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
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Substantive rulingFiled Aug. 29, 2025

Freeman v. Bisignano

Judge
Shannon Elkins
Docket
0:24-cv-02424
Court
U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
Pages
15
Social SecuritySummary JudgmentEvidence
In one sentence

In Freeman v. Bisignano, Magistrate Judge Shannon G. Elkins denied Kaylee F.'s request to overturn the Social Security Administration's denial of disability insurance benefits, finding that the Administrative Law Judge's decision was supported by substantial evidence and that the jobs identified by the vocational expert were consistent with the plaintiff's assessed functional limitations.

Who this affects

People who have applied for Social Security disability insurance benefits and whose claims were denied, particularly those who challenge the jobs identified by a vocational expert as inconsistent with their assessed functional limitations, and those with vision-related impairments who have not documented the functional impact of those impairments in the administrative record.

What happened

In Freeman v. Bisignano (Case No. 24-cv-2424), Kaylee F. applied for Social Security disability insurance benefits, claiming she was disabled due to PTSD, depression, anxiety and panic attacks, bone spurs, swollen ankles, memory loss, and fear of men. The Social Security Administration denied her claim, and an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) confirmed that denial, finding she retained the ability to perform certain light-work jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy. Kaylee F. then asked the federal district court to reverse that decision.

Kaylee F. made two main arguments. First, she argued that several jobs identified by a vocational expert — including Marking Clerk, Routing Clerk, Photo-Copy Machine Operator, and Document Preparation Clerk — required higher reasoning levels than her assessed functional capacity allowed, making them unsuitable for her. Second, she argued that three of those jobs required frequent near-vision ability, which she said conflicted with her diagnosed glaucomatous optic atrophy (a condition affecting the optic nerve) of her left eye. The Commissioner of Social Security asked the court to affirm the ALJ's decision in full.

Magistrate Judge Shannon G. Elkins rejected both of Kaylee F.'s arguments and affirmed the Commissioner's decision. On the reasoning-level issue, Judge Elkins found that the vocational expert — who holds a master's degree in rehabilitation counseling — had testified based on her professional training and experience that the listed jobs matched Kaylee F.'s functional capacity, and that the ALJ was entitled to rely on that testimony as substantial evidence. On the vision issue, Judge Elkins found that the medical record contained almost no documentation of actual vision problems or limitations, and that without such evidence, the ALJ could not properly include vision-related restrictions in the functional capacity assessment. As a result, the court denied Kaylee F.'s motion for summary judgment, granted the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment, and affirmed the denial of benefits.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Freeman v. Bisignano, Case No. 24-cv-2424 (SGE), United States District Court, District of Minnesota
Judge
Magistrate Judge Shannon G. Elkins (presiding by consent of both parties under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c))
Date
August 29, 2025

Background and Procedural History

Plaintiff Kaylee F. filed for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) under Title II of the Social Security Act on January 5, 2022, alleging an onset of disability on October 4, 2019, with a date last insured (DLI) of March 30, 2020. To succeed on a DIB claim, the plaintiff must show she became disabled on or before the DLI. Her alleged impairments included PTSD, depression with anxiety and panic attacks, bone spurs on her right foot, ankle problems, memory loss, and fear of men.

The Social Security Administration (SSA) denied her claim initially (March 31, 2022) and upon reconsideration (June 23, 2022). An ALJ held a hearing on December 9, 2022, at which both Kaylee F. and Vocational Expert (VE) Pauline Pegram-Wargel testified. On January 5, 2023, the ALJ issued a decision finding Kaylee F. not disabled for the relevant period. The SSA Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ's decision the final agency decision. Kaylee F. then sought review in federal district court.

The ALJ's Five-Step Analysis

The ALJ applied the standard five-step sequential evaluation: - Step 1: The ALJ found Kaylee F. had not engaged in substantial gainful activity during the relevant period. - Step 2: The ALJ found she had numerous severe impairments (a lengthy list including shoulder problems, spinal conditions, hip conditions, foot conditions, eye conditions, asthma, obesity, major depressive disorder, panic disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, PTSD, borderline intellectual functioning, borderline personality disorder, and ADHD, among others). - Step 3: The ALJ found that none of her impairments, individually or in combination, met or equaled the severity of a listed impairment in the Listing of Impairments (20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1). - Step 4 (Residual Functional Capacity / RFC): The ALJ assessed Kaylee F.'s RFC as capable of light work, with significant limitations: no crawling or climbing ladders/ropes/scaffolds; no work in extreme heat, humid environments, at unprotected heights, or around moving mechanical parts; no production-rate-pace work; only occasional interaction with supervisors and coworkers; no interaction with the public; only simple tasks and simple work-related decisions; only occasional adaptation to changes in work routine; and occasional exposure to atmospheric conditions. - Step 5: The ALJ, relying on VE testimony, found that jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy could be performed by someone with Kaylee F.'s RFC. The VE identified light-work jobs (Marking Clerk, DOT 209.587-034; Routing Clerk, DOT 222.687-022; Photo-Copy Machine Operator, DOT 207.685-014) and sedentary jobs (Document Preparation Clerk, DOT 249.587-018; Sorter, DOT 521.687-086; Assembler, DOT 669.687-014). The ALJ found Kaylee F. not disabled.

