Shopek v. City of Minneapolis

CASE: Shopek v. City of Minneapolis, Gina Filigenzi, Paul Cameron, and Destiny Xiong, No. 24-cv-4118 (LMP/EMB), U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota. JUDGE: Laura M. Provinzino, United States District Judge. DECIDED: December 1, 2025.

BACKGROUND: Plaintiff Brian Jeffrey Shopek, proceeding pro se (without an attorney), was employed by the City of Minneapolis as Supervisor of IT Deskside Services beginning January 2019. He has diagnosed anxiety, depression, and ADHD. His supervisor was defendant Gina Filigenzi (Director of ServiceDesk); defendant Paul Cameron was the City's Chief Information Officer; and defendant Destiny Xiong was a City Human Resources Manager and ADA Coordinator.

From 2020 onward, Shopek worked primarily remotely due to COVID-19 safety concerns. Beginning in 2022, the City required him to return to a hybrid schedule (at least three days on-site per week). Shopek struggled to comply, citing anxiety, particularly stemming from his discomfort with being in the office when Filigenzi was present. He made multiple requests for full-time remote work and related accommodations, which the City denied in whole or part, concluding that on-site supervision of his direct-reports team was an essential function of his position. The City instead offered partial accommodations including intermittent FMLA leave, which Shopek used extensively — largely to avoid coming to the office when Filigenzi was present.

After Shopek exhausted his twelve weeks of FMLA leave and refused to return to work on site as instructed on September 18, 2023, the City deemed his employment ended as a resignation under Civil Service Rule 13.06 (which provides that failure to return from a leave of absence is treated as a resignation). Shopek filed a charge of discrimination with the Minneapolis Department of Civil Rights (MDCR), which found no probable cause. He also received a right-to-sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in December 2024.

SHOPEK'S CLAIMS: Shopek's amended complaint (ECF No. 49) asserted twelve counts: (I) ADA disability discrimination; (II) ADA retaliation; (III) ADA failure to accommodate; (IV) ADA improper medical inquiries; (V) disability discrimination under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA); (VI) MHRA retaliation; (VII) wrongful discharge under Minnesota law; (VIII) Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (IX) FMLA interference; (X) FMLA retaliation; (XI) intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) under Minnesota common law; and (XII) violation of the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act (MGDPA).

Defendants moved to dismiss the entire amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

LEGAL STANDARD: The court applies the Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard — the complaint must allege enough facts to make the claim 'plausible on its face,' not merely possible. Pro se complaints are construed liberally but must still allege sufficient supporting facts.

ADA CLAIMS (Counts I–IV):

1. Individual Liability: The ADA does not impose personal liability on individual supervisors or co-workers. The court dismissed all ADA claims against Filigenzi, Cameron, and Xiong. Construing those claims as official-capacity claims (as Shopek urged) would make them duplicative of the claims against the City itself.

2. Administrative Exhaustion: ADA plaintiffs must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC (or a state/local equivalent agency) before suing in federal court. The court found that Shopek's Charge and Amended Charge to the MDCR adequately covered his claims of discrimination, failure to accommodate, and retaliation — these could reasonably be expected to grow from his filed charges. However, the court held that Shopek never raised allegations of improper medical inquiries before the agency, so Count IV (improper medical inquiries) was dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

3. Disability Discrimination (Count I): To qualify for ADA protection, an employee must be a 'qualified individual' — someone who can perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation. The court found that the essential functions of Shopek's supervisor role included on-site, in-person supervision of his direct-report team. The accommodations Shopek sought — full-time remote work, attending all meetings virtually, and avoiding in-person contact with Filigenzi — would have eliminated that essential function rather than merely modifying how it was performed. The court cited binding Eighth Circuit precedent: an accommodation is unreasonable if it requires the employer to eliminate an essential job function. Additional FMLA leave beyond the statutory twelve weeks is also not a reasonable accommodation. Because Shopek's preferred accommodations were unreasonable as a matter of law, he was not a 'qualified individual,' and Count I was dismissed. The court also noted that the City's past willingness to permit remote work did not legally establish that such an arrangement was a 'reasonable' accommodation going forward.

