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U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
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Substantive rulingFiled Sept. 2, 2025

Keating v. Frederick Debt Management, LLC

Judge
Eric Tostrud
Docket
0:24-cv-03659
Court
U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
Pages
8
Civil RightsMotion to DismissFee PetitionCivil Procedure
In one sentence

In Keating v. Frederick Debt Management, LLC, Judge Tostrud granted plaintiff Maria Keating's motion for default judgment against a debt collector that illegally contacted her directly after knowing she had an attorney, awarding her $6,403 in statutory damages, attorney's fees, and costs — slightly less than the $6,578 she requested.

Who this affects

Consumers who are represented by attorneys in debt collection disputes and have been contacted directly by debt collectors in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act; plaintiffs seeking default judgments against non-appearing defendants; attorneys and paralegals seeking fee awards in FDCPA cases in the District of Minnesota.

What happened

In Keating v. Frederick Debt Management, LLC (File No. 24-cv-3659), Maria Keating sued Frederick Debt Management, LLC, alleging the company violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) — a federal law that limits how debt collectors can contact consumers — and committed the Minnesota tort of intrusion upon seclusion. Keating's attorney had notified Frederick's predecessor company in 2022 that Keating was represented by counsel and disputed a payday lending debt originally owed to Check N' Go. Despite that notice, Frederick repeatedly contacted Keating directly starting in 2023, and sent letters falsely threatening to seek a court judgment and wage garnishment against her — actions the complaint alleges Frederick never intended to pursue and legally could not pursue.

Frederick never responded to the lawsuit or appeared in court, so the Clerk of Court entered a default against the company. When a defendant defaults, the court accepts the factual allegations in the complaint as true and must determine whether those facts support a valid legal claim, then calculate any damages owed. Here, the court found that Frederick's repeated direct communications with Keating — knowing she had an attorney — clearly violated Section 1692c(a)(2) of the FDCPA, which prohibits debt collectors from contacting a consumer directly when they know the consumer is represented by a lawyer on that debt.

Judge Tostrud granted Keating's motion for default judgment and awarded her $6,403. This includes $1,000 in statutory damages (the maximum allowed under the FDCPA for this type of violation), $4,913 in attorney's fees, and $490 in filing costs. The court approved the requested hourly rates for Keating's attorney ($425/hour) and paralegal ($210/hour), but reduced the law clerk's rate from the requested $145/hour to $95/hour — the same rate previously approved for that clerk in another case — because Keating provided no evidence justifying the higher rate. The court also ordered Keating's counsel to mail a copy of the ruling to Frederick by both regular and certified mail.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Keating v. Frederick Debt Management, LLC, No. 24-cv-3659 (ECT/EMB)
Judge
Eric C. Tostrud, United States District Judge
Date
September 2, 2025

Background and Facts (Accepted as True on Default)

Plaintiff Maria Keating, a Minnesota citizen, was the subject of debt collection efforts by Defendant Frederick Debt Management, LLC related to an alleged payday lending debt originating from Check N' Go. In 2022, Keating's counsel notified Frederick's predecessor-in-interest, Serenity Recovery LLC, that Keating was represented by an attorney and disputed the debt. Notwithstanding that notice, beginning in 2023, Frederick repeatedly sent debt collection communications directly to Keating. These communications included false threats — for example, a letter dated October 18, 2023, warned that Frederick would seek a court judgment and wage garnishment if the debt was not paid by October 28, 2023. The complaint alleges that Frederick never sought judgment, never could seek judgment, and never intended to — and similarly never sought or intended to garnish Keating's wages. The false threats were allegedly made to coerce payment.

Frederick was personally served with the summons and complaint on October 29, 2024, but never appeared or responded. The Clerk of Court entered Frederick's default. Frederick also did not appear at the September 2, 2025 hearing on the default judgment motion.

Legal Framework for Default Judgment

The court applied the standard two-step default judgment analysis: (1) determine whether the complaint's factual allegations (taken as true) establish a legitimate cause of action; and (2) ascertain the appropriate amount of damages. A party in default admits well-pleaded facts but not legal conclusions.

