Lager v. Bisignano
- John Docherty
- 0:24-cv-01236
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 20
In Lager v. Bisignano, Magistrate Judge Docherty upheld the Social Security Administration's denial of disability insurance benefits to plaintiff Scott L., finding that the administrative law judge did not err in concluding that Scott L.'s mental impairments were not severe, that the failure to separately analyze chronic pain syndrome was harmless, and that the residual functional capacity assessment was properly supported by the evidence.
Individuals who have applied for Social Security disability insurance benefits and whose claims have been denied, particularly those whose cases involve non-severe mental impairments or chronic pain syndrome diagnoses that were not separately evaluated at step two of the Social Security disability determination process.
What happened
In Lager v. Bisignano, plaintiff Scott L. sought federal court review of the Social Security Administration's denial of his application for disability insurance benefits — a program that pays benefits to workers who become disabled and have paid sufficient Social Security taxes. Scott L. suffers from Ehlers-Danlos syndrome, degenerative disc disease, chronic pain, and mental health conditions including depression and anxiety. The administrative law judge (ALJ) — the official who initially heard his case within the Social Security system — found that his mental impairments were not severe enough to limit his ability to work, did not separately evaluate chronic pain syndrome, and determined that despite his physical limitations he could return to his past jobs as a product engineer, technical salesperson, parts repair worker, or sales engineer.
Scott L. raised three challenges before the court. First, he argued the ALJ wrongly classified his depression and anxiety as non-severe. Second, he argued the ALJ should have separately considered chronic pain syndrome as a potential impairment. Third, he argued the ALJ's assessment of what he could still do despite his limitations — called a residual functional capacity — failed to account for his mental impairments and chronic pain syndrome. The Commissioner of Social Security defended the ALJ's decision and asked the court to affirm it. The court reviewed the record to determine whether the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence, a standard that requires enough evidence that a reasonable person could agree with the conclusion, even if other reasonable conclusions are also possible.
Magistrate Judge Docherty denied all three of Scott L.'s arguments and affirmed the Commissioner's final decision. On the mental impairments issue, the court found that the ALJ adequately supported his finding of only mild limitations in all four areas of mental functioning, pointing to conservative and sporadic treatment, improvement with medication, and daily activities that were generally intact. On chronic pain syndrome, the court found that the ALJ effectively considered all the individual sources of pain that would comprise that diagnosis, and that even if failing to label it separately was an error, it was harmless because the ALJ thoroughly addressed pain when assessing what Scott L. could still do. On the residual functional capacity, the court found that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's conclusions and that Scott L. had not identified specific limitations that were improperly omitted.
The detailed version
- Lager v. Bisignano, Case No. 24-cv-1236 (JFD), United States District Court, District of Minnesota
- Magistrate Judge John F. Docherty
- September 18, 2025
Procedural Posture
Plaintiff Scott L. sought judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Commissioner of Social Security's final decision denying his application for disability insurance benefits (DIB) under Title II of the Social Security Act. The ALJ issued a written decision on March 8, 2023, finding Scott L. not disabled; the Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ's decision the Commissioner's final decision. The court reviewed both parties' memoranda and affirmed the Commissioner.
Standard of Review
The court's review was limited to whether substantial evidence on the record as a whole supported the decision, or whether the ALJ committed an error of law. Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance but enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the conclusion. The court may not reverse simply because substantial evidence might also support a different outcome.
The Five-Step Sequential Analysis
The ALJ applied the standard five-step process used in Social Security disability determinations: (1) whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) whether the impairment meets or equals a listed impairment; (4) whether the claimant can perform past relevant work given his residual functional capacity (RFC — the most a claimant can do despite limitations); and (5) whether other work exists in the national economy the claimant can perform. The ALJ stopped at step four after finding Scott L. could return to past work.
Medical Background
Scott L. alleged disability beginning February 1, 2020, citing Ehlers-Danlos syndrome (EDS, a connective tissue disorder), degenerative disc disease, sleep apnea, hearing loss, chronic pain, chronic fatigue, arthritis, and stroke history. Medical records documented significant back and neck pain, with periods of substantial improvement through chiropractic care, epidural steroid injections, medial branch blocks, and physical therapy — including reports of 100% improvement in low back pain at one point and 100% pain relief after a medial branch block. Dr. Osborne, Scott L.'s treating physician, submitted questionnaires opining that Scott L. was incapable of even low-stress jobs, could not sit or stand for more than two to four hours in a workday, would need frequent unscheduled breaks, and had marked mental limitations. The ALJ found all of Dr. Osborne's opinions not persuasive, concluding they were inconsistent with her own treatment notes, clinical findings, and records from other providers.
Issue 1 — Severity of Mental Impairments
The ALJ found Scott L.'s depression and anxiety non-severe after evaluating the four 'paragraph B' functional criteria (understanding/remembering/applying information; interacting with others; concentrating/persisting/maintaining pace; and adapting/managing oneself), rating each as only mildly limited. The court upheld this finding. The court noted the ALJ cited specific record evidence: routine, conservative, and sporadic mental health treatment; rapid and significant improvement with medication (Cymbalta); Dr. Osborne's progress notes lacking functional restrictions; absence of mental health treatment records from providers other than Dr. Osborne; and Scott L.'s generally intact daily activities. The court addressed and rejected each of Scott L.'s counter-citations, including a treatment note he cited for concentration problems that actually documented resolution of those concerns, a progress note reflecting anxiety alongside normal attention and concentration and mild depressive symptoms, and his report of being 'short-fused,' which the court found not shown to have had more than minimal work impact or to have met the 12-month durational requirement. The court also noted Scott L. had not challenged the ALJ's compliance with 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c governing how ALJs must evaluate medical opinion persuasiveness.
Issue 2 — Chronic Pain Syndrome at Step Two
Dr. Schumann diagnosed Scott L. with chronic pain syndrome in October 2019, and it appeared in other records including some post-dating the February 1, 2020 onset date. The court found the diagnosis was established and relevant. However, the court held the ALJ did not err by not separately listing it as a severe impairment at step two. Under Eighth Circuit precedent, an ALJ's failure to list a specific impairment at step two is not error unless the impairment is 'separate and apart' from already-listed impairments. The court found the ALJ had considered pain from EDS and lumbar spine degenerative disc disease (both found severe), as well as hand, cervical, and thoracic pain as potentially separate sources. Scott L. did not identify any pain component comprising chronic pain syndrome that the ALJ failed to consider. Alternatively, the court held any error was harmless because the ALJ thoroughly considered all of Scott L.'s pain when assessing RFC — a well-established harmless-error doctrine in this district.
Issue 3 — RFC Assessment
The court found substantial evidence supported the RFC limiting Scott L. to light work with additional postural, environmental, and manipulative restrictions, without mental limitations. On pain: the ALJ considered and summarized extensive medical records, credited some evidence of significant pain (particularly lumbar spine MRI findings) but found that conservative and successful treatment, generally benign imaging, and Scott L.'s reported physical activities (daily walking, regular bicycling, exercise up to five times per week) supported the RFC. On mental limitations: Scott L. identified no specific mental limitations the ALJ should have included beyond Dr. Osborne's opinion, which the ALJ permissibly found not persuasive. The hypothetical question to the vocational expert was proper because it incorporated all limitations supported by substantial evidence.
Outcome
(1) Scott L.'s requested relief was denied; (2) the Commissioner's requested relief was granted; (3) the final decision of the Commissioner was affirmed. Judgment was ordered to be entered accordingly.
Reviewer note from the AI+
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