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U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
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Substantive rulingFiled Nov. 25, 2025

Gonzalez v. United States of America

Judge
Douglas Micko
Docket
0:25-cv-03938
Court
U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
Pages
5
HabeasImmigrationCivil RightsPro Se
In one sentence

In Camilo E. Gonzalez v. United States of America, Magistrate Judge Douglas L. Micko recommends denying the petition of federal prisoner Camilo Gonzalez, who sought to have earned time credits under the First Step Act applied to his sentence, because federal law bars such credits for prisoners under a final deportation order and that restriction does not violate the Constitution's equal protection guarantee.

Who this affects

Federal prisoners who are subject to final orders of removal and are seeking to apply First Step Act earned time credits to reduce their sentences.

What happened

In Camilo E. Gonzalez v. United States of America (Case No. 25-cv-3938), federal prisoner Camilo Gonzalez filed a petition asking the court to order the Federal Bureau of Prisons to apply First Step Act time credits — sentence reductions that eligible prisoners can earn through participating in rehabilitation programs — to his sentence. The First Step Act explicitly prohibits those credits for prisoners who are subject to a final order of removal (deportation), and Mr. Gonzalez does not dispute that such an order applies to him. Instead, he argues that this exclusion unconstitutionally discriminates against non-citizens in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution.

The court analyzed Mr. Gonzalez's equal protection argument under the lowest level of constitutional review, called rational basis review, which applies when a law does not target a suspect class such as a racial group and does not burden a fundamental right. Under this standard, a law is upheld if the government can point to any reasonable justification for it. Courts — including the Second and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals — have consistently found that excluding prisoners with final removal orders from earning time credits is rationally justified because it reduces the risk that such individuals will flee and ensures they serve their full sentences.

Magistrate Judge Douglas L. Micko recommends that Mr. Gonzalez's petition be denied and the case dismissed. Because this is a Report and Recommendation from a magistrate judge rather than a final order from the district judge, Mr. Gonzalez has 14 days from being served with this recommendation to file written objections with the court. This recommendation is not directly appealable to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case: Camilo E. Gonzalez v. United States of America, No. 25-cv-3938 (LMP/DLM), U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota. Decided: November 25, 2025. Author: Magistrate Judge Douglas L. Micko (Report and Recommendation).

Background

Petitioner Camilo E. Gonzalez is a federal prisoner who, in February 2022, became subject to a final order of removal (deportation) while serving his sentence. In October 2025, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 — a federal statute that allows prisoners to challenge the legality of their detention or sentence in federal court. His principal argument was that the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) should apply First Step Act Time Credits (FTCs) to reduce his sentence. FTCs are sentence-reduction credits that federal prisoners can earn by participating in approved rehabilitative programming under the First Step Act (FSA), codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4).

Statutory Bar

Section 3632(d)(4)(E)(i) of the FSA explicitly prohibits prisoners who are subject to a final order of removal from earning or applying FTCs. Mr. Gonzalez conceded both that this statutory bar exists and that he is subject to a final removal order. Despite this, he argued the provision should not apply to him.

Constitutional Argument

Liberally construing Mr. Gonzalez's pro se (self-represented) pleadings, the court interpreted his petition as raising an Equal Protection Clause challenge — the argument that § 3632(d)(4)(E)(i) unconstitutionally discriminates against a class of non-citizens.

Standard of Review

The court applied rational basis review, the most deferential standard of constitutional scrutiny. Heightened scrutiny — a more demanding standard — applies when a law targets a suspect class (such as a racial minority) or burdens a fundamental right. The court cited Eighth Circuit precedent holding that non-citizens unlawfully present in the United States are not a suspect class entitled to heightened scrutiny. See United States v. Sitladeen, 64 F.4th 978, 988 (8th Cir. 2023). Under rational basis review, a law survives constitutional challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable set of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.

Holding on Equal Protection

The court found that the FSA's exclusion of prisoners with final removal orders from FTCs easily survives rational basis review. It relied on persuasive authority from the Second Circuit (Cheng v. United States, 132 F.4th 655 (2d Cir. 2025)) and the Seventh Circuit (Lopez v. Emmerich, 2025 WL 3172841 (7th Cir. Nov. 13, 2025)), both of which held that the exclusion rationally advances legitimate government interests — specifically, reducing the flight risk of individuals with removal orders and ensuring that non-citizens who commit felonies in the United States serve their complete sentences. The court also noted that courts in the District of Minnesota have separately held that the FSA does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Casquete v. United States, No. 24-cv-02777 (PJS/ECW), 2025 WL 1373174 (D. Minn. Apr. 10, 2025).

Recommendation

Magistrate Judge Micko recommends (1) that Mr. Gonzalez's petition for a writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) be DENIED, and (2) that the action be DISMISSED. This is a Report and Recommendation, not a final order; the assigned district judge must act on it. Mr. Gonzalez has 14 days from service of the recommendation to file written objections under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1). The Report and Recommendation is not directly appealable to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.

Reviewer note from the AI+
This is a Report and Recommendation from a magistrate judge, not a final order. The assigned district judge (initials LMP) has not yet ruled. The summary accurately reflects this procedural posture. Date filed is listed as 2025-11-25, which is the date signed by the magistrate judge — this appears consistent with the opinion text. No issues with party names or judge's name.
The authoritative version

Read the full 5-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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Gonzalez v. United States of America · Court, Explained