Rud v. Johnston
- John Tunheim
- 0:23-cv-00486
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 19
In Rud v. Johnston, Judge Tunheim denied both sides' motions for summary judgment, ruling that while the Minnesota Sex Offender Program's complete lack of any procedure for patients to challenge delays in their court-ordered transfer to a less-restrictive facility violates constitutional due process, a factual dispute remains over what length of delay is 'unreasonable,' so the case must go to trial.
Individuals who are civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP) and have received valid court orders to be transferred to the less-restrictive Community Preparation Services (CPS) facility but are placed on a waitlist pending transfer. The ruling also has implications for MSOP administrators regarding what procedural safeguards must be provided to patients awaiting transfer.
What happened
In Rud v. Johnston, nine men civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP) sued the program's Executive Director and the state's Department of Human Services Commissioner under a federal civil rights law (42 U.S.C. § 1983). Each plaintiff had received a valid court order directing that he be transferred from a secure facility to a less-restrictive, unlocked treatment facility called Community Preparation Services (CPS), but was made to wait months — between six and ten months — on a waitlist before the transfer actually happened. All plaintiffs were eventually moved to CPS, but they argue the delays violated their constitutional right to fair process (procedural due process) because there was no procedure allowing them to challenge their place on the waitlist.
The defendants argued the lawsuit was moot because all plaintiffs had already been transferred. The court rejected that argument, finding that CPS placement can be revoked at any time by the program's Executive Director, that bed shortages and staffing problems are ongoing, and that a nearly identical lawsuit has already been filed by other patients — meaning the same situation could reasonably happen again to these same plaintiffs. On the core constitutional question, the court found that patients do have a protected legal interest in being transferred within a reasonable time after a valid transfer order, and that the MSOP provides absolutely no procedure through which patients can challenge their placement on the waitlist — not even after the delay has begun. The court held that this complete absence of any hearing or challenge mechanism fails to satisfy the Constitution's requirement of basic procedural fairness.
Judge Tunheim denied both motions for summary judgment. The plaintiffs' motion was denied because a genuine factual dispute remains over what length of delay counts as 'unreasonable': plaintiffs say seven days is the benchmark, while defendants say any delay caused by bed and staffing shortages is reasonable. That factual question must be resolved at trial. The defendants' motion was denied because the case is not moot and because — if a deprivation occurred — the MSOP's complete lack of any process for patients to challenge transfer delays does not meet constitutional requirements. The sole issue headed to trial is whether the plaintiffs were held past a 'reasonable' transfer time.
The detailed version
Case: Rud v. Johnston, Civil No. 23-486 (JRT/LIB), U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota. Decision date: September 12, 2025. Judge: John R. Tunheim, United States District Judge.
PARTIES AND CLAIMS Plaintiffs are nine individuals (James John Rud, Brian Keith Hausfeld, Joshua Adam Gardner, Andrew Gary Mallan, Dwane David Peterson, Lynell Dupree Alexander, Thomas Webber, Kenneth Donald Hand, and Ricky Durbin) who are civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP). They sue Nancy Johnston, MSOP Executive Director, and Shireen Gandhi, Department of Human Services Commissioner, in their official capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which allows individuals to sue state officials for violations of constitutional rights. The sole surviving claim after two rounds of motions to dismiss is a procedural due process challenge to defendants' failure to transfer plaintiffs to Community Preparation Services (CPS) — a less-restrictive, unlocked MSOP facility — within a reasonable time after valid court-ordered transfer orders became effective.
