Starr Indemnity & Liability Company, Inc. v. JPF Inc

CASE: Starr Indemnity & Liability Company, Inc. a/s/o (as subrogee of, meaning stepping into the shoes of its insured) Breakthru Beverage Minnesota Wine & Spirits, LLC, and Breakthru Beverage Minnesota Wine & Spirits, LLC v. JPF Inc., JRO Global, Inc., and Easy Express. Case No. 22-cv-3007 (LMP/DTS). U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota. Decided October 7, 2025. Judge Laura M. Provinzino.

FACTS: In 2021, Breakthru Beverage Minnesota Wine & Spirits, LLC ('BTB'), a wholesale liquor distributor, purchased liquor from the Jack Daniel's distillery in Tennessee (Brown-Forman Beverages Worldwide). BTB engaged JPF Inc. ('JPF'), a company it had worked with since the 1990s, to handle transportation. The Brown-Forman purchase order named 'JPF Inc.' as the carrier, and the resulting bill of lading — a shipping document that serves as the contract of carriage — also listed JPF as 'carrier' and directed Brown-Forman to contact JPF employees. JPF describes itself as a federally registered transportation broker; it owns no vehicles and employs no drivers. Because JPF's usual carrier was unavailable, JPF hired JRO Global, Inc. ('JRO') to perform the transport; the JPF-JRO contract identified JPF as broker and JRO as carrier, and prohibited JRO from reassigning the load without written consent. JRO, without notifying JPF, assigned the load to Easy Express through a third party called AB Broker Inc. ('AB'). AB instructed Easy Express — in a 'load confirmation' — to check in as 'JRO Global,' to say the load was going to St. Paul, Minnesota, and to actually deliver to an address in Illinois. Easy Express describes 'blind shipments' (where the bill of lading address differs from the actual delivery address) as common in the freight industry. Easy Express followed AB's instructions and delivered to Illinois. The liquor never reached BTB and is presumed stolen. BTB submitted an insurance claim to Starr Indemnity & Liability Company, Inc. ('Starr') for $288,621.25 and received $188,621.25 (reflecting a $100,000 deductible). Starr filed suit in December 2022. JRO never appeared and had a default judgment entered against it in April 2023.

CLAIMS: Starr sued JPF, JRO, and Easy Express under the Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 14706 et seq., which imposes strict liability (liability without requiring proof of negligence) on carriers for actual loss or injury to goods in interstate transport. Starr also alleged an alternative negligence claim against JPF for negligently hiring JRO. JPF filed a crossclaim against JRO for indemnification. Damages sought: $288,621.25 (combining Starr's payment of $188,621.25 and BTB's $100,000 deductible).

LEGAL FRAMEWORK — CARMACK AMENDMENT: To establish a prima facie case under the Carmack Amendment, a plaintiff must show: (1) delivery to the carrier in good condition; (2) arrival to the purchaser in damaged (or lost) condition; and (3) the amount of damages. The burden then shifts to the carrier to prove one of five defenses: act of God, public enemy, act of the shipper, public authority, or inherent vice of the goods. The Carmack Amendment applies only to 'carriers,' not 'brokers.' A carrier is an entity providing motor vehicle transportation for compensation. A broker arranges transportation by others. The critical question is whether the party 'accepted legal responsibility for' ensuring delivery of the goods — not merely whether it physically transported them or how it labeled itself.

JPF'S MOTION — CARMACK AMENDMENT CLAIM (DENIED): JPF argued it was indisputably a broker, citing its FMCSA (Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration) registration as a broker, its lack of equipment and drivers, the JPF-JRO contract labeling it as broker, and post-incident emails in which BTB's own personnel called JPF a 'broker.' The court rejected each of these as conclusive. Self-designation and federal registration as a broker are relevant but not dispositive. Physical inability to transport does not preclude carrier status, because the Carmack Amendment imposes liability on any entity that accepts legal responsibility for a shipment, regardless of whether it physically transports it. Post-incident references to JPF as 'broker' must be weighed against 263 bills of lading from 2021 listing JPF as 'carrier,' BTB's representative's testimony that he always considered JPF responsible for delivery, the parties' decades-long unwritten relationship, BTB's decision to contact JPF (not JRO or Easy Express) when the shipment disappeared, and JPF's own conduct in tracking down the shipment. Because reasonable jurors could reach different conclusions on whether JPF was a carrier or broker, genuine disputes of material fact preclude summary judgment. Motion DENIED.

JPF'S MOTION — NEGLIGENCE CLAIM (GRANTED): JPF moved for summary judgment on the negligence claim, arguing federal law preempts state tort claims in this area, or that the negligence claim is meritless on the facts. Starr entirely failed to address the negligence claim in its opposition brief. At the oral argument hearing, Starr's counsel acknowledged the omission but said the party did not intend to abandon the claim. The court held this was insufficient: under Eighth Circuit precedent (Satcher v. Univ. of Ark. at Pine Bluff Bd. of Trs., 558 F.3d 731, 735 (8th Cir. 2009)), failure to oppose a basis for summary judgment constitutes waiver (forfeiture) of that argument. Allowing the claim to proceed would prejudice JPF, which had no opportunity to respond to arguments Starr never made. Motion GRANTED on the negligence claim.

EASY EXPRESS'S MOTION (DENIED): Easy Express acknowledged it is a carrier but argued it fulfilled its contractual obligations by delivering to the address AB provided, and therefore cannot be liable. The court rejected this, explaining that under the Carmack Amendment the bill of lading is the governing contract of carriage and controls delivery obligations; any downstream contract providing a different delivery address does not override it. The court cited the Supreme Court's holding in Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Commercial Metals Co., 456 U.S. 336 (1982), and other authority that the bill of lading 'binds the shipper and all connecting carriers.' Easy Express's alternative argument — that JPF is the carrier so Easy Express is just a middleman — also failed, because the Carmack Amendment expressly imposes liability on the receiving carrier, the delivering carrier, and any intermediate carrier, and does not excuse downstream carriers because an upstream entity is also liable. Motion DENIED.

ORDER: (1) JPF's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 43) GRANTED IN PART as to the negligence claim (Count II) and DENIED IN PART as to the Carmack Amendment claim (Count I). (2) Easy Express's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 49) DENIED in its entirety. The case proceeds to trial on the Carmack Amendment claims against JPF and Easy Express.