Jennifer W. v. Bisignano

Case: Jennifer W. v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security, No. 24-cv-4127 (DJF), U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota. Decision issued November 14, 2025, by Magistrate Judge Dulce J. Foster.

Background and Procedural History Jennifer W. applied for disability insurance benefits (DIB) on November 15, 2021, alleging disability onset of January 1, 2020, based on complex PTSD, major depressive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and several physical conditions. She was 30 years old at the time of application with a GED and past work as a bartender/server, dispatcher, customer service representative, long-term caregiver, and security guard.

The Social Security Administration denied her claim initially and on reconsideration. An ALJ held a hearing on October 3, 2023, at which Jennifer W. and a vocational expert (VE) testified, with Jennifer W. represented by counsel. On December 14, 2023, the ALJ issued a decision denying DIB.

In the five-step sequential disability evaluation: at step one, the ALJ found Jennifer W.'s dog-walking work after onset did not constitute substantial gainful activity; at step two, he found three severe impairments (major depressive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and PTSD) and several non-severe impairments; at step three, he found no listed impairment was met or equaled. The ALJ assessed a residual functional capacity (RFC — the most a claimant can do despite her limitations) allowing a full range of work at all physical exertion levels but with nonexertional (mental and behavioral) restrictions: simple, routine, repetitive tasks not at fast production-rate pace; only occasional and superficial interactions with supervisors and co-workers; no public interaction; and only occasional, predictable workplace changes. At step four, the ALJ found she could not perform her past work. At step five, relying on VE testimony, the ALJ found she could perform hand packager (DOT 920.587-018, ~90,000 jobs), inspector/Rug-Inspector Helper (DOT 589.686-038, ~80,000 jobs), and warehouse worker (DOT 922.687-058, ~120,000 jobs) jobs existing in significant numbers nationally.

Jennifer W. asked the Appeals Council to review the decision and submitted two categories of new evidence: (1) 17 pages of Allina Health Systems records from September 2023; and (2) a 10-page psychological evaluation report and 5-page mental functioning questionnaire (collectively 'Richardson Evidence') completed by licensed psychologist Thomas K. Richardson, M.A., L.P., L.S.P., following his evaluation of Jennifer W. on January 25, 2024. The Appeals Council declined to consider the Allina records (finding no reasonable probability they would change the outcome) and declined to consider the Richardson Evidence because it post-dated the ALJ's decision and therefore purportedly did not 'relate to the period at issue.' The Appeals Council denied review, leaving the ALJ's denial in place.

Issue 1: Appeals Council's Exclusion of the Richardson Evidence The court reviewed de novo whether the Richardson Evidence was new, material, and related to the relevant period — the standard that would require the Appeals Council to consider it under 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(a)(5) and (b).

New and non-cumulative: The court found the Richardson Evidence was not merely cumulative of existing record evidence. The Commissioner argued it was cumulative of past diagnoses, treatment records, daily activity evidence, and a prior two-page checkbox medical opinion. The court disagreed, noting the Richardson Evidence was by far the most detailed mental health opinion in the record: it included a clinical interview, reported history, a battery of objective cognitive and mental functioning tests, test results, interpretation, conclusions, diagnoses, and treatment recommendations. Richardson's conclusion that Jennifer W. 'likely would be viewed as not suitable for competitive employment' and his completed Mental Functioning Questionnaire (drawing on 25 years of experience with Minnesota's vocational rehabilitation system) had no equivalent in the prior record.

Material and related to the relevant period: The court rejected the Commissioner's argument that the post-decision timing of the evaluation made it immaterial. Under Eighth Circuit precedent, the exact timing of new evidence is not dispositive of materiality. The court found the Richardson Evidence related to Jennifer W.'s condition before the ALJ's decision because: (a) there was no record evidence of significant deterioration in the approximately six weeks between the ALJ's December 2023 decision and the January 2024 evaluation; (b) Richardson's findings relied substantially on Jennifer W.'s long-standing mental health history, including substance addiction, multiple self-harm incidents dating to middle school, childhood trauma, domestic abuse, and a 'long-standing history of substantial depression issues resulting in multiple hospitalizations'; and (c) the suggestion of a sudden onset or worsening in a six-week window was highly improbable given that history. The court also rejected the Commissioner's argument that Richardson's 'unspecified neurocognitive disorder' diagnosis captured an 'after-acquired condition,' calling that argument premised on the 'meritless notion that a medical condition cannot exist unless it is diagnosed.'

