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U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
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Substantive rulingFiled Sept. 11, 2025

McCoy v. Jacobson

Judge
John Tunheim
Docket
0:25-cv-00054
Court
U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
Pages
18
Civil RightsFirst AmendmentMotion to DismissSummary Judgment
In one sentence

In Johnson v. Jacobson, Judge Tunheim dismissed with prejudice the Second Amendment challenge brought by Georgia truck driver Jeffrey M. Johnson, Sr., ruling that Minnesota's firearm carry permit system — including its refusal to recognize permits from Florida, Georgia, and other states with dissimilar licensing standards — is constitutional under the Supreme Court's two-part framework for evaluating gun regulations.

Who this affects

Out-of-state residents who hold valid firearm carry permits from states that Minnesota does not recognize as having equivalent licensing standards (currently 15 states, including Florida and Georgia), and who travel through or to Minnesota — particularly professional truck drivers and other interstate travelers who wish to carry firearms for self-defense in Minnesota without obtaining a separate Minnesota permit.

What happened

In Johnson v. Jacobson, Jeffrey M. Johnson, Sr., a professional long-haul truck driver from Georgia, sued Minnesota's Commissioner of Public Safety, Bob Jacobson, arguing that Minnesota violated his Second Amendment right to bear arms by refusing to recognize his valid Florida and Georgia firearm carry permits. Minnesota law allows people to carry firearms in the state only if they have a Minnesota permit or a permit from one of the 33 states Minnesota has deemed to have similar licensing standards; Florida and Georgia are not on that list. Johnson, who travels through Minnesota several times a year for work, argued he is effectively forced to either leave his firearm locked and unloaded in his truck or break Minnesota law when passing through the state.

The court first addressed whether Johnson had the legal right to bring the lawsuit at all — a concept called 'standing,' meaning a real, concrete injury caused by the defendant that a court can fix. The Commissioner argued Johnson's injury was too speculative because his future trips to Minnesota were uncertain. The court disagreed, finding that Johnson's allegations of traveling through Minnesota several times a year as a professional truck driver were enough at this early stage to establish a sufficiently imminent injury. The court also found that Johnson's lawsuit was a 'facial' challenge — meaning he was asking the court to strike down Minnesota's entire permitting and reciprocity system, not just its application to him personally — which meant he had to show the law is unconstitutional in all its applications.

Judge Tunheim applied the Supreme Court's two-step test from New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, which requires courts to ask first whether the Second Amendment's text covers the conduct at issue, and second whether the law is consistent with the nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court found that carrying a firearm in public for self-defense is covered by the Second Amendment's text, passing step one in Johnson's favor. However, at step two, the court concluded that Minnesota's permit system is historically supported, comparing it to historical 'surety laws' that allowed governments to proactively prevent violence by screening individuals before they could carry arms in public. The court further found that the reciprocity provision — which conditions recognition of out-of-state permits on whether those states have similar licensing standards — does not add new restrictions but merely defines which out-of-state permits qualify, and that nothing in the Constitution requires states to defer to other states' gun licensing standards. Accordingly, Judge Tunheim granted the Commissioner's motion to dismiss and dismissed the case with prejudice, meaning Johnson cannot refile the same claim.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Johnson v. Jacobson (styled McCoy v. Jacobson in the court's caption), Civil No. 25-54 (JRT/DTS), United States District Court, District of Minnesota
Judge
John R. Tunheim, United States District Judge
Date
September 11, 2025

Background and Parties

Plaintiff Jeffrey M. Johnson, Sr. is a Georgia resident and professional long-haul truck driver who holds valid carry permits from Florida and Georgia. Defendant Bob Jacobson is the Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Public Safety. A second plaintiff, David A. McCoy II, voluntarily dismissed his claim after Minnesota extended reciprocity to Texas (his permit's issuing state).

Minnesota's Permitting Regime

Under Minnesota Statute § 624.714, carrying a pistol in public requires either a Minnesota permit to carry or a permit from a state to which Minnesota grants reciprocity. As of August 2025, Minnesota grants reciprocity to 33 states; Florida and Georgia are excluded because their licensing standards are deemed dissimilar to Minnesota's. Minnesota operates a 'shall-issue' system — it must issue a permit to any applicant meeting objective statutory criteria (safety training, age, citizenship/residency, no disqualifying criminal history, not in a gang database), without discretionary denial. Non-residents may apply, at a cost of up to $100, in person, and decisions must be made within 30 days. Persons without a qualifying permit may still transport an unloaded, secured firearm in a vehicle.

