Dominguez Sanchez v. Bondi
- Katherine Menendez
- 0:25-cv-03682
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 14
In Dominguez Sanchez v. Bondi, Judge Katherine Menendez granted the petition of Belsai D.S., a long-time U.S. resident with DACA status arrested by immigration authorities, holding that he is not subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) and ordering the government to provide him a bond hearing before an immigration judge within seven days.
Noncitizens who entered the United States without inspection and have resided in the country for years, particularly those with DACA status or similar long-term presence, who are detained by ICE without a bond hearing under the government's July 2025 policy treating them as 'arriving aliens' subject to mandatory detention. This ruling directly affects Belsai D.S. and has persuasive relevance to similar cases pending in this district and nationwide.
What happened
In Dominguez Sanchez v. Bondi, Belsai D.S., a Mexican-born man who has lived in the United States since age five and holds Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) status, was arrested by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in August 2025 and held in a detention center in Elk River, Minnesota without any opportunity for a bond hearing. The government relied on a July 2025 policy memo arguing that people who entered the U.S. without inspection — meaning without going through an official border checkpoint — must be treated as if they are 'arriving aliens' trying to enter the country for the first time, making them subject to mandatory, no-bond detention under a federal immigration law, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). Mr. D.S. filed a court petition challenging his detention as unlawful and asking for a bond hearing, at which he could argue he is not a flight risk or danger to the community.
The central legal dispute was whether Mr. D.S. falls under the mandatory detention rules of § 1225(b)(2), which apply to people 'seeking admission' at the border, or under a different law, § 1226(a), which allows immigration authorities to detain people during removal proceedings but requires that they be given the chance to seek release on bond. The government argued that because Mr. D.S. entered without inspection and was never formally admitted, he is permanently classified as an 'applicant for admission' subject to mandatory detention with no bond. The court rejected this argument on multiple grounds: the plain language of § 1225(b)(2) applies to someone currently 'seeking admission,' not someone who entered decades ago; § 1226(a) and its mandatory counterpart § 1226(c) are the proper framework for people already living in the country; and the 2025 Laken Riley Act — which added a new mandatory detention category for undocumented people arrested for certain crimes — would be meaningless surplusage if § 1225(b)(2) already mandated detention for all undocumented residents. The court also noted that this interpretation aligns with longstanding government practice and the structure of the immigration laws as described by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Judge Katherine Menendez granted Mr. D.S.'s petition, declaring that he is held under § 1226(a)'s discretionary framework, not § 1225(b)(2)'s mandatory detention rules. The court ordered the government to provide him a bond hearing within seven days. If no bond hearing is held within that time, the court ordered that Mr. D.S. must be immediately released. The parties were also directed to update the court within ten days on the outcome of the bond hearing or his release, and to advise whether further proceedings are needed.
The detailed version
- Dominguez Sanchez v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-3682 (KMM/EMB)
- Katherine Menendez, United States District Judge
- October 1, 2025
Background and Facts
Petitioner Belsai D.S. is a native and citizen of Mexico who has resided in the United States since approximately 1990, when he entered at age five without inspection (i.e., without going through an official port of entry or obtaining permission). Beginning in 2014, he was granted Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) status, which he has renewed every two years. His most recent DACA renewal was approved on September 5, 2025, extending through September 4, 2027 (the opinion contains what appears to be a typographical error listing the end date as September 4, 2025).
On August 10, 2025, Mr. D.S. was arrested by local police on a charge of violating a domestic abuse no-contact order. This arrest triggered ICE notification. On August 12, 2025, ICE arrested Mr. D.S. in Bloomington, Minnesota, serving him with a Notice to Appear (NTA) — a charging document initiating removal proceedings — and an I-200 administrative arrest warrant. The NTA alleged removability on the ground that he entered without inspection and was never admitted or paroled. He has been held at the ICE detention facility in Elk River, Minnesota. The court noted that the local criminal arrest did not trigger mandatory detention under either 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) or the Laken Riley Act.
On July 8, 2025, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a memo (attributed to Todd Lyons, directed to ICE employees) announcing that noncitizens present in the United States who entered without inspection are subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), are ineligible for a bond hearing before an immigration judge, and may not be released except by parole during the pendency of removal proceedings. This was a change from longstanding prior agency practice.
Legal Framework
Three principal detention statutes were at issue:
1. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b): Governs inspection and detention of 'arriving aliens' and persons 'seeking admission.' Under § 1225(b)(2)(A), if an immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond doubt entitled to be admitted, that person must be detained pending removal proceedings. The government argued this provision applies to all undocumented people in the U.S. because § 1225(a)(1) defines an 'alien present in the United States who has not been admitted' as deemed an 'applicant for admission.'
2. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a): Governs arrest and detention of aliens already in the country pending a decision on removal. Under this provision, DHS may detain the person or release them on bond or conditional supervision. A person detained under § 1226(a) is entitled to a bond hearing before an immigration judge, at which they may seek release by demonstrating they are neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community.
3. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c): Mandates detention without bond for aliens who have committed specified serious crimes. As amended by the Laken Riley Act (Pub. L. No. 119-1, 2025), § 1226(c)(1)(E) also requires mandatory detention for noncitizens who entered without admission or parole and who have been arrested for, charged with, or convicted of certain enumerated crimes.
Petitioner's Claims
Mr. D.S. filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, asserting: (Count One) a declaration that he is not subject to § 1225(b)(2) mandatory detention and is instead subject to § 1226(a), entitling him to a bond hearing; (Count Two, Four) that denying bond eligibility violates § 1226(a)(2)(A) and related regulations; (Count Three) that denying him a bond hearing violates his Fifth Amendment due process rights; and (Count Five) that applying § 1225(b)(2) to him violates the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
Respondents' Arguments
The government raised four defenses: (1) lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(g), 1226(e), 1252(a)(5), and 1252(b)(9); (2) that several named respondents (DHS, ICE, Sirce Owen, EOIR) are not proper custodians; (3) that the APA claim is not properly brought in a habeas petition; and (4) that § 1225(b)(2) mandates Mr. D.S.'s detention on the merits.
Jurisdiction
The court held it has habeas jurisdiction. It rejected the government's primary reliance on § 1252(g), which strips jurisdiction over claims 'arising from' the Attorney General's decisions to 'commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.' Citing Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471 (1999) ('AADC'), and Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018), the court emphasized that § 1252(g) applies only to those three discrete actions and that a challenge to the lawfulness of detention without a bond hearing does not arise from any of them. The court explicitly disagreed with S.Q.D.C. v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-3348 (D. Minn. Sept. 9, 2025), which had found § 1252(g) barred jurisdiction in a similar case, and agreed with Maldonado v. Olson, No. 25-cv-3142 (D. Minn. Aug. 15, 2025). The court declined at this stage to dismiss any named respondents, noting the government did not identify which respondents are proper custodians and that the APA question was inadequately briefed.
Merits: § 1225(b)(2) vs. § 1226(a)
The court held that § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to Mr. D.S. and that he is entitled to a bond hearing under § 1226(a). The court's reasoning relied on four independent grounds, joining a large and growing body of district court decisions nationwide:
1. Plain text — 'seeking admission': Section 1225(b)(2)(A) requires that the individual be 'seeking admission' — language that implies present, active effort to gain entry. Mr. D.S., who entered 35 years ago and has lived in the country since childhood, is not currently seeking admission. The government's reading, by relying solely on the definitional provision in § 1225(a)(1) (deeming unadmitted aliens 'applicants for admission'), effectively strikes the 'seeking admission' language from § 1225(b)(2)(A) in violation of the canon against surplusage.
2. Structure and plain text of § 1226: Section 1226(a) facially governs detention of aliens already in the country pending removal decisions. Section 1226(c) explicitly covers both 'inadmissible' and 'deportable' aliens for mandatory detention based on criminal history. The 2025 Laken Riley Act amendment adding § 1226(c)(1)(E) — mandatory detention for undocumented entrants who are arrested for or convicted of certain crimes — would be entirely superfluous if § 1225(b)(2) already mandated detention for all undocumented residents.
3. Statutory context and structure: Section 1225 is specifically addressed to the inspection and processing of persons arriving at the border, while § 1226 governs those already in the country. This structural distinction, recognized in Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. at 289, confirms that § 1225(b) was not intended to reach long-term residents who entered years ago.
4. Legislative history and longstanding agency practice: Prior to the July 2025 memo, the government consistently treated noncitizens present in the U.S. who entered without inspection as subject to § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2). The legislative history of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) supports this reading.
The court also found the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) recent contrary interpretation in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), unpersuasive and inconsistent with the statutory text, citing Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024) (limiting deference to agency statutory interpretations).
Relief Granted
The court granted the habeas petition on Count One. It: (1) declared that Mr. D.S. is not subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2) and is instead subject to § 1226(a)(1); (2) ordered Respondents to provide a bond hearing under § 1226(a) within seven days; (3) ordered immediate release if no bond hearing is provided within that time; and (4) required a status update from both parties within ten days regarding the bond hearing results or Mr. D.S.'s release, along with proposals for any further proceedings. The court declined to reach the APA claim (Count Five), Fifth Amendment claim (Count Three), and regulatory claims (Counts Two and Four), deeming them unnecessary given the habeas relief granted.
Reviewer note from the AI+
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