Keamu v. Noem
- Patrick Schiltz
- 0:24-cv-03134
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 15
In Keamu v. Noem, Chief Judge Patrick J. Schiltz dismissed with prejudice a Liberian immigrant's challenge to the denial of his application to adjust his immigration status, finding that his repeated lies about a prior marriage were legally 'material' misrepresentations that made him inadmissible and that a specialized waiver provision he sought to use did not apply to him.
Liberian nationals and other non-citizens who have applied or may apply to adjust their immigration status under the Liberian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act (LRIF), particularly those with complex marital histories or prior immigration applications, and those seeking waivers of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1159(c).
What happened
In Keamu v. Noem (Case No. 24-CV-3134), Prince K., a Liberian citizen living in Minnesota, sued federal immigration officials under a law called the Administrative Procedure Act, which allows courts to review certain government agency decisions. Prince argued that the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) wrongly denied his application to become a lawful permanent resident under a law called the Liberian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act (LRIF). USCIS denied his application because it found he had repeatedly lied about his marital history — specifically, he denied being married to a woman named Fredricklyn J. in both written applications and a sworn interview, when in fact they had been culturally married in Liberia.
The core legal dispute was whether Prince's lies about his first marriage were 'material' — meaning significant enough under immigration law to make him ineligible. Prince argued his lies didn't matter because his later marriage to Kartumu K. was legally valid under Minnesota law and USCIS never found he committed marriage fraud. The government argued that the lies were material because they blocked USCIS from investigating his full marital history, which could have revealed red flags about whether his marriages were genuine or were entered into just to gain immigration benefits. Prince also argued that USCIS pointed him to the wrong legal form for seeking a waiver of his inadmissibility, and that he should be allowed to use a different waiver process available to refugees and people granted asylum.
Chief Judge Patrick J. Schiltz sided entirely with the government and dismissed all four claims with prejudice, meaning Prince cannot refile them. The court held that Prince's concealment of his first marriage was legally material because it naturally tended to cut off USCIS's inquiry into facts — including suspicious patterns in his marital conduct — that were directly relevant to whether his marriages were genuine. On the waiver issue, the court found that the refugee-and-asylum waiver provision Prince wanted to use simply does not apply to people in his situation, since he was not admitted as a refugee or granted asylum, and the word 'Refugee' in the LRIF's title does not change that plain reading of the statute.
The detailed version
- Keamu v. Noem, No. 24-CV-3134 (PJS/ECW)
- Chief Judge Patrick J. Schiltz
- September 22, 2025
Parties and Background
Plaintiff Prince K. is a Liberian citizen and Minnesota resident. Defendants are Kristi Noem (Secretary of Homeland Security), Kika Scott (Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, or USCIS), and Steven Rice (Field Office Director of the USCIS St. Paul-Minneapolis office), all sued in their official capacities.
Prince was traditionally married to Fredricklyn J. in Liberia in August 2013. He entered the United States in April 2014 on a non-immigrant visa, disclosing his marriage to Fredricklyn on that application. Fredricklyn filed a Form I-130 (Petition for Alien Relative) on his behalf but later withdrew it, writing to USCIS that Prince had moved out of her home weeks after their child was born to live with another woman who claimed to be his wife. Prince later moved back and persuaded Fredricklyn to refile, then moved out again once she did. Prince and Fredricklyn divorced in July 2015 — about one month after his temporary protected status and work authorization were approved.
In August 2016, Prince married Kartumu K. in Minnesota. In 2018, Kartumu filed a Form I-130 and Prince concurrently filed a Form I-485 (Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status). On the I-485, Prince stated he had been married only once (to Kartumu) and described Fredricklyn only as a former girlfriend, not a former wife. In a July 2019 USCIS interview conducted under oath, Prince again denied ever being married to Fredricklyn or anyone other than Kartumu. USCIS denied both Kartumu's I-130 and Prince's I-485 in early 2020.
