Avila v. Bondi
Joaquin Herrera Avila v. Pamela Bondi, Attorney General; Kristi Noem, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Todd M. Lyons, Acting Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Sirce Owen, Acting Director for Executive Office for Immigration Review; Peter Berg, Director, Fort Snelling Field Office Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Ryan Shea, Sheriff of Freeborn County; Samuel Olson, Director, St. Paul Field Office Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Executive Office for Immigration Review; and U.S. Department of Homeland Security
- John Tunheim
- 0:25-cv-03741
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 17
In Joaquin Herrera Avila v. Pamela Bondi et al., Judge Tunheim granted a petition for release from immigration detention, ruling that Petitioner Joaquin Herrera Avila — a Mexican citizen who entered the U.S. without authorization and was later arrested during a traffic stop — is entitled to a bond hearing under the discretionary detention statute (8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)) rather than being subject to mandatory detention under a different statute (8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)).
Noncitizens (particularly those who entered the United States without authorization and have been living in the country for years) who are detained by ICE and facing removal proceedings in the District of Minnesota — and potentially elsewhere — may be affected by this ruling's determination that such individuals are entitled to a discretionary bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) rather than subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). The ruling directly requires federal immigration authorities to provide Avila a bond hearing within 7 days.
What happened
In Joaquin Herrera Avila v. Pamela Bondi et al., Joaquin Herrera Avila, a Mexican citizen who entered the United States without authorization in 2006 and again in 2016, was arrested by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) during a traffic stop in Minneapolis on August 29, 2025. He was detained and given a Notice to Appear for removal proceedings. Avila filed a petition asking a federal court to order that he receive a bond hearing — a proceeding before an immigration judge at which he could argue he should be released while his case proceeds — rather than be held without any hearing.
The federal government argued the court lacked authority to hear the case and that a different immigration law, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), required Avila to be held without any bond hearing because he was never lawfully admitted to the country. The court rejected both arguments. On jurisdiction, it held that Avila's challenge to the legality of his detention — as distinct from his removal proceedings — is the kind of claim courts may hear. On the merits, the court found that § 1225(b)(2) applies to people actively "seeking admission" at the border, not to someone like Avila who had lived in the country for years. The court also reasoned that the government's broad reading would make parts of the 2025 Laken Riley Act meaningless, because those provisions specifically mandate detention for certain long-term unauthorized residents only if they have committed enumerated crimes — which would be unnecessary if § 1225(b)(2) already covered everyone in that situation.
Judge Tunheim granted the habeas petition (the formal request for release from unlawful detention) and ordered that Respondents must provide Avila a bond hearing within 7 days. If no hearing is held, Avila must be immediately released. The court also barred the government from moving Avila out of the District of Minnesota before the bond hearing takes place. Avila's separate motion for a temporary restraining order was denied as moot because the petition itself provided the relief he sought. The parties must file a status update with the court within 10 days reporting the outcome of any bond hearing or confirming Avila's release.
The detailed version
- Joaquin Herrera Avila v. Pamela Bondi et al., Civil No. 25-3741 (JRT/SGE)
- John R. Tunheim, United States District Judge
- October 21, 2025
Procedural Posture
Petitioner Joaquin Herrera Avila filed a Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (a court order challenging the lawfulness of his detention) and a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. The parties consented at an October 2, 2025 status conference to having the court decide the merits of the petition. The court granted the petition in part and denied the temporary restraining order as moot.
Statutory Framework
The core dispute concerns which of two federal immigration detention statutes governs Avila's detention. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) applies to "applicants for admission" — defined as aliens present in the U.S. who have not been admitted or who arrive in the U.S. — and mandates detention pending removal proceedings if an immigration officer determines the person is not clearly entitled to be admitted. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), by contrast, applies to aliens already in the country and facing removal; it is discretionary, allowing the Attorney General to detain, release on bond (minimum $1,500), or release on conditional parole. A third provision, § 1226(c), as amended by the 2025 Laken Riley Act, mandates detention for certain inadmissible aliens who have been arrested for, charged with, or convicted of specified crimes. Avila has not committed any such enumerated crime.