4. ADA Retaliation (Count II): A plaintiff must show (1) protected activity, (2) an adverse action, and (3) a but-for causal connection between them. The court found no plausible causal connection. The City's accommodations process was ongoing and responsive; the City revoked Shopek's accommodations only after his medical documentation expired and he refused to submit updated documentation. After he provided updated documentation, the City re-evaluated his requests and granted some. The City placed Shopek on continuous leave because he could not perform essential job functions, not because he filed complaints. His separation resulted from his voluntary refusal to return to work after his FMLA leave was exhausted, which triggered Civil Service Rule 13.06. The court dismissed Count II.

5. Failure to Accommodate (Count III): Because Shopek could not establish a prima facie case of ADA disability discrimination (he was not a 'qualified individual'), he necessarily could not prevail on a failure-to-accommodate claim. Count III was dismissed.

SECTION 1983 / DUE PROCESS CLAIM (Count VIII): Section 1983 allows civil suits against government actors who deprive individuals of constitutional rights. Shopek alleged that defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process by classifying his separation as a resignation under Civil Service Rule 13.06, thereby denying him the right to appeal.

Against the Individual Defendants (in their individual capacities): Shopek failed to allege that Filigenzi, Cameron, or Xiong personally caused the denial of a meaningful appeal process. The individuals who told Shopek he could not appeal were different City officials not named as defendants. His allegation that the Individual Defendants categorized his departure as a resignation specifically to prevent an appeal was unsupported and conclusory. Moreover, Civil Service Rule 13.06 plainly mandates that failure to return from leave 'will be considered a resignation,' and Shopek admitted he did not return. The court found no reasonable inference of unconstitutional motive. Claims against the Individual Defendants were dismissed.

Against the City: Municipal liability under § 1983 requires both (a) an official policy, custom, or practice and (b) an underlying constitutional violation by a city employee. Because the court found no constitutional violation by any individual city employee, the § 1983 claim against the City also failed.

FMLA CLAIMS (Counts IX and X):

1. Interference (Count IX): An FMLA interference claim requires showing the employer denied benefits to which the employee was entitled. Shopek alleged three theories: (a) Filigenzi required him to work while on FMLA leave; (b) he was 'forced' to take FMLA leave; and (c) he was placed on a continuous leave of absence using his FMLA time. As to (a), the court reviewed the email Shopek cited: Filigenzi expressly affirmed his right to FMLA leave and only asked him to plan for how his team's work would be covered, which is not interference. As to (b), the record showed Shopek voluntarily chose to use FMLA leave to avoid being in the office when Filigenzi was present. As to (c), the City placed him on continuous leave because he demonstrably could not fulfill the essential function of on-site supervision — not to interfere with FMLA rights. Count IX was dismissed.

2. Retaliation (Count X): Shopek alleged retaliation for taking FMLA leave in the form of restricted duties upon return, failure to properly reinstate him, and use of team members' complaints against him. However, Shopek acknowledged that team members did raise legitimate leadership concerns. His conclusory allegation that those concerns were motivated by his FMLA use was insufficient. Furthermore, the City offered Shopek a return to work within a week of placing him on leave — well before his FMLA entitlement expired — but he refused to attend an in-person meeting with Cameron as a condition of return. His ultimate separation resulted from his own choice not to return after exhausting his FMLA entitlement. There was no plausible inference that FMLA use — rather than his failure to return — caused the separation. Count X was dismissed.

STATE-LAW CLAIMS (Counts V–VII, XI–XII): After dismissing all federal claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)) over the five remaining Minnesota state-law claims (MHRA discrimination and retaliation, wrongful discharge, IIED, and MGDPA). The court noted that when all federal claims are dismissed before trial, considerations of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and respect for state courts (comity) generally favor allowing state courts to decide state-law issues. These claims were dismissed without a ruling on their merits, meaning Shopek may potentially refile them in Minnesota state court.

DISPOSITION: Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to all federal claims (Counts I–IV, VIII–X); those claims are dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim. The motion is DENIED AS MOOT as to state-law claims (Counts V–VII, XI–XII); those claims are dismissed without prejudice due to declination of supplemental jurisdiction. Judgment to be entered accordingly.