Samuel v. Bondi
Ebenezer Olaniyi Samuel v. Pam Bondi, Kristi Noem, Joseph Edlow, Cindy Munita, and Joshua Marx, in their official capacities
- Laura Provinzino
- 0:25-cv-02140
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 13
In Samuel v. Bondi, Judge Provinzino denied the government's motion to dismiss a Nigerian man's lawsuit seeking court review of his denied naturalization application, holding that the government's pending removal case against him — initiated only by a Notice to Appear, not a formal arrest warrant — does not legally block the court from hearing his case.
Noncitizens (non-U.S. citizens) who have had their naturalization (citizenship) applications denied by USCIS and have filed federal court petitions seeking review, and who are simultaneously facing removal (deportation) proceedings initiated only by a Notice to Appear rather than a formal arrest warrant. This ruling is also relevant to immigration lawyers and government attorneys litigating naturalization cases in the District of Minnesota.
What happened
In Samuel v. Bondi, Ebenezer Olaniyi Samuel, a Nigerian national who became a lawful permanent resident in 2019 through marriage to a U.S. citizen, applied for U.S. citizenship in July 2024. The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied his application in November 2024, concluding his marriage was a sham entered solely to obtain immigration benefits. After USCIS also denied his request for reconsideration, Samuel filed a petition in federal court asking a judge to review that denial. The Department of Homeland Security then initiated separate removal (deportation) proceedings against him by serving a Notice to Appear.
The government moved to dismiss Samuel's petition on two grounds: first, that the pending removal proceedings made the case legally moot (meaning there was nothing left for the court to decide), and second, that Samuel had not stated a valid legal claim. The government relied on a federal law — 8 U.S.C. § 1429 — that bars the Attorney General from considering a naturalization application when removal proceedings are pending 'pursuant to a warrant of arrest,' and on an Eighth Circuit case holding that such proceedings moot a court petition. A key factual and legal dispute centered on whether a Notice to Appear — the document used to initiate Samuel's removal proceedings — is the same as a 'warrant of arrest' under that statute. Courts across the country have disagreed on this question, with the Seventh Circuit saying yes and the Ninth Circuit saying no.
Judge Provinzino sided with the Ninth Circuit's reasoning and denied the government's motion to dismiss on both grounds. The court reasoned that the plain meaning of 'warrant of arrest' refers to a document issued by a neutral magistrate directing law enforcement to take someone into custody — which a Notice to Appear is not. The court also noted that other federal statutes and the government's own regulations treat these two documents as distinct, and that interpreting them as equivalent would render part of § 1429's language meaningless. Additionally, the court applied the Supreme Court's 2024 Loper Bright decision, which eliminated the old rule requiring courts to defer to agencies' interpretations of federal statutes, and independently concluded that the government's regulation equating the two documents is inconsistent with the statute's text. The case will proceed.
The detailed version
- Ebenezer Olaniyi Samuel v. Pam Bondi, Kristi Noem, Joseph Edlow, Cindy Munita, and Joshua Marx, Case No. 25-cv-2140 (LMP/JFD)
- Laura M. Provinzino, United States District Judge
- October 21, 2025
Background
Ebenezer Olaniyi Samuel, a Nigerian national, entered the United States in October 2016 on a B1 non-immigrant (temporary business) visa. He married Daphene Abraham, a U.S. citizen, in May 2017. Abraham filed an immigration petition on his behalf, and USCIS granted Samuel lawful permanent resident (green card) status on July 26, 2019. Samuel applied for naturalization (U.S. citizenship) on July 1, 2024.
Based on a 2019–2020 USCIS investigation and Samuel's naturalization interview, USCIS denied his naturalization application on November 25, 2024, concluding he had entered into a sham marriage for immigration benefits. Because USCIS found the marriage was not genuine, it also concluded Samuel was never lawfully admitted for permanent residence — a prerequisite for naturalization. USCIS denied his request for reconsideration on April 21, 2025.
On May 16, 2025, Samuel filed a petition under 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c), which allows a federal district court to conduct de novo (from scratch, with no deference to USCIS's findings) judicial review of a denied naturalization application. Samuel is proceeding pro se (representing himself without an attorney).
On June 24, 2025, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated removal (deportation) proceedings against Samuel by serving him a Notice to Appear (Form I-862), alleging his sham marriage made him removable. Those proceedings remain pending.
Government's Motion to Dismiss
The government moved to dismiss Samuel's petition under two Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Rule 12(b)(1) (lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, meaning the court has no authority to hear the case) and Rule 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted). The government's core argument was that the pending removal proceedings rendered Samuel's petition moot — that is, there was no longer a live controversy for the court to resolve.
