Mairs v. Eischen
- Eric Tostrud
- 0:25-cv-03153
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 9
In Mairs v. Eischen, Magistrate Judge Elsa M. Bullard recommends denying federal prisoner Spencer Curtis Mairs's request for First Step Act sentence credits because he pleaded guilty to distributing drugs that caused serious bodily injury, which legally bars him from earning those credits.
Federal prisoners who were convicted of drug distribution offenses under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), (B), or (C) where death or serious bodily injury resulted, particularly those who pleaded guilty and admitted the serious-bodily-injury element, and who are seeking First Step Act time credits toward early release.
What happened
In Mairs v. Eischen (Case No. 25-CV-3153), Spencer Curtis Mairs, a federal prisoner, asked the court to order the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to give him time credits toward an earlier release under the First Step Act of 2018, a law that lets most federal prisoners shorten their sentences by completing rehabilitation programs. The BOP had already determined he was ineligible for those credits, and he filed this petition — treated by the court as a formal request for release from unlawful custody (called a habeas petition) — to challenge that decision.
Mairs made three arguments for why he should be eligible. First, he said the 'serious bodily injury' part of his drug conviction was never really proven because there was no toxicology report. The court rejected this because Mairs had already admitted to that fact as part of his guilty plea and had also agreed not to challenge his conviction afterward. Second, he cited court decisions from other circuits where the BOP had improperly looked beyond a prisoner's official conviction documents to find disqualifying conduct — those courts said the BOP could only look at what a prisoner was actually convicted of. But the court found those cases helped Mairs's situation not at all, because unlike those prisoners, Mairs was officially charged with and convicted of the disqualifying offense. Third, Mairs argued the serious bodily injury enhancement could not have applied because it carries a 20-year mandatory minimum and he only received a 10-year sentence. The court checked the underlying criminal records and found that a legal exception allowing a sentence below the mandatory minimum had been applied at sentencing, so the enhancement still counted.
Magistrate Judge Bullard denied Mairs's motion to have a lawyer appointed, finding his claims lacked merit and that the case was neither factually nor legally complex — noting that Mairs's own 18-page filing showed he was capable of presenting his arguments. Judge Bullard recommends that Mairs's habeas petition be denied and the case be dismissed. Because this is a magistrate judge's recommendation rather than a final order, Mairs has 14 days to file written objections with the district court.
The detailed version
Case: Mairs v. Eischen, No. 25-CV-3153 (ECT/EMB), U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota. Decided: December 29, 2025 (dated December, year confirmed by filing date). Authoring judicial officer: Magistrate Judge Elsa M. Bullard.
Procedural Posture
Petitioner Spencer Curtis Mairs filed a 'Motion to Award First Step Act Credits,' which the court construed as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (a federal statute allowing prisoners to challenge the legality of their imprisonment or the conditions of their confinement). The court conducted a preliminary review under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, applicable here by analogy under Rule 1(b) of those rules.
Background
In 2021, Mairs was indicted in the District of North Dakota on one count of distributing a controlled substance (heroin and fentanyl) resulting in serious bodily injury, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). He pleaded guilty and admitted: (1) he knowingly and intentionally distributed the substances; (2) the use resulted in serious bodily injury; and (3) he was subject to a 20-year mandatory minimum under § 841(b)(1)(C). His plea agreement also contained a broad waiver of appeal and collateral attack rights, including the right to argue that admitted conduct falls outside the statute. Judgment was entered July 19, 2022, listing the offense as 'Distribution of Controlled Substances Resulting in Serious Bodily Injury.'
Legal Framework — First Step Act (FSA) Eligibility
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4), most federal prisoners can earn time credits by completing recidivism-reduction programming. However, § 3632(d)(4)(D)(lviii) expressly renders ineligible any prisoner convicted under § 841(b)(1)(A), (B), or (C) 'for which death or serious bodily injury resulted from the use of such substance.'
Analysis of Mairs's Three Arguments
1. No toxicology report / serious bodily injury not proven: Mairs argued the serious-bodily-injury element was not established because the sentencing court lacked a toxicology report. The court rejected this because Mairs admitted the element in his plea agreement and waived his right to require proof at trial and to collaterally challenge his conviction. The court also noted that a § 2241 petition is not the proper procedural vehicle for such a challenge under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e).
2. BOP should not 'second-guess' the court: Mairs relied on Lallave v. Martinez, 635 F. Supp. 3d 173 (E.D.N.Y. 2022), and Valladares v. Ray, 130 F.4th 74 (4th Cir. 2025), which held that FSA ineligibility under § 3632(d)(4)(D)(lviii) is limited to those actually convicted of the disqualifying offense, and that the BOP may not look to uncharged facts. The court distinguished those cases: unlike those petitioners, Mairs was charged with and convicted of the disqualifying offense. Applying Lallave and Valladares actually cuts against Mairs — the charging documents themselves establish his disqualifying conviction. The court also distinguished a pending case in the same district (Stevenson v. Eischen, 25-cv-1308) where the underlying charging documents did not establish a disqualifying conviction.
3. Sentence below mandatory minimum means enhancement did not apply: Mairs argued that because § 841(b)(1)(C) carries a 20-year mandatory minimum but he received only 10 years, the enhancement must not have been applied. The court found this unpersuasive, explaining that mandatory minimums can be reduced by statutory exceptions (e.g., the 'safety valve' under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), or guidelines reductions under 18 U.S.C. § 994(n)). The court confirmed from the underlying criminal record that such an exception was applied, and that the enhancement still controlled the conviction.
Motion to Appoint Counsel
Denied. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B), courts may appoint counsel in habeas proceedings if the interests of justice require it. Citing Abdullah v. Norris, 18 F.3d 571, 573 (8th Cir. 1994), the court found that appointment is inappropriate where claims lack merit, and that even if they had merit, the case was neither factually nor legally complex. Mairs's 18-page petition with citations to relevant caselaw and attached BOP documents demonstrated his ability to present his claims without counsel.
Disposition
Magistrate Judge Bullard issued an Order and Report and Recommendation. As an Order, the Motion to Appoint Counsel (Dkt. No. 7) is DENIED. As a Report and Recommendation, the court recommends that the habeas petition (Dkt. No. 1) be DENIED and the case be DISMISSED. Because this is a magistrate judge's recommendation, the parties have 14 days under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1) to file written objections with the district court, after which the assigned district judge will review and act on the recommendation.
Reviewer note from the AI+
Read the full 9-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.