Shae v. Mchenry

Case: Yee S. v. Pamela Bondi, U.S. Attorney General; Kristi Noem, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security; Tauria Rich, Acting Director, St. Paul Field Office, Immigration and Customs Enforcement; and Warden of Freeborn County Detention Center. File No. 25-CV-02782 (JMB/DLM). Judge Jeffrey M. Bryan, United States District Court, District of Minnesota. Decided October 9, 2025.

BACKGROUND: Yee S. is a native of Burma (Myanmar) who came to the United States as a refugee in 2007 and later became a lawful permanent resident. On January 19, 2021, he pleaded guilty to first-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minnesota Statute § 609.342.1(a). The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated removal proceedings, and Yee S. admitted removability under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii). On September 13, 2021, an Immigration Judge ordered him removed but also granted deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), ordering removal to any country other than Burma that would accept him. That order became final on October 13, 2021.

Because ICE determined there was no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, Yee S. was released in December 2021 under an Order of Supervision pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(g). He complied with all conditions and had no further law enforcement contact. On June 6, 2025, federal marshals re-arrested him. The next day, ICE served a Notice of Revocation of Release citing 'changed circumstances' and stating that ICE was 'in the process of obtaining a travel document,' without identifying any specific country or describing any concrete steps taken. An informal interview was conducted the same day with no meaningful discussion reflected in the notes. Yee S. remained detained at Freeborn County Adult Detention Center. He filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on July 7, 2025, under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (a federal statute allowing courts to review the lawfulness of a person's detention). He later obtained counsel and filed an emergency motion to expedite the ruling and an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction.

JURISDICTION: The court confirmed jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), because Yee S. challenged the revocation of supervised release and continued detention rather than the underlying removal order itself. Respondents did not contest jurisdiction.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK: After a final order of removal, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1) provides a 90-day removal period, after which certain noncitizens may be detained further under § 1231(a)(6). However, indefinite detention is unconstitutional. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689. When ICE releases a noncitizen under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(g) because removal is not significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future, it may revoke that release under § 241.13(i) only upon violation of supervised release or 'changed circumstances' showing a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. § 241.13(i)(2). ICE must also notify the noncitizen of the reasons for revocation and conduct an informal interview promptly. § 241.13(i)(3). The burden under § 241.13 falls on ICE to establish that changed circumstances justify re-detention. The court cited Roble v. Bondi, Escalante v. Noem, Nguyen v. Hyde, and Sarail A. v. Bondi as persuasive authority.

HOLDING — HABEAS PETITION (GRANTED IN PART): The court found that ICE failed to comply with § 241.13(i)(2). The Revocation Notice contained only boilerplate language about 'changed circumstances' and a vague reference to obtaining a travel document, without identifying any country, describing steps taken, or making a reasoned determination based on the factors listed in § 241.13(f) (including history of efforts to remove the noncitizen to third countries, Department of State views, and reasonably foreseeable results of removal efforts). The government's court filings were equally conclusory, citing only an unsubmitted declaration and repeating vague assertions. The court noted that the government provided even less factual support than in Nguyen, where the court found the government's showing insufficient despite evidence of an existing repatriation agreement with Vietnam and active processing of travel documents. The court also noted concern that ICE may have violated the notification requirement of § 241.13(i)(3) by serving the Revocation Notice only after Yee S. was already re-detained. The court ordered Respondents to release Yee S. immediately, no later than 10:00 a.m. CT on October 10, 2025, under the conditions of the original December 2021 Order of Supervision, and required government counsel to file a sworn statement confirming compliance.

HOLDING — PERMANENT INJUNCTION (DENIED): The court denied the request for a permanent injunction barring future detention as insufficiently specific under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(1)(B) and noted that ICE retains the legal authority to re-detain Yee S. in the future if it properly follows § 241.13 regulations.

HOLDING — MOTION TO EXPEDITE AND TRO MOTION (DENIED AS MOOT): Because the habeas petition was granted, both the emergency motion to expedite and the TRO/preliminary injunction motion were denied as moot.

ZADVYDAS ISSUE (NOT DECIDED): Yee S. also raised a constitutional claim under Zadvydas that his detention exceeded six months without a significant likelihood of removal, which would independently require release. The court declined to reach this question in light of its ruling on the regulatory ground, but expressed concern that detention had exceeded six months and noted that the longer detention continues, the shorter the timeframe that can count as the 'reasonably foreseeable future' for purposes of Zadvydas.