Remmick v. Brunswick Corporation
- Eric Tostrud
- 0:25-cv-01951
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 10
In Remmick v. Brunswick Corporation, Judge Tostrud granted the boat manufacturer's motion to dismiss Angela Remmick's husband Dillon Remmick from the lawsuit, finding he was fraudulently joined as a defendant because the complaint's own facts showed Dillon acted reasonably and could not be found negligent under Minnesota law.
Plaintiffs who sue multiple defendants in state court where some defendants share the plaintiff's state citizenship, particularly in product liability and personal injury cases involving potential fraudulent joinder disputes; spouses involved in tort litigation against each other; parties navigating removal and remand disputes in federal court.
What happened
In Remmick v. Brunswick Corporation, Angela Remmick was severely injured when her husband Dillon lost control of a pontoon boat and crashed into a dock where she was sitting at Gull Lake in Minnesota. Angela sued both Dillon and the boat engine manufacturer, Brunswick Corporation, in state court. Because Angela and Dillon are both Minnesota citizens while Brunswick is not, the case had to involve only out-of-state parties to be heard in federal court — so Brunswick argued that Dillon was improperly added to the suit just to block federal jurisdiction, a legal move called 'fraudulent joinder,' and removed the case to federal court.
The central question was whether Angela's negligence claim against Dillon had any real legal basis. Under Minnesota law, a person is negligent when they fail to exercise the care a reasonably careful person would use in the same situation. The complaint itself described Dillon slowly approaching the dock, shifting into neutral, and following the engine manufacturer's own operating instructions — but then being unable to shift into reverse because the engine malfunctioned due to a faulty gasket. The complaint even stated directly that Dillon 'was unable to control the boat.' The only allegations of negligence against Dillon were bare legal conclusions with no supporting facts.
Judge Tostrud granted Brunswick's motion to dismiss Dillon from the case, finding that the complaint's own factual allegations portrayed Dillon as acting reasonably and that the negligence claims against him were nothing more than unsupported legal conclusions. The court rejected Angela's three arguments for keeping Dillon in the case, including her argument that the claim would survive under Minnesota's more lenient pleading rules, explaining that Eighth Circuit standards for fraudulent joinder — not state pleading rules — govern the analysis. All claims against Dillon Remmick were dismissed without prejudice, meaning Angela could potentially refile claims against him, and the federal case against Brunswick Corporation proceeds.
The detailed version
- Remmick v. Brunswick Corporation, File No. 25-cv-1951 (ECT/LIB), United States District Court, District of Minnesota
- Eric C. Tostrud
Background
On June 17, 2022, Dillon Remmick was piloting a pontoon boat toward a dock on Gull Lake near Brainerd, Minnesota, where his wife Angela Remmick was seated with her legs over the dock's edge. The pontoon was equipped with an engine manufactured by Brunswick Corporation (also known as Mercury Marine). As Dillon approached the dock, he shifted into neutral per Brunswick's operating instructions and planned to shift into reverse to slow the boat. However, a gasket failure in the engine's idle limiter caused the engine to begin running at high RPMs and prevented shifting into reverse. The complaint explicitly states Dillon 'was unable to control the boat,' which coasted into the dock and severely injured Angela's legs.
Angela filed suit in Minnesota state court against Brunswick (for negligence and strict products liability) and against Dillon (for negligence). Brunswick, incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in Wisconsin, removed the case to federal court under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a), 1441(b), and 1446, invoking diversity jurisdiction (which requires complete diversity — all plaintiffs and defendants from different states). Because both Angela and Dillon are Minnesota citizens, Dillon's presence in the lawsuit would ordinarily destroy diversity and require remanding the case to state court. Brunswick moved to dismiss Dillon, arguing he was fraudulently joined.
Legal Standard — Fraudulent Joinder
Under Eighth Circuit precedent, joinder is fraudulent when 'there exists no reasonable basis in fact and law supporting a claim against the resident defendant.' Filla v. Norfolk S. Ry., 336 F.3d 806, 810 (8th Cir. 2003). A claim is 'colorable' — meaning joinder is proper — if state law might plausibly impose liability on the defendant given the alleged facts. All facts and legal ambiguities are resolved in the plaintiff's favor. When courts are uncertain, doubts are resolved in favor of remanding to state court. If fraudulent joinder is established, the court may dismiss the non-diverse (same-state) defendant and retain federal jurisdiction over the remaining claims against the diverse defendant.