The government relied on 8 U.S.C. § 1429, which states that 'no application for naturalization shall be considered by the Attorney General' if 'there is pending against the applicant a removal proceeding pursuant to a warrant of arrest.' The government also cited Akpovi v. Douglas, 43 F.4th 832 (8th Cir. 2022), in which the Eighth Circuit held that pending removal proceedings — even if initiated after a § 1421(c) petition is filed — prevent a district court from ordering naturalization and render the petition moot.
The Key Legal Question
The court identified a critical issue the government glossed over: Samuel's removal proceedings were initiated only by a Notice to Appear, not a formal warrant of arrest. Section 1429 only restricts naturalization proceedings when removal proceedings are pending 'pursuant to a warrant of arrest.' The Eighth Circuit in Akpovi had not resolved this question because in that case it was undisputed that a warrant of arrest had been issued.
The Circuit Split
- The Seventh Circuit in Klene v. Napolitano, 697 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2012), held that a Notice to Appear constitutes a 'warrant of arrest' under § 1429, relying on a DHS regulation (8 C.F.R. § 318.1) that equates the two for purposes of § 1429. - The Ninth Circuit in Yith v. Nielsen, 881 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2018), explicitly rejected that holding, concluding that DHS's regulation was unreasonable in light of the plain text of § 1429. - Within the Eighth Circuit, a majority of district courts that had addressed the issue sided with the Ninth Circuit. See Sanga v. Barr, 706 F. Supp. 3d 803 (S.D. Iowa 2020); Adegbesote v. Tritten, No. 20-cv-1940 (D. Minn. 2021). A contrary ruling came from Gardener v. Barr, 2019 WL 1001340 (E.D. Mo. 2019).
The Court's Reasoning
Judge Provinzino joined the Ninth Circuit's position for three main reasons:
1. Plain meaning: A 'warrant of arrest' in ordinary and legal usage means a document issued by a disinterested (neutral) magistrate, based on probable cause, directing law enforcement to arrest and take a person into custody. A Notice to Appear does neither — it is more like a summons notifying a noncitizen of removal proceedings. It does not direct custodial arrest.
2. Internal regulatory consistency: DHS's own separate regulations distinguish between a Notice to Appear and a warrant of arrest. For example, 8 C.F.R. § 236.2(a) refers to 'the notice to appear, and the warrant of arrest, if issued,' and 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(b) states that at the time of a Notice to Appear, a noncitizen 'may be arrested' under the authority of a separate Form I-200 (Warrant of Arrest). The court applied the canon of construction that different words in a statute or regulatory scheme are presumed to carry different meanings.
3. Avoiding surplusage: Removal proceedings are always initiated by a Notice to Appear under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a). If 'warrant of arrest' in § 1429 meant the same thing as a Notice to Appear, then the phrase 'pursuant to a warrant of arrest' in § 1429 would be superfluous — it would add nothing because every removal proceeding involves a Notice to Appear. Courts must construe statutes to give effect to every word, not render any portion meaningless (the canon against surplusage).
Loper Bright and Post-Chevron Analysis
The court also noted that prior cases (including Yith, Klene, Sanga, Adegbesote, and Gardener) were decided under the now-overruled Chevron doctrine, which required courts to defer to agencies' reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutes. The Supreme Court eliminated Chevron deference in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024). Under Loper Bright, courts must independently determine the best reading of a statute. Applying that standard, the court found DHS's regulation equating a Notice to Appear with a 'warrant of arrest' is inconsistent with the statute's plain text and cannot stand.
The court also expressly rejected the reasoning in Klene (which used no traditional tools of statutory interpretation and cited no authority for its claim that all circuits agreed) and Gardener (which relied on policy concerns about removal proceedings taking priority over naturalization, rather than on statutory text).
Rule 12(b)(6) Ruling
The government's failure-to-state-a-claim argument was derivative of its mootness argument — it argued that Samuel's request for relief was barred as a matter of law because § 1429 prevented the Attorney General from naturalizing him. Having rejected that premise, the court also denied the Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
Procedural Notes
Samuel filed his opposition brief two weeks late, after the motion had already been taken under advisement. The court declined to grant the motion on that basis alone, given Samuel's pro se status and continued litigation efforts, but warned him that future late filings could result in motions being granted by default. The court did not consider the arguments in the late-filed brief. Samuel had also moved to stay proceedings pending an Illinois state-court declaratory judgment action about his marriage's validity; he later withdrew that request after the Illinois case was dismissed. Both the stay motion and the motion to continue proceedings were denied as moot.
Outcome
- Government's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 9): DENIED. - Samuel's Motion to Stay Proceedings (ECF No. 16): DENIED as moot. - Samuel's Motion to Continue Proceedings (ECF No. 23): DENIED as moot. - The case will proceed.
Reviewer note from the AI+
Read the full 13-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.