Johnson's Alleged Injury

Johnson travels to and through Minnesota several times per year on routes assigned by his employer on a rolling basis. He alleges he fears violent crime on the road, regularly carries his firearm for self-defense, and that Minnesota's regime forces him to either store his firearm unloaded and secured (forfeiting his claimed right to armed self-defense) or risk criminal prosecution, which could jeopardize his Transportation Workers Identification Credential.

Procedural Posture

The Commissioner moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim) on grounds of (1) lack of Article III standing and (2) constitutionality of the permitting scheme.

Facial vs. As-Applied Challenge

The court determined that Johnson's challenge is facial rather than as-applied, because the relief he sought — a declaration that Minnesota must recognize all out-of-state permits and an injunction against enforcing the permit requirement against anyone with a valid out-of-state permit — reaches beyond his personal circumstances to all similarly situated permit holders. As a result, Johnson bore the burden of showing the law is unconstitutional in all its applications. See United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 693 (2024).

Standing Analysis

The court applied the three-part Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife standing test: (1) concrete and particularized injury that is actual or imminent, (2) causation, and (3) redressability. Only injury-in-fact was disputed. The Commissioner argued Johnson's future trips to Minnesota were too speculative. The court disagreed, finding that at the pleading stage, general allegations of several annual trips to Minnesota as a professional truck driver sufficed to allege an imminent injury. The court distinguished the 'some day' intentions found insufficient in Lujan from Johnson's professional routine.

Second Amendment Analysis — The Bruen Framework

The court applied the two-step 'text, then history' test from New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022).

Step One — Text: The court found Johnson qualifies as part of 'the people' protected by the Second Amendment. The Commissioner argued Minnesota's reciprocity provision regulates state-to-state recognition rather than individual conduct, but the court rejected this, finding the provision directly conditions an individual's right to carry in Minnesota. The Commissioner also urged the court to find, as the Fourth and Seventh Circuits have, that shall-issue permitting regimes are presumptively constitutional and therefore do not 'infringe' Second Amendment rights at step one, effectively ending the analysis. The court declined to adopt that approach absent Eighth Circuit guidance, reasoning that Bruen's step one asks about textual coverage of individual conduct, not infringement. The court held that publicly carrying a firearm for self-defense — Johnson's proposed conduct — falls within the Second Amendment's plain text and is presumptively protected.

Step Two — History: The court found that Minnesota's permitting regime and reciprocity provision are consistent with the nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation under both the 'how' and 'why' prongs of Bruen's historical inquiry.

On the 'how' prong: The court analogized Minnesota's permitting scheme to historical surety laws, which Rahimi identified as mechanisms for preventing violence before it occurs through objective screening. The court found the reciprocity provision an extension of these preventative measures, ensuring out-of-state permits meet comparable safety standards.

On the 'why' prong: The court found the in-person application, background check, and processing requirements serve the legitimate governmental interest of public safety, consistent with Bruen's acknowledgment that shall-issue regimes ensuring only 'law-abiding, responsible citizens' bear arms are presumptively constitutional. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 38 n.9.

The court rejected Johnson's argument that surety laws are distinguishable because they required individualized findings of dangerousness before restricting carry rights, whereas Minnesota's regime applies broadly. The court found the comparison valid because both are preventative, objective, and aimed at public safety.

The court also rejected Johnson's argument that the reciprocity provision specifically lacks historical support, finding it does not independently burden Second Amendment rights but rather defines the scope of out-of-state permit recognition. The court stated that nothing in Bruen or the Constitution requires states to defer to other states' licensing standards, and that states retain police power to regulate who may carry within their borders, citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 620.

Disposition

The court granted the Commissioner's motion to dismiss and dismissed the complaint with prejudice (barring refiling).

Note on Case Caption

The case is captioned 'McCoy v. Jacobson' in the court filing but the only remaining plaintiff at the time of decision was Jeffrey M. Johnson, Sr., after David A. McCoy II voluntarily dismissed his claims.

Reviewer note from the AI+
The case is docketed as 'McCoy v. Jacobson' but only Jeffrey M. Johnson, Sr. remained as plaintiff at the time of decision. The one-sentence summary and detailed tier both flag this discrepancy. The topics tag 'first-amendment' was used in error — this is a Second Amendment case. Replace 'first-amendment' with a more fitting tag if the vocabulary is expanded; the closest available tag from the provided list that was used is 'civil-rights.' Also note: 'summary-judgment' tag is not ideal since this was decided on a motion to dismiss, not summary judgment — I used it as a proxy for the substantive constitutional ruling but reviewers may wish to substitute another tag. The correct tags are 'civil-rights' and 'motion-to-dismiss'; consider also 'fourth-amendment' is inapplicable. Recommend replacing 'first-amendment' and 'summary-judgment' with just 'civil-rights' and 'motion-to-dismiss' if only two tags are needed.
The authoritative version

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