Fleming v. United States Department of Justice
- Susan Richard Nelson
- 0:19-cv-02713
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 5
In Fleming v. United States Department of Justice, Judge Susan Richard Nelson denied federal prisoner Rhonda Fleming's third attempt to reopen a civil rights lawsuit she originally filed in 2018, finding the request came too many years too late and that reopening would be futile because the applicable statute of limitations has already expired.
Federal prisoners who have previously had civil cases dismissed and are attempting to reopen them years later, particularly those subject to the three-strikes rule under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and those whose claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act may be time-barred.
What happened
In Fleming v. United States Department of Justice, Rhonda Fleming, a federal inmate, originally filed this lawsuit in December 2018 alleging she experienced or witnessed sexual abuse by Bureau of Prisons (BOP) employees at several federal correctional facilities. The case was dismissed without prejudice in March 2020 because Fleming could not pay the court filing fee and did not qualify for a fee waiver (known as 'in forma pauperis' status) due to a federal rule that bars prisoners who have had three or more prior lawsuits dismissed as frivolous or for failure to state a claim. Two previous attempts by Fleming to reopen the case — in 2020 and 2023 — were also denied.
Fleming filed this third motion to reopen more than five years after the original dismissal, this time enclosing checks to cover the filing fee and noting that BOP investigators had questioned her as recently as May 2025 about an ongoing sexual abuse investigation. She argued this new development justified reopening her case. The legal standard she needed to meet — Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), which allows a court to reopen a case for 'any other reason that justifies relief' — requires showing exceptional circumstances.
Judge Susan Richard Nelson denied the motion for two main reasons. First, the motion was filed an unreasonably long time after the case was closed — over five years — and some of the events underlying the lawsuit occurred as long as ten years ago, which would prejudice the defendants. Second, reopening the case would be pointless because Fleming's claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act are now barred by the statute of limitations (the legal deadline for filing such claims), meaning the case would simply be dismissed again. The court also noted that Fleming's checks were not deposited and were returned to her.
The detailed version
Case: Rhonda Fleming v. United States Department of Justice, et al., No. 0:19-cv-2713-SRN-KMM (D. Minn.). Judge: Susan Richard Nelson, United States District Judge. Order dated: December 10, 2025.
Background and Procedural History
Rhonda Fleming, a pro se (self-represented) federal inmate currently housed at Federal Medical Center Carswell in Fort Worth, Texas, originally filed this civil action in December 2018 against numerous Bureau of Prisons (BOP) employees, alleging sexual abuse against inmates at several federal correctional institutions.
On March 26, 2020, the Court dismissed the action without prejudice as to all defendants except Lieutenant Riehm and six unknown BOP correctional officers at FCI-Waseca. The dismissal was based on Fleming's failure to pay the civil filing fee and her ineligibility for in forma pauperis (IFP) status — a fee waiver available to indigent litigants. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), known as the 'three-strikes rule,' a prisoner who has had three or more prior civil actions dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim is barred from IFP status unless the prisoner demonstrates she faces imminent danger of serious physical injury. The Court found Fleming did not meet the imminent-danger exception and dismissed the case without prejudice for failure to prosecute.
Fleming moved to reopen the case twice previously: (1) in June 2020, citing the death of George Floyd and comparing his treatment to her own alleged mistreatment, which was denied; and (2) in September 2023, citing a putative class action involving sexual abuse at FCI-Dublin and alleging a threat of retaliation by a correctional officer after she spoke with the FBI — also denied because she had not shown an exception to § 1915(g) and had not paid the filing fee.
Third Motion to Reopen
Fleming filed her Third Motion to Reopen more than five years after the original dismissal, now enclosing checks to cover the filing fee. She asserted that there is an ongoing investigation into sexual abuse she suffered and that BOP investigators questioned her as recently as May 2025.
Legal Analysis
The Court analyzed the motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), which permits relief from a final judgment in specified circumstances. Because Fleming's motion did not implicate the specific grounds in Rule 60(b)(1)–(5) (mistake, newly discovered evidence, fraud, void judgment, or satisfied/equitable judgment), she could only seek relief under the catchall provision, Rule 60(b)(6), which allows relief for 'any other reason that justifies relief.' The Court noted this is an extraordinary remedy requiring exceptional circumstances. See City of Duluth v. Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa, 702 F.3d 1147, 1155 (8th Cir. 2013).
The Court identified two independent grounds for denial:
1. Timeliness: Rule 60(c) requires that a Rule 60(b) motion be made within a 'reasonable time.' The Court found that more than five years after the original dismissal — and over two years after the denial of the Second Motion to Reopen — is an unreasonably long delay. Some of the underlying events occurred approximately ten years ago. While the Court acknowledged Fleming may have needed time to save money for the filing fee, the delay was excessive and reopening would prejudice defendants.
2. Futility: Fleming's Proposed Amended Complaint raised claims against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. § 2401, which has a two-year statute of limitations. That limitations period has expired. Reopening the case would therefore result in immediate dismissal, and Fleming cannot use Rule 60(b)(6) as a vehicle to circumvent the statute of limitations. Additionally, the Court noted that if the case were reopened and then dismissed, Fleming would lose her filing fee.
Ruling
The Court denied the Third Motion to Reopen [Doc. No. 82]. The checks submitted by Fleming for the filing fee were returned without deposit.
Reviewer note from the AI+
Read the full 5-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.