In April 2020, Prince filed a second Form I-485 under the Liberian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act (LRIF), National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L. 116-92, § 7611. This time he acknowledged two marriages. USCIS issued a Notice of Intent to Deny and directed him to file a Form I-601 (Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)). Prince filed the I-601 in January 2021. In January 2024, USCIS denied Prince's second I-485, finding him inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) for having 'repeatedly misrepresented material information regarding [his] marital status.' USCIS also denied the I-601 waiver, finding he had not shown a qualifying relative would suffer extreme hardship. An administrative appeal was also denied.
Legal Claims
- Count I: USCIS misinterpreted § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) and acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying his second I-485. - Count II: USCIS acted arbitrarily by directing him to file a § 1182(i) waiver petition instead of a § 1159(c) waiver petition. - Counts III and IV: Declaratory relief claims corresponding to Counts I and II.
Legal Standards
The court applied the Rule 12(b)(6) standard (motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim), accepting all factual allegations as true and drawing reasonable inferences in Prince's favor. The court also considered documents outside the petition that were 'necessarily embraced' by it — the 2024 denial decisions and related materials — without converting the motion to one for summary judgment.
Ruling on Counts I and III — Materiality of Misrepresentation
Section 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) bars admission of any alien who, by fraud or willful misrepresentation of a material fact, seeks to procure an immigration benefit. Prince conceded his misrepresentations were willful; the sole dispute was whether the misrepresented facts were 'material.'
The court applied the legal standard from Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759 (1988), and Matter of D-R, 27 I. & N. Dec. 105 (BIA 2017): a misrepresentation is material if it 'tends to shut off a line of inquiry that is relevant to the alien's admissibility and that would predictably have disclosed other facts relevant to his or her eligibility.' The court rejected Prince's narrower standard — that a fact is material only if its disclosure would have directly changed the eligibility outcome — and adopted USCIS's broader standard.
The court found Prince's concealment of his marriage to Fredricklyn was plainly material. Had Prince disclosed it, USCIS would have investigated and potentially learned: the circumstances of the Liberian marriage; the suspicious timing of his U.S. visa application; his pattern of moving out of Fredricklyn's home (first after their child's birth, then again after she filed an I-130); and his divorce from Fredricklyn just one month after obtaining temporary protected status. These facts could have triggered inquiry into whether his marriages were fraudulent, including a potentially permanent bar to admission under 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c). The court noted that materiality is not a 'but for' test — USCIS does not need to show the true facts would have resulted in denial, only that the misrepresentation was capable of influencing an adjudicator. Counts I and III were dismissed.
Ruling on Counts II and IV — Wrong Waiver Form
Prince argued USCIS should have directed him to seek a waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 1159(c) rather than § 1182(i). Section 1159(c) is a waiver provision that applies only to aliens adjusting status under § 1159 — that is, refugees admitted under § 1157 or asylees under § 1158. Prince is neither.
Prince's argument that the word 'Refugee' in the LRIF's title entitles him to the § 1159(c) waiver was rejected. The court analyzed the text of § 1159 and the LRIF and found: (1) § 1159(c)'s waiver applies only to aliens 'seeking adjustment of status under this section' (§ 1159), which covers only § 1157 refugees and § 1158 asylees; (2) the LRIF exempts LRIF applicants from only four grounds of inadmissibility (§§ 1182(a)(4), (5), (6)(A), and (7)(A)) — not § 1182(a)(6)(C), which applies to Prince; and (3) Congress knows how to incorporate § 1159(c)'s waiver standard into other statutes when it chooses to, and it did not do so in the LRIF. The court cited Bryant v. Rice, No. 24-CV-3687 (D. Minn. Aug. 4, 2025), as a recent example of this reasoning. Counts II and IV were dismissed.
Disposition
USCIS's motion to dismiss (ECF No. 25) was GRANTED. The amended petition (ECF No. 15) was DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE AND ON THE MERITS. Judgment is to be entered accordingly.
Reviewer note from the AI+
Read the full 15-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.