The court declined to consider Angela's expert report (which Brunswick cited) because it undermined rather than supported the negligence claim against Dillon, and declined to consider pre-litigation communications cited by Angela because they addressed only preliminary liability positions, not Dillon's underlying conduct.
Analysis — Negligence Against Dillon
Minnesota negligence requires: (1) a duty of care, (2) breach of that duty, (3) injury, and (4) proximate causation. The parties agreed Dillon owed Angela a duty of care under Minnesota Stat. § 86B.311, subdiv. 1(1), and that Angela was injured. The court focused on the breach element.
The court found no arguably reasonable basis to predict liability for two reasons:
1. The complaint's own factual allegations affirmatively portrayed Dillon as acting reasonably: he approached slowly, shifted into neutral consistent with Brunswick's instructions, and planned to shift into reverse — but the engine's mechanical failure made that impossible. The complaint itself concluded that Dillon 'was unable to control the boat.'
2. The complaint's negligence allegations against Dillon — that he 'failed to use reasonable care,' that his conduct 'constitutes negligence,' and that he 'is liable for its negligence' — were bare legal conclusions. Under Eighth Circuit fraudulent-joinder standards (drawing on Block v. Toyota Motor Corp., 665 F.3d 944 (8th Cir. 2011), and Henson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 3 F.4th 1075 (8th Cir. 2021)), conclusory allegations without supporting facts do not create a reasonable basis to predict that Minnesota law might impose liability.
Rejection of Angela's Three Arguments
1. Angela argued the precedents relied upon by Brunswick (Block, Henson, Lane) were distinguishable because they involved 'factually dependent duties' where an exception had to apply before liability could attach. The court rejected this distinction, citing Wivell v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 773 F.3d 887 (8th Cir. 2014), where fraudulent joinder was found based on failure to plead facts supporting breach — regardless of whether the duty itself was contingent.
2. Angela argued at the hearing that because this was not a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss posture, the reasoning from those cases should be ignored. The court rejected this characterization, noting that in Henson the Eighth Circuit explicitly analyzed fraudulent joinder (not just Rule 12(b)(6)) and that Block and Lane draw a clear distinction between the two standards, with fraudulent joinder being a more plaintiff-friendly standard.
3. Angela argued the claim would survive under Minnesota's notice-pleading standard, so Dillon should not be dismissed. The court rejected this approach, citing Klein as Tr. for Stanback v. Menard, Inc., No. 24-cv-2362, 2024 WL 4880384 (D. Minn. Nov. 25, 2024), and holding that Eighth Circuit fraudulent-joinder rules — not state pleading standards — govern the analysis.
Notable Footnote — Collusion Concern
Judge Tostrud included an extensive footnote expressing concern about possible collusion between the spouses. The court noted that: (1) Dillon is insured and his carrier appointed his counsel — so any award against Dillon would come from insurance, which 'may actually inure to the benefit of the wrongdoing spouse'; (2) Dillon did not oppose the suit or move to dismiss, which is unusual in fraudulent-joinder cases; and (3) Dillon's Answer disclaimed knowledge of basic facts such as whether he was on the lake that day or whether he was operating the boat. The court found it 'reasonable to ask whether the insurance carrier is the real party in interest' but concluded it was unnecessary to resolve the collusion question since Dillon was already being dismissed on fraudulent-joinder grounds.
Ruling
Brunswick's motion to dismiss Dillon Remmick as a fraudulently joined defendant was GRANTED. All claims against Dillon Remmick were DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE (meaning Angela is not barred from refiling against him, but the federal court case against Brunswick Corporation proceeds). The dismissal without prejudice was the court's disposition; the opinion does not specify whether and where Angela could refile against Dillon.
Reviewer note from the AI+
Read the full 10-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.