Good cause for late production: Jennifer W. was referred for neuropsychological testing on June 8, 2023 — roughly four months before the ALJ hearing and six months before the decision. The delay was attributable to scheduling backlogs, not lack of diligence. The parties did not meaningfully dispute good cause.

The court declined the Commissioner's invitation to assess how the Richardson Evidence might affect the overall outcome, explaining that when the Appeals Council improperly fails to consider new evidence (as opposed to considering it and declining review), the court's role is limited to whether the evidence should have been considered — not to reweighing the record. The court ordered remand directly to the ALJ (under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), sentence four) with instructions to consider the Richardson Evidence in the context of the full record and recall a VE if a modified RFC requires it.

Issue 2: VE Testimony — Internal Inconsistency Jennifer W. raised two challenges to the step-five VE testimony. The first, regarding the hand packager's duty to regulate conveyor speed, was rejected: the court found nothing in the DOT description of hand packager indicating a pace or rate requirement inconsistent with her RFC's prohibition on fast production-rate work.

The second inconsistency was upheld. The DOT requires level 2 reasoning for both the hand packager and warehouse worker occupations, which means the ability to 'carry out detailed but uninvolved written or oral instructions.' The VE simultaneously testified (a) that Jennifer W. could perform those occupations, and (b) that her limitation to 'simple, routine, repetitive tasks precludes the ability to carry out detailed, written and oral instructions.' The court found this internal self-contradiction — distinct from any DOT-versus-RFC conflict — rendered the VE's testimony unreliable. The Commissioner's argument that Eighth Circuit and district court precedent forecloses any inconsistency between a simple-tasks limitation and level-2 DOT reasoning was found to miss the point: the issue was not VE testimony vs. DOT, but the VE contradicting himself. The ALJ was required to resolve this conflict and failed to do so.

Issue 3: VE Testimony — Unreliable Job Numbers On cross-examination, the VE could not articulate a coherent methodology for his job-number estimates, describing only a vague 'count' from the Bureau of Labor Statistics website and the Occupational Outlook Handbook, calling it his 'own homemade way.' He referenced a PhD background in statistics and 30+ years as a Social Security contractor, but offered no further explanation.

In post-hearing written objections, Jennifer W. submitted data from Job Browser Pro — described by the Seventh Circuit as a 'well-accepted' database in the field — showing dramatically different numbers: hand packager, approximately 72,297 (vs. VE's ~90,000); inspector, 15 (vs. VE's ~80,000); warehouse worker, approximately 4,109 (vs. VE's ~120,000).

The ALJ overruled the objections based solely on the VE's years of experience. The court rejected this as insufficient. Citing Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97 (2019), the court noted that even a highly credentialed VE must be able to explain the methodology behind job-number estimates in understandable terms. The VE's 'homemade' description identified no methodology, let alone a well-accepted one, and the wildly divergent numbers from a reliable database (particularly the inspector figure of 15 vs. 80,000) undermined any confidence in the estimates. The court concluded the VE's testimony lacked sufficient reliability to constitute substantial evidence supporting the step-five conclusion.

Disposition The court: (1) granted Jennifer W.'s request for relief in part and denied it in part; (2) denied the Commissioner's request to affirm; and (3) vacated the ALJ's decision and remanded under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), sentence four, for further administrative proceedings. On remand, the ALJ must consider the Richardson Evidence, reassess the five-step analysis as warranted, and recall a VE to provide job-number estimates based on reliable sources and a well-accepted, articulable methodology, also resolving the prior VE's internal inconsistency regarding detailed instructions.