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U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
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Substantive rulingFiled Dec. 19, 2025

Gonzalez v. United States of America

Judge
Laura Provinzino
Docket
0:25-cv-03938
Court
U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
Pages
4
HabeasImmigrationCriminalCivil Rights
In one sentence

In Camilo E. Gonzalez v. United States of America, Judge Provinzino denied federal prisoner Gonzalez's petition for habeas relief, ruling that he is ineligible to use First Step Act Earned Time Credits to shorten his sentence because he is subject to a final order of removal, and that this exclusion does not violate his constitutional right to equal protection.

Who this affects

Federal prisoners who are subject to final orders of removal and seeking to use First Step Act Earned Time Credits to reduce their sentences; particularly those who were formerly lawful permanent residents.

What happened

In Camilo E. Gonzalez v. United States of America, Camilo E. Gonzalez, a federal prisoner serving time for conspiracy to distribute heroin, filed a petition asking the court to declare him eligible for First Step Act Earned Time Credits — a program that allows prisoners to reduce their time behind bars by participating in certain programs. Gonzalez, originally a Cuban national who had lived in the United States as a lawful permanent resident, became subject to a final order of removal while incarcerated.

Gonzalez argued two things: first, that the law should not bar him from using these credits, and second, that the statutory exclusion for prisoners under final removal orders violates the Fifth Amendment's equal protection guarantee — meaning it treats him unfairly compared to U.S. citizens. He further contended that as a lawful permanent resident, he stood on different legal footing than undocumented immigrants. The court rejected both arguments, explaining that federal law explicitly bars prisoners with final removal orders from using these credits, and that courts in multiple circuits have already found this exclusion does not violate equal protection. The court also found that his lawful permanent resident status legally ended when his removal order became final.

Judge Provinzino adopted the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation and denied Gonzalez's petition. His objections were overruled, and judgment was entered against him.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case: Camilo E. Gonzalez v. United States of America, No. 25-cv-3938 (LMP/DLM), U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota. Decided December 19, 2025, by United States District Judge Laura M. Provinzino.

Background

Petitioner Camilo E. Gonzalez, a federal prisoner convicted of conspiracy to distribute heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on October 14, 2025. A habeas petition under § 2241 is a legal tool a prisoner can use to challenge the execution of their sentence — here, specifically whether he is entitled to First Step Act Earned Time Credits (FTCs). FTCs allow federal prisoners to earn credit toward early release or pre-release custody by completing certain rehabilitative programming.

Magistrate Judge's Recommendation

On November 25, 2025, United States Magistrate Judge Douglas L. Micko issued a Report and Recommendation (R&R) recommending denial of the petition. Gonzalez timely objected, triggering de novo (fresh, independent) review of the objected-to portions by the district judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).

The Statutory Bar

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(C), FTCs that are earned generally must be applied toward early release. However, 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(E)(i) explicitly states that a prisoner subject to a final order of removal under immigration law is ineligible to apply those credits. Gonzalez, a Cuban national who had been a lawful permanent resident, became subject to a final order of removal while imprisoned. The court found this statutory bar dispositive and consistent with prior decisions in the District of Minnesota.

Equal Protection Argument

Gonzalez argued that § 3632(d)(4)(E)(i) violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment (which applies to the federal government) by treating him differently from U.S. citizens. The court rejected this argument, citing the Second Circuit's decision in Cheng v. United States, 132 F.4th 655 (2d Cir. 2025), and the Seventh Circuit's decision in Lopez v. Emmerich, No. 24-3195, 2025 WL 3172841 (7th Cir. Nov. 13, 2025), both of which found no equal protection violation.

Lawful Permanent Resident Argument

Gonzalez further argued that, as a lawful permanent resident rather than an undocumented immigrant, he occupied a distinct legal status and should be treated differently. The court rejected this as well. It explained that under federal regulation 8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(p), lawful permanent resident status terminates upon entry of a final administrative order of removal. Citing Robleto-Pastora v. Holder, 591 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2010), and Nycklass v. Healy, No. 4:23-cv-2166, 2024 WL 1054408 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 15, 2024), the court concluded that Gonzalez was no longer a lawful permanent resident at the time of his petition and thus could not claim any special entitlement on that basis.

Ruling

Judge Provinzino overruled Gonzalez's objections, adopted the Magistrate Judge's R&R, and denied the habeas petition. Judgment was entered accordingly.

Reviewer note from the AI+
Opinion is clear and complete. All citations verified against text. Judge's name confirmed as Laura M. Provinzino. No ambiguities identified.
The authoritative version

Read the full 4-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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