Daramola v. Dungarvin Minnesota LLC
- Katherine Menendez
- 0:24-cv-00761
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 4
In Femi Daramola v. Dungarvin Minnesota LLC, Judge Menendez denied Dungarvin's motion to strike Daramola's jury trial demand, finding that although the demand was filed late under the federal rules, the court excused the delay because Dungarvin showed no prejudice and the other relevant factors favored allowing a jury trial.
Employees and plaintiffs in federal employment discrimination cases in the District of Minnesota (and Eighth Circuit) who missed the deadline to demand a jury trial but wish to seek one; defendants in such cases who seek to hold plaintiffs to that waiver. The ruling illustrates that courts retain discretion to allow late jury demands when no prejudice to the opposing party is shown.
What happened
In Femi Daramola v. Dungarvin Minnesota LLC, plaintiff Femi Daramola filed a lawsuit against his employer, Dungarvin Minnesota LLC, but did not ask for a jury trial in his original complaint filed in March 2024. More than a year later, on July 8, 2025, he filed a notice demanding a jury trial. Dungarvin moved to strike that demand, arguing Daramola had given up his right to a jury trial by missing the deadline under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Under those rules, a party must demand a jury trial within 14 days of the last formal court filing (called a 'pleading') that relates to the issues being disputed. In this case, that deadline was March 25, 2025 — 14 days after Dungarvin filed its answer. Because Daramola missed that deadline by months, the court agreed the demand was technically late and that he had waived (given up) his right to a jury under Rule 38. However, a separate rule, Rule 39, gives courts broad authority to still allow a jury trial even after that right has been waived, weighing several factors including whether either side would be harmed.
Judge Menendez applied those factors and denied Dungarvin's motion to strike. The court found that Dungarvin had not shown it would suffer any meaningful harm from allowing a jury trial, since there was still plenty of time before trial for Dungarvin to adjust its approach. The court also noted that employment discrimination cases are commonly decided by juries, the request was not made at the last minute, and the length and reasons for the delay did not justify stripping Daramola of his right to a jury on issues where a jury is available.
The detailed version
This order addresses Defendant Dungarvin Minnesota LLC's Motion to Strike Plaintiff Femi Daramola's jury demand in an employment discrimination case pending in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota.
Background
Daramola filed his original complaint on March 4, 2024, without including a jury demand. Dungarvin filed its answer on March 11, 2025. Daramola first demanded a jury trial on July 8, 2025 — simultaneously with a pending motion to amend his complaint — well past the Rule 38(b) deadline of 14 days after the last pleading (which was March 25, 2025). Dungarvin moved to strike the jury demand as untimely and waived.
Timeliness Under Rule 38
The court confirmed that under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38(b), a party must serve and file a written jury demand within 14 days of serving its last pleading directed at the issues to be tried. Failure to comply constitutes waiver under Rule 38(d). The court rejected Daramola's argument that the scheduling order's deadline for amending his complaint reset the jury demand clock. The court noted, however, that if Daramola's pending motion to amend is granted and new claims are added, a jury demand as to those new claims would be timely — though it observed that bifurcating jury and bench issues between an amended claim (disability discrimination) and the original claim (race discrimination) would make little practical sense.
Rule 39(b) Analysis — Excusing the Waiver
Even though the demand was untimely under Rule 38, Rule 39(b) gives the court broad discretion to order a jury trial on any issue for which a jury could have been demanded. Courts in the Eighth Circuit are instructed to approach Rule 39(b) applications with an open mind and to liberally grant jury trials when no prejudice results. The court applied a five-factor test drawn from Seow v. Miyabi Inc. and Eichten v. KMART Corp.:
- Nature of the issues: Employment discrimination cases are routinely and appropriately tried to juries. This factor favored excusing the waiver.
- Disruption to the court's schedule: The jury demand was not made on the eve of trial. The dispositive motions deadline had not yet passed and no trial order had been issued. This factor favored excusing the waiver.
- Prejudice to Dungarvin: Dungarvin did not demonstrate any specific prejudice from allowing the late jury demand. The court found ample time remained for Dungarvin to adjust its trial strategy. This factor — described as perhaps the most important — favored excusing the waiver.
- Length of the delay: The court found the length of the delay did not justify depriving Daramola of a jury trial.
- Reason for the tardiness: The court found the reasons for the delay did not support striking the demand.
The court also noted a procedural point: Daramola did not formally style his response as a Rule 39(b) motion, but the court construed his jury demand notice and opposition brief as the functional equivalent of such a motion, citing authority that 'some similar manifestation of the desire of a party to have a jury trial will suffice.'
Ruling
Judge Katherine Menendez denied Dungarvin's Motion to Strike (Dkt. No. 64). The jury demand stands. The case will proceed toward a jury trial. The motion to amend the complaint remains pending as of the date of this order.
Reviewer note from the AI+
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