Wiley v. Fleet Farm LLC

CASE: Wiley v. Fleet Farm LLC, No. 24-cv-4135 (LMP/JFD), U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota. JUDGE: Laura M. Provinzino, United States District Judge. DECIDED: September 9, 2025.

BACKGROUND: On October 10, 2021, Devondre Trevon Phillips and Terry Brown exchanged gunfire inside Truck Yard – SP LLC's bar in downtown St. Paul, Minnesota. Numerous patrons were injured by stray bullets; Marquisha Wiley was killed. Phillips and Brown were later convicted in Minnesota state court and sentenced to 346 and 441 months in prison, respectively.

Plaintiffs — the injured patrons and Marquisha Wiley's co-trustees — brought Minnesota state-law negligence claims against two categories of defendants: (1) Fleet Farm LLC, Fleet Farm Group LLC, and Fleet Farm Wholesale Supply Co. LLC (collectively 'Fleet Farm'), a federally licensed retail firearms chain; and (2) Truck Yard – SP LLC ('Truck Yard'), the bar's owner. Defendants removed the case to federal court and each moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

AGAINST FLEET FARM: Plaintiffs alleged that Fleet Farm sold 24 firearms to Jerome Horton ('Horton') over five months (June–October 2021), despite multiple red flags indicating he was a straw purchaser (someone who buys a gun on another's behalf while falsely claiming it is for themselves). Red flags included: multi-gun purchases on the same day (often 9mm handguns), staggered purchases at different Twin Cities Fleet Farm locations, and Horton photographing or videotaping firearms during purchases — behavior consistent with communicating with the true intended recipients. Horton transferred one firearm purchased on July 31, 2021, to Gabriel Young-Duncan, who passed it to Phillips. Both Horton and Young-Duncan later pleaded guilty to federal felony firearms charges. Plaintiffs brought three claims: Count II (negligence), Count III (negligence per se), and Count IV (negligent entrustment).

AGAINST TRUCK YARD: Plaintiffs alleged that Truck Yard created a dangerously raucous atmosphere by advertising DJ events on weekends that drew large, rowdy crowds. In the year before the shooting, police were called to the bar repeatedly for violent incidents. Two days before the shooting, Ramsey County Sheriff Bob Fletcher posted a YouTube video publicly predicting that gun violence at Truck Yard's bar was imminent given the crowd volume. Plaintiffs alleged Truck Yard negligently failed to provide adequate security, screen patrons for weapons, warn of danger, or ban firearms.

JURISDICTION:

Over Fleet Farm: The court found federal-question jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1331) even though the claims sound in state-law negligence, because resolving them necessarily requires construing federal firearms laws and regulations. Applying the four-part test from Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251 (2013): (1) federal law was necessarily raised because Fleet Farm's duty of care is framed almost entirely by federal statutes and ATF regulations governing licensed dealers; (2) the federal issues were actually disputed; (3) the issues were substantial to the federal system as a whole, given Congress's expressed intent to impose national uniformity in firearms regulation; and (4) exercising federal jurisdiction was consistent with the congressional division of labor between state and federal courts. The court cited and agreed with Minnesota v. Fleet Farm LLC, 679 F. Supp. 3d 825 (D. Minn. 2023) (Tunheim, J.), which reached the same conclusion in related litigation.

Over Truck Yard: No federal-question jurisdiction exists because Truck Yard's claim involves no federal law. The court found supplemental jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1367) appropriate because, while the factual predicates for each defendant's liability differ, both defendants' conduct allegedly combined to produce a single, indivisible injury to plaintiffs. Relying on analogies to Fiegler v. Tidex Inc., 826 F.2d 1435 (5th Cir. 1987) (two geographically separate accidents causing single back injury), and Zuchowski v. Alpena Public Schools, 2018 WL 1947277 (E.D. Mich. 2018) (school and landlord each contributing to teenager's death), the court concluded there was a 'discernable overlap' of operative facts sufficient to warrant supplemental jurisdiction. The court also declined to exercise its discretion to remand, finding judicial economy, convenience, and fairness favored keeping all claims in one forum, and that the Truck Yard claim did not raise a novel state-law issue (because plaintiffs disclaimed reliance on an unsettled 'negligent security' cause of action and instead relied on established negligence theories).

