Ollestad v. City of Mora
Thomas Richard Ollestad v. City of Mora, Deputy Russell Coleman, in his individual capacity, Deputy Dylan Vangorden, in his individual capacity, and Deputy Jake Kleszky, in his individual capacity
- Katherine Menendez
- 0:25-cv-00003
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 21
In Ollestad v. City of Mora, Judge Menendez dismissed with prejudice all seven claims brought by Thomas Richard Ollestad against Kanabec County sheriff's deputies and the City of Mora, finding that the deputies' use of force during his March 2024 courthouse arrest was reasonable and that none of his other civil rights, disability, or municipal liability claims were adequately supported by the facts alleged.
Individuals who have been subjected to force during arrest and wish to bring civil rights claims against law enforcement officers, as well as plaintiffs seeking to raise disability accommodation claims in the context of arrest. Also relevant to litigants attempting to challenge state court orders in federal district court.
What happened
In Ollestad v. City of Mora, Thomas Richard Ollestad sued three sheriff's deputies — Russell Coleman, Dylan VanGorden, and Jake Kleszky — and the City of Mora after he was arrested on March 21, 2024, at the Kanabec County Courthouse. Ollestad had entered the courthouse law library in violation of a court administrative order restricting his access, refused repeated deputy commands to leave (responding with profanity), and was physically taken to the ground and handcuffed. He filed seven claims including excessive force, failure to provide medical care, violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), a related Rehabilitation Act claim, failure to train and supervise, municipal policy liability, and a substantive due process violation.
The court reviewed video footage and an audio recording of the arrest alongside the allegations in Ollestad's complaint. On the excessive force claim, the court found the deputies gave Ollestad multiple chances to leave, warned him of arrest, and used only the force necessary to handcuff a non-compliant person — and that they were not aware of his shoulder injury before the arrest began. On the deliberate indifference to medical needs claim, the court found Ollestad had contradicted himself about which shoulder was injured and stopped complaining shortly after being handcuffed, making it implausible that the deputies knowingly ignored a serious medical need. On the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims, the court found no evidence the deputies knew of his disabilities, that he never requested an accommodation, and that the 'wrongful arrest' theory he relied on has never been formally adopted by the Eighth Circuit (the federal appeals court covering this region). The failure-to-train, municipal liability, and substantive due process claims all failed as well, largely because no underlying constitutional violation was plausibly alleged.
Judge Menendez granted the defendants' motion to dismiss and dismissed Ollestad's entire complaint with prejudice — meaning he cannot refile the same claims — finding that amending the complaint would be futile. The court also denied as moot Ollestad's own motion to strike defenses raised in the defendants' answer, since the whole case was being dismissed. The court also noted, as a procedural matter, that to the extent Ollestad challenged the validity of the state court's March 2024 administrative order, that challenge was barred by a legal doctrine (called Rooker-Feldman) that prevents federal district courts from reviewing state court judgments.
The detailed version
CASE: Ollestad v. City of Mora, No. 25-cv-3 (KMM/LIB), U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota. JUDGE: Katherine Menendez, United States District Judge. DECIDED: November 18, 2025.
BACKGROUND: Plaintiff Thomas Richard Ollestad filed suit on January 2, 2025, arising from his March 21, 2024 arrest at the Kanabec County Courthouse in Mora, Minnesota. The Kanabec County courts had previously issued administrative orders in November 2023 and March 2024 restricting Ollestad's courthouse access due to repeated disrespectful, abusive, and threatening behavior toward court staff. Despite these orders, Ollestad entered the courthouse law library on March 21, 2024, and began using its computers. Deputies Coleman, VanGorden, and Kleszky approached him, repeatedly (at least ten times) ordered him to leave, and warned him of arrest. Ollestad refused, responding with profanity including 'I don't give a fuck.' The deputies then physically took him to the ground, handcuffed him, and arrested him for disorderly conduct. During the arrest, Ollestad complained his 'fucking shoulder is broken' but contradicted himself about which shoulder was hurt. After being brought to his feet, the deputies used his uninjured left arm to escort him out. Ollestad underwent a medical screening at the jail which noted shoulder pain but found no signs requiring immediate care. The entire recorded interaction lasted approximately six minutes.