BACKGROUND MSOP is a civil commitment program for sex offenders with three phases of treatment. CPS is the least restrictive of three MSOP facilities and houses patients in Phase III of treatment who are preparing for community reintegration. Transfer to CPS requires a 'reduction in custody' order from the Commitment Appeal Panel (CAP), a state appellate body; orders become effective 15 days after issuance if not appealed. CPS has 145 beds but, due to staff shortages, currently only supports 130 patients. Patients with effective transfer orders who cannot be immediately placed are put on a waitlist and moved to CPS in order of when their transfer orders became effective. Patients may ask about their position on the waitlist. Legislative approval is required to expand CPS, and DHS cannot unilaterally shift funds to add beds. Each plaintiff received a valid, effective transfer order but experienced delays of six to ten months before being transferred. As of the summary judgment filings, all plaintiffs had been transferred.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY Filed in state court and removed to federal court March 1, 2023. Following two rounds of motions to dismiss, the court dismissed all claims except the official-capacity procedural due process claim. A Second Amended Complaint added plaintiffs still awaiting transfer. Cross motions for summary judgment were filed April 1, 2025, and argued August 14, 2025.
MOOTNESS ANALYSIS The court rejected defendants' mootness argument by applying the 'capable of repetition yet evading review' exception. This exception applies when (1) the challenged action was too short in duration to be fully litigated before it ended, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation the same parties will face the same situation again. The court found both elements met: delays of six to ten months are too brief to complete federal litigation (citing Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431 (2011)), and CPS placement can be revoked at any time by the Executive Director under Minn. Stat. § 253D.29, subd. 3(a). Ongoing bed and staffing shortages mean future delays are reasonably expected, and a nearly identical suit (Navratil v. Johnston) has already been filed by other MSOP patients.
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS The court applied a two-step framework: (1) does a protected liberty or property interest exist, and (2) if so, was sufficient process provided?
Protected Interest: The court found, consistent with its prior rulings and the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in McDeid v. Johnston, 984 N.W.2d 864 (Minn. 2023), that plaintiffs have a protected liberty and property interest in being transferred to CPS within a reasonable time following a valid, effective transfer order.
Deprivation — Genuine Dispute of Fact: The court declined to resolve at summary judgment whether plaintiffs were actually deprived of that interest, because what constitutes a 'reasonable amount of time' remains a disputed factual question. Undisputed evidence shows transfer takes only two days once a bed is available, and testimony suggests seven days would be reasonable in ordinary circumstances. But neither party established whether the ongoing bed and staffing shortages constitute 'extraordinary circumstances' that expand the reasonable transfer window. This dispute of material fact defeats both motions on the deprivation question.
Sufficiency of Process — Resolved Against Defendants: Using the balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), the court weighed (a) the weight of plaintiffs' interest, (b) the likelihood of erroneous deprivation without process, and (c) the government's interest in the procedures it provided.
(a) Plaintiffs' interest is substantial: delay in transfer means additional time in more restrictive confinement and, plaintiffs allege, a functionally prolonged civil commitment, because time spent waiting cannot be recovered.
(b) Risk of erroneous deprivation is high: defendants provide zero procedure — no hearing, no formal challenge mechanism — through which patients can contest their placement on the waitlist. The court noted that the waitlist itself, which plaintiffs can only inquire about informally, and contempt proceedings (previously rejected as insufficient in the motion-to-dismiss ruling) do not satisfy due process. Unlike cases such as Mathews and Mickelson v. County of Ramsey, 823 F.3d 918 (8th Cir. 2016), where plaintiffs had at least some post-deprivation procedure available, here there is no procedure at all.
(c) MSOP's administrative interest is significant but does not justify complete absence of process: the court acknowledged the program's genuine staffing and bed-space challenges, but held that due process requires at minimum some opportunity to be heard — a 'check against mistaken decisions' (quoting Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252 (1987)) — after notice of waitlist placement.
CONCLUSION AND ORDERS 1. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 142] — DENIED. Genuine dispute of material fact over what constitutes a reasonable transfer time prevents judgment for plaintiffs. 2. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 147] — DENIED. Case is not moot; the complete absence of any procedure for patients to challenge waitlist placement violates procedural due process if a deprivation is found.
The sole issue for trial is whether plaintiffs were deprived of their protected interest by being kept on the waitlist for an unreasonable amount of time — i.e., what 'reasonable amount of time' means in the circumstances presented.
Reviewer note from the AI+
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