Wagner v. Hon. Jessica Bierwerth

This case arises from Richard Mark Wagner's lawsuit against Hon. Jessica Bierwerth (in her individual and official capacity as a Ramsey County Family Court judge) and Donald W. Harper (in his individual and official capacity as the Ramsey County Family Court Administrator), stemming from a dispute over Wagner's inability to file pleadings in a state-court marriage dissolution proceeding without paying a $405 filing fee.

Procedural Background

On October 9, 2025, the court dismissed Wagner's original complaint following a mandatory preservice review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), which requires courts to screen complaints filed by parties seeking to proceed without paying filing costs and to dismiss those that fail to state a viable claim. Wagner then attempted to seek reconsideration and to amend his complaint, but his October 28 and November 10 submissions lacked actual motions — they included only letters, proposed amended complaints, and proposed orders. The court declined to act on those filings. On November 25, 2025, Wagner properly filed a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) (seeking relief from the final judgment) and a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) (seeking leave to amend the complaint), attaching a proposed amended complaint.

Rule 60(b) Motion

Rule 60(b) allows a court to relieve a party from a final judgment in specified extraordinary circumstances, including 'mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect' (Rule 60(b)(1)) and 'any other reason that justifies relief' (Rule 60(b)(6)). The Eighth Circuit has described Rule 60(b) relief as 'extraordinary relief which may be granted only upon an adequate showing of exceptional circumstances.' Harley v. Zoesch, 413 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir. 2005).

Wagner argued he deserved relief because he had reasonably but incorrectly believed his November 10 submissions constituted proper motions. Judge Provinzino rejected this argument, explaining that Wagner's alleged mistake related to his post-judgment filings — not to the underlying judgment itself. Because Wagner provided no reason why the original judgment of dismissal was the product of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, he failed to meet the standard for Rule 60(b) relief.

Motion for Leave to Amend — Legal Standard

Under Rule 15(a)(2), courts should 'freely give leave' to amend 'when justice so requires.' However, once a final judgment has been entered, a plaintiff cannot amend a complaint unless the judgment is first set aside. BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman, 605 U.S. 204, 213 (2025). Any request to amend after judgment must be consistent with the stringent standards of Rule 60(b). United States v. Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, 752 F.3d 737, 743 (8th Cir. 2014). Leave to amend may also be denied when the proposed amendment is futile — meaning it could not survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.

Proposed Amended Complaint — Monell Claim Against Ramsey County

In his proposed amended complaint, Wagner dropped Bierwerth and Harper as defendants and instead brought a single claim against Ramsey County under Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Under Monell, a local government (municipality) can be held liable for a constitutional violation only when the violation results from an official policy, an unofficial custom, or a deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise employees. Wagner alleged that Ramsey County maintained an unconstitutional policy or custom of conditioning acceptance of filings on payment of fees without providing meaningful alternatives for people who cannot afford them, in violation of First Amendment court-access rights and Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection rights.

Policy Claim

An official policy requires a deliberate choice made by an official with final policymaking authority. Wagner alleged Ramsey County had a blanket policy of refusing filings unless fees were paid, but the court found this was internally contradicted by Wagner's own acknowledgment that a fee-waiver application process existed. A court need not accept contradictory allegations as true. The court also found that Wagner's allegation that his fee-waiver application was 'not processed and effectively denied' was too vague and conclusory to support a plausible claim — Wagner did not explain why the application was denied, and a denial for legitimate reasons is equally plausible. The court also noted, taking judicial notice of the state-court docket, that no fee-waiver application appeared on the state-court record and that the final dissolution order reflected that Wagner had not properly filed responsive pleadings due to failure to pay fees — with no mention of a properly submitted waiver application. The court also rejected as legally incorrect Wagner's apparent argument that denying a fee-waiver application without a hearing is per se unconstitutional, citing authority that motions may be decided on written submissions.

Custom Claim

A municipal custom is an unofficial but persistent and well-settled practice that has the force of law, encompassing a widespread pattern of unconstitutional misconduct that policymakers were deliberately indifferent to or tacitly authorized. The court noted that an unconstitutional custom cannot arise from a single act. Because Wagner alleged only one incident — the denial of his fee-waiver application — he failed to plausibly allege an unconstitutional custom.

Disposition

Both motions were denied. Wagner's Rule 60(b) motion (ECF No. 15) was denied because he did not demonstrate grounds to set aside the underlying judgment. His motion for leave to amend the complaint (ECF No. 14) was denied because the proposed amended complaint was futile — it did not plausibly allege either a policy or custom claim under Monell and therefore could not survive a motion to dismiss. The case remains dismissed.