Osorio-Calderon v. Warden FCI Sandstone

Jose Osorio-Calderon was sentenced in 2018 to 151 months in federal prison for coercion and enticement of a minor to engage in sexual activity under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), and is currently housed at the Federal Correctional Institution in Sandstone, Minnesota. Under the First Step Act (FSA), 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4), federal prisoners can earn time credits (FTCs) by participating in needs-based programming, which can be applied to shorten their sentence or move up their date for transfer to prerelease custody — such as a residential reentry center (RRC, commonly called a halfway house) or home confinement. As of April 2025, Osorio-Calderon had earned 1,095 days of FTCs: 365 were applied to shorten his sentence (moving his release date from July 3, 2027 to July 3, 2026), and the remaining 730 days were to be applied toward prerelease custody, making him eligible for that transfer as of July 3, 2024.

Despite this eligibility, the BOP was unable to place him. U.S. Probation in the Northern District of New York rejected his request in March 2024, finding his sister's residence unsuitable for supervision. The BOP's Residential Reentry Manager office in Puerto Rico rejected placement there in November 2024 and again in April 2025, citing local ordinances restricting sex offenders' proximity to locations frequented by children. Osorio-Calderon filed this habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, requesting either an order compelling the BOP to immediately transfer him to prerelease custody or, alternatively, a writ of mandamus under 28 U.S.C. § 1361 compelling the same.

Magistrate Judge Douglas L. Micko issued a Report and Recommendation (R&R) recommending that the petition be granted. The R&R acknowledged that Eighth Circuit precedent — primarily Kruger v. Erickson, 77 F.3d 1071 (8th Cir. 1996) and Spencer v. Haynes, 774 F.3d 467 (8th Cir. 2014) — holds that federal courts lack jurisdiction over habeas petitions challenging an inmate's place of confinement rather than the legality or length of the sentence itself. However, the R&R concluded that the Supreme Court's 2025 per curiam decision in Trump v. J.G.G., 604 U.S. 670 (2025), 'complicated if not upended' this precedent. In J.G.G., the Supreme Court held that detained noncitizens challenging removal under the Alien Enemies Act must do so via habeas, and that habeas remains available even when immediate release is not the only remedy sought. The R&R read J.G.G. broadly to authorize habeas challenges to any government decision to hold a person at a particular location. Alternatively, the R&R concluded that the FSA's mandatory language requiring the BOP to transfer eligible prisoners to prerelease custody, combined with the general rule that federal courts have habeas jurisdiction over claims alleging violations of federal law, independently provided jurisdiction.

District Judge Laura M. Provinzino rejected both of the R&R's jurisdictional conclusions. As to J.G.G., the court emphasized that district courts in the Eighth Circuit are bound by circuit precedent unless the Supreme Court or the en banc Eighth Circuit overrules it, even if a later Supreme Court decision arguably undermines the reasoning. The court distinguished J.G.G. as arising from civil immigration detention under an eighteenth-century statute, not from criminal incarceration under a modern sentencing law, and held that Kruger and Spencer 'have direct application' to this case under Bierman v. Dayton, 900 F.3d 570 (8th Cir. 2018). As to the FSA's mandatory language, the court pointed to 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b), which states that BOP placement decisions are 'not reviewable by any court' '[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law.' The court relied on Crowe v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, No. 24-cv-3582, 2025 WL 1635392 (D.D.C. June 9, 2025), which held that the FSA's mandatory transfer provision does not displace the BOP's statutory placement discretion under Section 3621(b). Because prerelease custody is a place of confinement — not a release from incarceration, see United States v. Houck, 2 F.4th 1082 (8th Cir. 2021) — the court held it lacks jurisdiction to review the BOP's decisions on the matter.

The court also rejected the mandamus claim, finding that Osorio-Calderon could not satisfy the three-part test under Mitchael v. Colvin, 809 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 2016): (1) a clear and indisputable right to the relief sought, (2) a nondiscretionary duty on the part of the government, and (3) no other adequate remedy. Because Section 3621(b)'s bar on judicial review of placement decisions applies 'regardless of the cause of action asserted,' Osorio-Calderon had no clear right to the relief requested, foreclosing mandamus relief.

The court expressed genuine sympathy for Osorio-Calderon, noting that he has been held past his prerelease eligibility date for more than a year due to what the court characterized as 'bureaucratic finger-pointing,' and acknowledged the value of prerelease programs for reducing recidivism and aiding reintegration. However, the court concluded it lacked authority to grant relief and urged the BOP to diligently locate a suitable placement. The amended petition was dismissed without prejudice — meaning the dismissal does not permanently bar Osorio-Calderon from pursuing similar relief if circumstances or the law changes.