Bakambia v. Ghebre

Case: Bakambia v. Ghebre, No. 24-cv-3653 (LMP/DJF), U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota. Decided September 3, 2025, by U.S. District Judge Laura M. Provinzino, adopting the May 23, 2025 Report and Recommendation (R&R) of Magistrate Judge Dulce J. Foster.

Background Plaintiff Marc Amouri Bakambia is a prisoner at the Minnesota Correctional Facility in Stillwater (MCF-Stillwater). He filed a pro se complaint (meaning he represented himself without a lawyer) against two groups of defendants: (1) the 'DOC Defendants,' who are employees of the Minnesota Department of Corrections, including the Commissioner of Corrections Paul Schnell, Warden William Bolin, medical personnel, correctional officers, and administrative staff; and (2) the 'Centurion Defendants' — Genet Ghebre, Stephen Craane, and Louis Shicker — employees of Centurion, a private Texas company that contracts with the DOC to provide prisoner medical services. Bakambia alleged: (1) deliberate indifference to his chronic health conditions in violation of the Eighth Amendment; (2) First Amendment retaliation for prior lawsuits he had filed; (3) excessive force; (4) procedural due process violations under the Fourteenth Amendment; and (5) violations of the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act.

Both groups of defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which allows dismissal when a complaint fails to state a legally sufficient claim. Magistrate Judge Foster issued an R&R recommending that all claims be dismissed except Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims against Reid, Oliveras, and Oberembt. Bakambia timely objected, triggering de novo review (independent, fresh review) by Judge Provinzino of the objected-to portions.

Objection 1: Meet-and-Confer Statement Bakambia argued that counsel for the Centurion Defendants committed fraud by stating in a required pre-filing conference statement that he had attempted to contact Bakambia by letter before filing the motion. Bakambia said he never received the letter. The court found this objection inconsequential because Bakambia did not explain how taking 'judicial notice' of this dispute would have changed the outcome of the motion to dismiss. The court also noted that Bakambia himself had raised mail delay issues at MCF-Stillwater, which the court had previously cited when granting him an extension of time. Objection overruled.

Objection 2: Centurion Defendants Allegedly Failed to Address All Claims Bakambia argued that the Centurion Defendants' motion to dismiss should have been denied because they did not rebut every factual allegation in his complaint, relying on Kelsey v. Ewing, 652 F.2d 4 (8th Cir. 1981). The court rejected this argument on two grounds: (1) Bakambia did not identify which specific claims were left unaddressed; and (2) Kelsey involved a motion for summary judgment (a different procedural mechanism requiring rebuttal of material facts), not a motion to dismiss. On a motion to dismiss, the defendants are not obligated to rebut each allegation — rather, it is the plaintiff's burden to show that the complaint states a plausible claim even accepting all factual allegations as true. Objection overruled.

Objection 3: 'Normalizing' Fraudulent Conduct Bakambia argued that Magistrate Judge Foster improperly 'normalized' allegedly false medical records and incident reports. The court found this objection too vague to evaluate, as Bakambia did not explain what error was made or how any different treatment would change the result. Objection overruled.

Objection 4: Conspiracy and First Amendment Retaliation Claims

Conspiracy (42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)): To state a claim under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must allege: (1) the existence of a conspiracy; (2) its purpose was to deprive him of equal protection of the laws; (3) an overt act in furtherance; (4) resulting injury; and (5) class-based discriminatory animus. Additionally, under the intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine, employees of the same governmental entity acting within the scope of their employment cannot conspire with each other as a matter of law. The court upheld Magistrate Judge Foster's conclusion that Bakambia failed to allege any particularized agreement among most defendants, and that to the extent an agreement among Reid, Renstrom, and Corrado could be inferred, the intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine barred the claim. The court also found no allegation of class-based discriminatory motive. Bakambia's argument that claims should have been analyzed under § 1983 rather than § 1985(3) was deemed forfeited because he did not raise it before the magistrate judge.

First Amendment Retaliation: To state a First Amendment retaliation claim, a prisoner must allege: (1) engagement in constitutionally protected activity; (2) an adverse action that would deter a person of ordinary firmness; and (3) retaliatory motive. Under Eighth Circuit precedent, if a disciplinary decision is supported by 'some evidence' that the prisoner actually committed the rule violation, a retaliatory discipline claim fails. Here, Bakambia's own exhibits included a witness account from Cerney describing his disorderly behavior and a 'Waiver of Hearing' form that Bakambia signed, admitting to the violation and waiving all procedural rights including appeal. These provided 'some evidence' that Bakambia actually committed the disorderly conduct violation, defeating his retaliation claim. The court also found no factual allegations connecting any defendant's actions to retaliatory animus from prior litigation. Objection overruled.

Objection 5: Due Process Claims Bakambia argued that his Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights were violated because he was denied the right to call witnesses and present exculpatory evidence at his disciplinary hearing. The court upheld dismissal on two independent grounds: First, prisoners do not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in being free from placement in administrative segregation, nor in having prison officials follow their own regulations. Second, Bakambia's signed 'Waiver of Hearing' admitted to the violation and expressly waived all procedural rights. The court also noted that under Eighth Circuit precedent, prisoners placed in administrative segregation are not constitutionally entitled to call witnesses or have an evidentiary hearing — only informal, nonadversary procedures are required. Bakambia's conclusory allegation that Warner was not impartial was not credited because conclusory allegations are not presumed true under the motion to dismiss standard. Objection overruled.

Objection 6: Use of Force Claims Bakambia argued that Magistrate Judge Foster erroneously reframed his 'misuse of force' and 'aiding and abetting misuse of force' claims as Eighth Amendment 'excessive force' claims, applying a higher legal standard. The court found no error. Courts have an obligation to construe pro se complaints within the proper legal framework, and Bakambia cited no authority establishing a different standard or explaining what the correct standard should be. Objection overruled.

Objection 7: Constitutionality of DOC Disciplinary Policy Bakambia argued that Magistrate Judge Foster failed to address his claim that the DOC's disciplinary policy (Policy 303.010) was unconstitutional because it allowed his charge to be classified as 'minor,' which denied him the right to counsel and to call witnesses. The court found this argument meritless: the Eighth Circuit has clearly held that administrative segregation requires only informal, nonadversary procedures — prisoners have no constitutional right to call witnesses or have legal representation at such hearings. Furthermore, Bakambia's signed waiver demonstrated he received all the process he was constitutionally due. Objection overruled.