PLCAA PREEMPTION (applicable to Fleet Farm only):

The Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901–7903, generally preempts civil actions against firearms dealers for harm caused by criminal misuse of firearms by third parties. The court first addressed whether PLCAA preemption is analyzed claim-by-claim or action-wide, and adopted the claim-specific framework: each cause of action must independently satisfy an exception to PLCAA preemption. The court reasoned that PLCAA's text uses 'action' to mean 'cause of action,' that PLCAA's own exceptions enumerate specific causes of action, and that an action-wide framework would allow impermissible 'claim-smuggling.'

Count II (Negligence) — NOT PREEMPTED: The court held plaintiffs adequately invoked the 'predicate exception,' 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(iii), which allows suits when a seller 'knowingly violated a State or Federal statute applicable to the sale or marketing of the product' and the violation proximately caused the harm. Plaintiffs alleged Fleet Farm knowingly violated federal and state laws prohibiting sales to straw purchasers (including 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(d), 933(a)(1)), supported by specific red-flag allegations providing plausible circumstantial evidence of knowledge. The predicate statute must regulate the firearms industry specifically — which the cited laws clearly do. The court rejected Fleet Farm's argument that simple negligence claims are categorically preempted, citing legislative history from PLCAA's co-sponsors.

Count III (Negligence Per Se) — NOT PREEMPTED: Fleet Farm did not assert that this count was preempted, so preemption analysis did not apply to it.

Count IV (Negligent Entrustment) — PREEMPTED AND DISMISSED: PLCAA exempts 'negligent entrustment' claims, but defines the term narrowly to require that the seller supplied a firearm to a person who 'uses the product in a manner involving unreasonable risk of physical injury.' 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(B). The court found the word 'use' ambiguous as applied to a straw purchaser who transfers (rather than directly fires) the gun. Examining legislative history — specifically, the concerns raised by dissenting House committee members that PLCAA would close the courthouse door for victims of straw-purchase-facilitated shootings, which concerns supporters dismissed — the court concluded Congress intended 'use' to require that the direct buyer personally use the gun in a harmful way. Because Horton (the buyer) did not shoot anyone, Count IV is preempted and dismissed without prejudice.

AIDING-AND-ABETTING THEORY (PLCAA): Plaintiffs premised their negligence and negligence-per-se claims partly on Fleet Farm aiding and abetting Horton's unlicensed firearms distribution. The court rejected Fleet Farm's argument that only the specific forms of aiding-and-abetting listed in the predicate exception are permissible, holding that the word 'including' in 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(iii) signals non-exhaustive examples. The court then applied Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 605 U.S. 280 (2025), which held that aiding-and-abetting a gun-sale violation can satisfy the predicate exception but requires an affirmative act, intent to facilitate the offense, and specific (not generalized) allegations. The court distinguished Smith & Wesson (where Mexico's complaint was too vague, alleged no specific transactions, and involved manufacturers selling through middlemen) because here plaintiffs identified 24 specific transactions with dates, locations, firearm types, and serial numbers, a single named offender (Horton), and specific statutory violations — and Fleet Farm sold directly to Horton. This theory survives.

SUFFICIENCY OF FLEET FARM CLAIMS:

Count II (Negligence): Under Minnesota law, plaintiffs must plead duty, breach, injury, and proximate cause. — Duty: A defendant who creates a 'dangerous situation' owes a duty to prevent foreseeable harm. Domagala v. Rolland, 805 N.W.2d 14 (Minn. 2011). Selling firearms to a known straw purchaser creates a dangerous situation; Congress itself recognized that straw purchasing is the leading channel for 'crime guns' in urban communities. — Breach: Most of the alleged statutory and regulatory violations were adequately pleaded. However, plaintiffs may not premise negligence on 27 C.F.R. § 478.124(c)(1) (requiring dealers to obtain ATF Form 4473) because plaintiffs never alleged Fleet Farm failed to obtain the form — only that it was falsely completed. — Proximate Cause: Fleet Farm's sale to Horton was sufficiently alleged as a proximate cause. Although criminal acts generally break the chain of causation, an intervening criminal act does not do so if it was reasonably foreseeable. Here, the firearm was purchased at a Fleet Farm in Blaine and used in a shooting less than 20 miles away in St. Paul just over two months later, consistent with ATF's own red-flag guidance about short windows between purchase and crime. The court declined to resolve proximate cause as a matter of law, finding reasonable minds could disagree. Count II survives.