Plaintiff's Arguments on Appeal

1. Reasoning-Level Conflict: Kaylee F. argued that the first three light-work jobs (Marking Clerk, Routing Clerk, Photo-Copy Machine Operator) carry a Reasoning Level 2 in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) — requiring workers to apply common-sense understanding to carry out 'detailed but uninvolved' instructions and deal with a few concrete variables. The Document Preparation Clerk carries a Reasoning Level 3 — requiring carrying out instructions in written, oral, or diagrammatic form and dealing with 'several concrete variables.' She argued these levels exceeded her RFC, which limited her to simple tasks, simple work-related decisions, and only occasional changes in work routine.

2. Vision/Near Acuity Conflict: Kaylee F. argued that Marking Clerk, Routing Clerk, and Sorter require frequent near acuity (close-up vision), which she claimed was incompatible with her diagnosed glaucomatous optic atrophy of the left eye — a condition the ALJ recognized as a severe impairment.

Court's Legal Standard

Judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) is limited to whether the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole, or whether there was a legal error. Substantial evidence is defined as less than a preponderance but enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the conclusion. The court may not reverse simply because substantial evidence might support a different outcome.

Court's Holdings

On Reasoning Levels: Magistrate Judge Elkins rejected Kaylee F.'s argument. She noted that DOT job descriptions represent maximum requirements for a generic position, not tailored assessments for a specific individual, and that the RFC determination (step four) and the job-identification process (step five) are separate analytical steps with the burden of proof resting on different parties. The VE, who holds a master's degree in Rehabilitation Counseling, acknowledged areas where her testimony departed from the DOT but explained that her professional training and experience supported her conclusions. Under Eighth Circuit precedent (Welsh v. Colvin, 765 F.3d 926, 930 (8th Cir. 2014)), the ALJ was entitled to rely on the VE's testimony as substantial evidence. The court found no legal error in the ALJ's reliance on the VE.

On Vision/Near Acuity: Magistrate Judge Elkins also rejected this argument. The court noted that Kaylee F. raised her vision issues for the first time in briefing to the district court. Although the ALJ listed glaucomatous optic atrophy as a severe impairment at step two, the ALJ found that the medical records did not document findings meeting the relevant Listings. A 2017 referral for glaucoma testing resulted in no diagnosis. There were no further records of testing or treatment for vision problems. Because the record contained essentially no substantive documentation of actual vision limitations affecting Kaylee F.'s ability to work, the ALJ was unable to include vision restrictions in the RFC — a finding the court said was consistent with the principle that a person can have a severe impairment that does not necessarily translate into work-related functional limitations (citing Lacroix v. Barnhart, 465 F.3d 881, 888 n.3 (8th Cir. 2006)). The court found that the ALJ's exclusion of vision-related RFC limitations was supported by substantial evidence.

Disposition - Kaylee F.'s motion for summary judgment: DENIED - Commissioner's motion for summary judgment: GRANTED - Commissioner's final decision (denying DIB benefits): AFFIRMED

Note on 'Dowel Inspector'

Kaylee F.'s brief challenged a job called 'Dowel Inspector,' but that term appeared nowhere in the ALJ's decision or the administrative record. The court disregarded that challenge entirely.

Reviewer note from the AI+
Opinion is clear and complete. The court uses the plaintiff's first name and last initial per District of Minnesota policy; the case caption lists the defendant as 'Frank Bisignano,' which is reflected in the case name used. The judge signed as 'Shannon G. Elkins,' United States Magistrate Judge. One minor note: the opinion references Plaintiff's Brief as both Dkt. 5 and Dkt. 6 in different places (the ordering section cites Dkt. 5, the introduction cites Dkt. 6); this appears to be a minor clerical inconsistency in the opinion itself and does not affect the substantive summary.
The authoritative version

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Freeman v. Bisignano · Court, Explained