Facts
Avila, a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the U.S. without inspection in 2006 and again without admission or parole near Hidalgo, Texas, on or about October 10, 2016. On August 29, 2025, ICE encountered him during a traffic stop in Minneapolis; he admitted entering illegally and lacking lawful status documentation. He was arrested and issued a Notice to Appear charging inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (present without admission or parole) and § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) (lacking valid entry documents). The Notice to Appear checked the box for "alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or paroled" but did not check the box for "arriving alien." His Form I-213 likewise identified him as present without having been admitted or paroled.
Respondents' Arguments
1. Jurisdiction: Respondents argued that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) strips the district court of subject matter jurisdiction because § 1252(g) bars judicial review of the Attorney General's decisions to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders. 2. Merits: Respondents argued that § 1225(b)(2) mandates Avila's detention because the statutory definition of "applicant for admission" encompasses any noncitizen present in the country who has not been lawfully admitted, citing the Board of Immigration Appeals decision in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).
Court's Holdings
Jurisdiction (§ 1252(g)): The court held that § 1252(g) does not bar Avila's habeas claim. The Supreme Court has construed § 1252(g) narrowly to cover only three discrete actions: commencing proceedings, adjudicating cases, and executing removal orders. Avila's challenge — contesting the lawfulness of his detention without a bond hearing — is independent of and collateral to the removal process itself. The court also noted that even if § 1252(g) were implicated, the Eighth Circuit recognizes an exception for habeas claims raising pure questions of law, and the question here (which detention statute applies) is precisely such a question.
Merits — Which Detention Statute Applies: The court held that § 1226(a) governs Avila's detention, not § 1225(b)(2), for three independent reasons:
1. Plain text: Section 1225(b)(2)(A) uses the phrase "alien seeking admission," which implies current, active conduct — most logically occurring at the border upon inspection. Avila has lived in the country for years and is not currently seeking admission. Reading § 1225(b)(2) to apply to every person who qualifies as an "applicant for admission" under § 1225(a)(1) would render the "seeking admission" language superfluous, which courts must avoid.
2. Avoidance of surplusage — Laken Riley Act: If § 1225(b)(2) already mandated detention of every inadmissible alien present in the country, the 2025 Laken Riley Act's amendments to § 1226(c)(1)(E) — which specifically mandate detention for inadmissible aliens only when they have additionally committed enumerated crimes — would be entirely superfluous. Statutes must be construed to give effect to every provision.
3. Record evidence: Avila's Notice to Appear checked the box for alien present without admission or parole, not the box for "arriving alien." Consistent with Maldonado v. Olson, No. 25-3142 (D. Minn. Aug. 15, 2025), the plain text of the Notice to Appear supports application of § 1226 rather than § 1225.
The court explicitly declined to follow the BIA's contrary interpretation in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, citing Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024) (courts must exercise independent judgment on questions of law and may not defer to agency interpretations simply because a statute is ambiguous).
Additional Party — Samuel Olson
Samuel Olson, Director of the ICE St. Paul Field Office, was omitted from the original petition but named in later filings. Both sides treated him as a respondent. The court added him on its own initiative under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21. The court also declined to dismiss other named respondents (DHS, ICE, EOIR, and Sirce Owen) even though they may not have direct custody, because it was unclear who would be responsible for complying with the bond-hearing order.
Orders Entered:
- Samuel Olson joined as Respondent.
- Habeas petition GRANTED: (a) Avila is not subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2); § 1226(a) governs; (b) Respondents must provide Avila a bond hearing within 7 days, at which both sides may present evidence on danger to the community and flight risk; (c) if no bond hearing is held within 7 days, Avila must be immediately released; (d) within 10 days, parties must file a status update on the bond hearing results or Avila's release and advise whether further proceedings are needed.
- Respondents ENJOINED from moving Avila outside the District of Minnesota before the bond hearing. Post-hearing transfers under § 1226(a) require prior court approval.
- Motion for Temporary Restraining Order DENIED as moot.
- Parties have 3 days to file any requests for redaction.
Reviewer note from the AI+
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