CLAIMS ASSERTED (all dismissed):
1. EXCESSIVE FORCE (42 U.S.C. § 1983 / Fourth Amendment): Ollestad claimed the deputies used unprovoked, unreasonable force. The court applied the qualified immunity framework, requiring both a constitutional violation and that the violated right was 'clearly established.' Under Graham v. Connor (1989), force is evaluated for objective reasonableness based on the severity of the crime, whether the suspect posed a threat, and whether the suspect was resisting arrest. The court found the deputies gave multiple warnings before using any force, and then used only the force necessary to subdue a non-compliant person. The deputies were not on notice of Ollestad's shoulder injury before the arrest began; Ollestad never mentioned it until he was already being handcuffed. Under Copeland v. Locke (8th Cir. 2010), aggravation of a pre-existing injury unknown to officers does not establish excessive force. DISMISSED for failure to state a claim.
2. DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE TO MEDICAL NEED (§ 1983 / Fourteenth Amendment — the court recharacterized this from Fourth to Fourteenth Amendment because Ollestad was a pretrial detainee): A deliberate indifference claim requires (1) an objectively serious medical need, and (2) that defendants knew of the need yet deliberately disregarded it. The standard exceeds gross negligence. The court found that even assuming a serious medical need existed, Ollestad contradicted himself about which shoulder was injured, stopped complaining shortly after handcuffing, and never indicated his mental health issues to the deputies. Insufficient to plausibly allege the deputies had subjective awareness of a serious risk. DISMISSED.
3. AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (ADA) — TITLE II: Ollestad claimed the deputies discriminated against him by failing to accommodate his disabilities during the arrest. ADA Title II requires showing the plaintiff is a qualified individual with a disability who was denied program benefits or services because of disability, and that any discrimination was intentional or the result of deliberate indifference. The court found: (a) the deputies had no notice of his disabilities; (b) Ollestad never requested an accommodation; and (c) under the 'wrongful arrest' theory (that officers mistook disability-related behavior for criminal conduct), that theory has never been formally adopted by the Supreme Court or Eighth Circuit, and even if available, Ollestad failed to allege his arrest resulted from any such mistake — the arrest was for disorderly conduct based on his own profane and non-compliant behavior, not a misidentification of disability symptoms as criminal conduct. DISMISSED.
4. REHABILITATION ACT (against City of Mora): The Rehabilitation Act prohibits disability discrimination in federally funded programs and operates similarly to the ADA. A failure-to-train theory under the Act requires showing intentionality or deliberate indifference. The court noted the City of Mora was likely the wrong defendant (the deputies were Kanabec County Sheriff's Deputies), but dismissed on the merits regardless, finding no plausible allegations of inadequate training conducted with intent or deliberate indifference toward disabled persons. DISMISSED.
5. FAILURE TO TRAIN AND SUPERVISE (§ 1983 against the individual deputies): A supervising officer can be liable under § 1983 for failure to train or supervise if they were deliberately indifferent to or tacitly authorized the unconstitutional acts and had notice of inadequate training. Because the court found no underlying constitutional violation by any deputy, and because Ollestad alleged no facts showing any deputy was deliberately indifferent to another's conduct, this claim failed. DISMISSED.
6. MONELL / MUNICIPAL LIABILITY (§ 1983 against City of Mora): Under Monell v. Dep't of Social Services (1978), a municipality can be liable under § 1983 only if a constitutional violation resulted from (1) an official policy, (2) an unofficial custom, or (3) deliberate indifference to a failure to train or supervise. Ollestad alleged several unofficial customs of aggressive and excessive policing. However, the court held that absent an underlying constitutional violation by a city employee, there can be no Monell liability. Because the court found no constitutional violation, this claim could not proceed. DISMISSED.
7. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS (§ 1983 / Fourteenth Amendment): Ollestad claimed the deputies' conduct was 'brutal,' 'inhumane,' 'outrageous,' and 'conscience shocking.' The substantive due process clause protects against government conduct that 'shocks the conscience' or interferes with fundamental liberties. Only 'truly egregious and extraordinary' state action gives rise to such a claim. The court found the deputies used only reasonable force to arrest a non-compliant person violating a court order. Their conduct was not egregious or extraordinary. DISMISSED.
ROOKER-FELDMAN: The court also noted that to the extent Ollestad's complaint sought to have the March 2024 administrative order declared illegal or void, such a challenge was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prohibits federal district courts from reviewing or overturning state court judgments.
ADDITIONAL PROCEDURAL NOTE: Ollestad did not file a response to the motion to dismiss but did file a Motion to Strike the defendants' answer. The court denied the Motion to Strike as moot because the entire complaint was dismissed.
DISPOSITION: Defendants' Motion to Dismiss GRANTED. Complaint DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE (no refiling permitted; the court found amendment would be futile). Plaintiff's Motion to Strike DENIED AS MOOT.
Reviewer note from the AI+
Read the full 21-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.