Count III (Negligence Per Se): A negligence-per-se claim substitutes a statutory standard for the ordinary reasonable-person standard; the plaintiff must be among those the statute sought to protect and must have suffered the type of harm the statute was designed to prevent. Fleet Farm argued that gun-control statutes protect 'the public at large' and thus cannot ground a negligence-per-se claim under Kronzer v. First National Bank of Minneapolis, 235 N.W.2d 187 (Minn. 1975). The court found a controlling older precedent directly on point: Anderson v. Settergren, 111 N.W. 279 (Minn. 1907), in which the Minnesota Supreme Court allowed a negligence-per-se claim based on a firearms statute, holding that legislatures typically intend gun-control laws to protect both the public and private individuals. Settergren has never been overruled. The court also rejected Fleet Farm's argument that the cited statutes must provide a private right of action — Minnesota law expressly permits negligence-per-se claims premised on statutes that do not create private rights of action. Count III survives.

Aiding-and-Abetting (Civil, State Law): Under Minnesota civil aiding-and-abetting law (Witzman v. Lehrman, 601 N.W.2d 179 (Minn. 1999)), plaintiffs must show (1) a primary tortfeasor committed a tort causing plaintiff's injury, (2) the defendant knew the primary tortfeasor's conduct was a breach of duty, and (3) the defendant substantially assisted or encouraged the breach. The court found all elements adequately pleaded: the red-flag allegations plausibly establish Fleet Farm's knowledge of Horton's wrongful conduct (not merely awareness of 'red flags,' but notice of actual wrongdoing); and selling firearms directly to a known straw purchaser constitutes substantial assistance. The court rejected application of the stricter 'routine professional services' standard (applicable to attorneys, accountants, bankers) to retail firearms sales.

TRUCK YARD NEGLIGENCE:

The court analyzed four theories of duty:

(1) Innkeeper Liability — DISMISSED: Under Boone v. Martinez, 567 N.W.2d 508 (Minn. 1997), innkeeper liability requires the proprietor to have had notice of the specific offending party's dangerous propensities. Plaintiffs alleged only general notice that violence might occur at the bar, not specific knowledge of Phillips's or Brown's propensities. This theory fails as a matter of law.

(2) Premises Liability — DISMISSED: Plaintiffs did not identify a distinct duty under premises liability that differs from the duty already addressed under innkeeper liability, and cited no authority allowing both theories to coexist.

(3) Voluntary Assumption of Duty — DISMISSED: Plaintiffs alleged that by hiring security, Truck Yard assumed a duty to provide adequate security. The court, relying on Robb v. Funorama, Inc., 2005 WL 1331265 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005), held that hiring security does not by itself create a duty of care, because such a rule would perversely deter businesses from implementing security measures. Plaintiffs made no allegations that Truck Yard made specific security representations on which plaintiffs relied and in reliance on which they refrained from self-protective action, which Robb suggested might be sufficient.

(4) 'Own Conduct' Theory — SURVIVES: Under Domagala v. Rolland and Fenrich v. Blake School, 920 N.W.2d 195 (Minn. 2018), a defendant who engages in misfeasance (active misconduct creating positive injury) — as opposed to nonfeasance (failure to act) — owes a duty of reasonable care to prevent foreseeable harm. The court found plaintiffs plausibly alleged misfeasance: Truck Yard actively promoted a raucous, late-night party atmosphere by advertising and hiring DJs, drawing large uncontrollable crowds. This is distinct from mere failure to act. Foreseeability was also adequately alleged: police were called to the bar multiple times in the prior year, and Sheriff Fletcher publicly predicted a shooting two days before it occurred. Whether Truck Yard failed to exercise reasonable care in managing the risk it created (including through inadequate security measures) is a question for the jury. The court noted that Truck Yard's argument that all bars have boisterous atmospheres is a jury argument, not grounds for dismissal.

DISPOSITION: 1. Fleet Farm's Motion to Dismiss: GRANTED IN PART as to Count IV (negligent entrustment), DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; DENIED as to Counts II and III and the aiding-and-abetting theory. 2. Truck Yard's Motion to Dismiss: DENIED (negligence claim proceeds on 'own conduct' theory only; innkeeper liability, premises liability, and voluntary assumption of duty theories dismissed).