Liability Analysis

Keating asserted violations of multiple FDCPA provisions: 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c(a)(2), 1692d, 1692e, 1692e(4), 1692e(5), and 1692f, as well as the Minnesota common-law tort of intrusion upon seclusion. The court found a clear FDCPA violation under § 1692c(a)(2), which prohibits a debt collector from communicating directly with a consumer in connection with debt collection if the debt collector knows the consumer is represented by an attorney regarding that debt and has knowledge of or can readily ascertain the attorney's name and address — unless the attorney fails to respond within a reasonable time or consents to direct contact. The court confirmed Keating qualifies as a "consumer" under 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3) and that Frederick qualifies as a "debt collector" under 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6), citing a parallel case, Kaminski v. Frederick Debt Mgmt., LLC, No. 2:25-cv-80 (S.D. Ohio 2025). The court did not separately analyze the remaining FDCPA provisions or the intrusion upon seclusion tort claim, finding it sufficient to rest liability on § 1692c(a)(2).

Damages

The FDCPA (15 U.S.C. § 1692k) permits recovery of: (a) actual damages; (b) statutory damages up to $1,000; and (c) reasonable attorney's fees and costs. Keating sought only statutory damages, attorney's fees, and costs — no actual damages.

Statutory Damages: The court awarded the full $1,000 statutory maximum.

Attorney's Fees — Lodestar Calculation: The court used the lodestar method (hours reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate).

- Attorney Christopher Wilcox (rate: $425/hour, approved): Fourteen years of practice, extensive consumer law experience including debt collection defense, FDCPA, FCRA, and mortgage servicing; adjunct professor at University of Minnesota Law School (2014–2022); member of National Association of Consumer Advocates; contributing author to Minnesota CLE publications. Two local attorneys submitted supporting declarations attesting to the reasonableness of his rate in the Twin Cities market. The court approved $425/hour, consistent with its prior ruling in Kelly v. United Payment Ctr. Inc., No. 22-cv-1799 (D. Minn. 2023).

- Paralegal Lisa Robertson (rate: $210/hour, approved): 24 years of legal experience; office manager and paralegal at Christensen Sampsel since 2014. The court had previously approved $190/hour for Ms. Robertson in Major v. Halliday Watkins & Mann, P.C., No. 24-cv-1897 (D. Minn. Dec. 27, 2024). The approximately 10% increase was found reasonable.

- Law Clerk (rate: $95/hour, reduced from requested $145/hour): The court had previously approved $95/hour for this same law clerk in Major. Keating argued that the clerk's additional experience and near-completion of law school and bar preparation justified the higher rate, but provided no supporting evidence or authority. The court declined to award more than $95/hour.

Hours: 8.6 attorney hours + 1.8 paralegal hours + 4.0 law clerk hours = 14.4 total hours. The court found this reasonable for an FDCPA matter resolved by early default judgment (including researching and drafting the complaint, client communications, and preparing the default motion). An additional $500 was approved for Mr. Wilcox's time attending the default judgment hearing.

Fee and Cost Calculation: - Attorney fees: 8.6 hrs × $425 = $3,655 - Paralegal fees: 1.8 hrs × $210 = $378 - Law clerk fees: 4.0 hrs × $95 = $380 - Hearing attendance: $500 - Total attorney's fees: $4,913 - Filing costs: $490 - Total fees and costs: $5,403

Note: The court observed that Keating's own submitted numbers appeared to add up to $4,613 in fees rather than the $4,588 she requested, but did not resolve this discrepancy because it was immaterial to the outcome.

Total Award

$1,000 (statutory damages) + $5,403 (fees and costs) = $6,403

Keating had requested $6,578 total. The reduction reflects the lower law clerk rate.

Order

  1. Keating's motion for default judgment [ECF No. 13] is GRANTED.
  2. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter default judgment against Frederick Debt Management, LLC and in favor of Maria Keating in the amount of $6,403.
  3. Plaintiff's counsel is ordered to mail a copy of the Opinion and Order to Frederick at its registered address by both first-class mail and certified mail, return receipt requested.
Reviewer note from the AI+
The topics tag 'motion-to-dismiss' is not ideal here — this is a default judgment ruling, not a motion to dismiss. However, there is no 'default-judgment' tag in the permitted vocabulary. The closest available tags were used. Consider requesting addition of a 'default-judgment' tag to the vocabulary. Also, the court did not separately analyze most of the FDCPA provisions alleged or the intrusion upon seclusion claim; the opinion rests liability solely on § 1692c(a)(2). This is accurately reflected in the summary.
The authoritative version

Read the full 8-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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Keating v. Frederick Debt Management, LLC · Court, Explained