Myers v. Itasca County HRA

This opinion addresses three post-judgment motions filed by pro se plaintiff Tricia Marie Myers following the court's August 19, 2025 grant of summary judgment (a ruling in favor of the defendants without a trial) in favor of Itasca County HRA and individual defendants Diane Larson, Carrie Schmitz, and Kenda Roddenberg. The underlying case involved Myers's claims that her constitutional due process and equal protection rights were violated when her federal housing vouchers were terminated after HRA found she had engaged in illegal drug use.

Motion to Vacate Summary Judgment (Denied) Myers filed a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) — which allows a party to ask a court to alter or amend a judgment — on September 23, 2025. The court denied this motion on two independent grounds. First, a Rule 59(e) motion must be filed within 28 days of entry of judgment; Myers filed 34 days after judgment was entered on August 20, 2025, making the motion untimely. Second, even if timely, Myers's supporting memorandum did not seek to alter or amend the judgment in the technical sense, but instead asked the court to reconsider its prior ruling and reach a different outcome — functionally a motion to reconsider. Under District of Minnesota Local Rule 7.1(j), a party must obtain the court's permission and demonstrate 'compelling circumstances' before filing a motion to reconsider. Myers did neither. The court noted that Rule 59(e) motions are not meant to give litigants a second chance to re-litigate decided issues, citing Nordgren v. Hennepin County.

Motion to Extend Time to File Notice of Appeal (Granted) Myers did not file her notice of appeal within the standard 30-day deadline set by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(A). Judgment was entered August 20, 2025; her notice of appeal was filed October 15, 2025. However, under Rule 4(a)(5), a district court may extend the deadline if: (1) the extension motion is filed within 30 days after the original deadline expired; and (2) the moving party shows excusable neglect or good cause. Myers satisfied the first requirement. On the second requirement, the court applied an equitable balancing test from Gibbons v. United States, 317 F.3d 852 (8th Cir. 2003), weighing the reason for delay, potential prejudice to other parties, length of delay, and the moving party's good faith. The court found Myers's explanations — that she was unaware of the judgment's entry and found post-judgment procedural rules complex as a self-represented litigant — to be credible. The court acknowledged that Myers only sought to appeal after defendants' memorandum pointed out her vacate motion was untimely, but nonetheless credited her housing instability (she is frequently unhoused) as making receipt of notice more difficult, and extended leniency to her as a pro se litigant. The court extended the appeal deadline to October 18, 2025, rendering Myers's October 15, 2025 notice of appeal timely.

Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (IFP) on Appeal (Granted) Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, a party may apply to proceed without paying filing fees if they demonstrate financial inability to pay and that the appeal is taken in good faith. The court found both requirements satisfied. Myers's application demonstrated she cannot afford the filing fee (and the record also reflected that IFP status had been granted at the start of the case, with the appeal filing fee already noted as waived). On good faith, while the court stated it believes Myers's appeal is 'unlikely to be successful,' it found the appeal was not frivolous and was made in good faith, entitling Myers to be heard by the Eighth Circuit.

Judge

John R. Tunheim, United States District Judge, District of Minnesota. **Case No.:** 24-1395 (JRT/LIB)

Date

December 4, 2025