Styczinski v. City of Eden Prairie

This order arises from a civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the federal statute that allows individuals to sue state and local government actors for violating their constitutional rights. Plaintiffs Jennifer Styczinski, Thomas Styczinski, and their minor child A.S. allege that the City of Eden Prairie, Community Center Manager Valerie Verley (sued in both her individual and official capacities), and Parks and Recreation Director Amy Markle (sued only in her official capacity) violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by permanently banning them from the aquatics area of the Eden Prairie Community Center (EPCC) under the EPCC's Verbal Abuse Policy, which the plaintiffs allege lacked any process to challenge the ban.

On May 30, 2025, the plaintiffs moved for leave to amend their complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) to add a claim for punitive damages. Defendants opposed the motion solely on the ground of futility — arguing the proposed amendment could not survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The plaintiffs did not file a reply brief, though they were permitted to do so.

The court identified three independent reasons this claim was futile:

1. The city code does not say what plaintiffs claim. The plaintiffs argued that Eden Prairie City Code § 2.23, subd. 2(C)(2) required multiple levels of review — including by the City Manager, Parks Commission, and City Council — before the Verbal Abuse Policy could take effect, and that Verley bypassed these steps. The court reviewed the actual text of the ordinance and found it merely describes the Parks, Recreation and Natural Resources Commission's advisory duties, including the ability to recommend policies to the City Council. It does not establish a mandatory multi-level review process. Because the ordinance itself contradicted the plaintiffs' allegations, the court declined to accept those allegations as true, citing cases including Bogie v. Rosenberg, 705 F.3d 603 (7th Cir. 2013), and Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2001). An organizational chart showing Verley at the bottom of a hierarchy did not cure this defect, as it does not modify the city code.

2. No allegation that Verley was personally responsible for the review process. Even accepting the plaintiffs' reading of the city code, the complaint contains no allegations that Verley — who sat at the bottom of the organizational hierarchy — had any responsibility or ability to ensure the Policy was reviewed by persons above her direct supervisor, Director Lotthammer. The court noted that the complaint affirmatively acknowledged Verley obtained Director Lotthammer's approval. The court cited Fisherman v. Milender, No. 23-CV-3836, 2025 WL 476225 (D. Minn. Jan. 22, 2025), for the proposition that a § 1983 claim fails where there is no allegation of personal involvement in the alleged violation.

3. No facts showing reckless or callous indifference. Even assuming both the existence of a review process and Verley's responsibility for it, the complaint contained no factual allegations supporting the inference that bypassing such a process constituted "reckless or callous indifference" to federally protected rights. The Eighth Circuit has held that punitive damages require evidence that the defendant "acted in the face of a perceived risk that his or her actions would violate federal law." McAdoo v. Martin, 899 F.3d 521, 527 (8th Cir. 2018). The plaintiffs alleged that Verley knew the First Amendment applied to them, but did not allege that she was aware that failing to follow a review process — or that the Policy itself — violated federal law, or that such unlawfulness should have been apparent to her. The court noted the Eighth Circuit has denied punitive damages even in cases where defendants were found to have unconstitutionally retaliated against plaintiffs for First Amendment activity. Cornell v. Woods, 69 F.3d 1383 (8th Cir. 1995).