Toomey v. Dakota County

Case

Toomey v. Dakota County, No. 25-cv-1214 (LMP/ECW) (D. Minn. Mar. 2, 2026)

Judge

Laura M. Provinzino, United States District Judge

The County then reached a settlement with Toomey for $30,000, structured as a 'Pierringer release.' A Pierringer release is a device recognized under Minnesota law (see Frey v. Snelgrove, 269 N.W.2d 918 (Minn. 1978)) allowing a plaintiff to settle with one or more defendants while continuing to pursue claims against others. Under this structure, the settling defendant is dismissed from the case; its exposure is limited to its own proportionate share of fault as determined at trial; the plaintiff agrees to indemnify the settling defendant against any contribution claims from the non-settling defendants; and the non-settling defendants remain free to argue at trial that the settling defendant bears a portion of the fault.

Because the settlement amount exceeded $10,000 and involved a Minnesota municipality, the parties sought court approval under Minn. Stat. § 466.08, which requires district court approval for such settlements. The court noted, in a footnote, that it was not entirely clear whether this state-law approval requirement applies in federal court (where the Erie doctrine—the rule that federal courts apply state substantive law but federal procedural law—could bear on the question), but proceeded to apply the statute because no party raised the issue.

Objections by Janvrin and Olson

First Objection — Paragraph 5 Language: Janvrin and Olson objected to language in paragraph 5 of the settlement agreement, which stated that Toomey releases the fraction of the total damages attributable to the County's fault, 'as a consequence of the Lawsuit or otherwise by operation of law,' with reference to the County's liability 'to Plaintiff, Janvrin, Olson, Reiman, MEnD, or any other person or entity.' They argued this could be read to release their own claims against the County and impair their ability to present evidence of the County's comparative fault at trial.

The court rejected this reading. It held that paragraph 5 only effects a release by Toomey—the only party releasing anything—and operates to limit the County's exposure to its own share of causal negligence, which is the standard function of a Pierringer release. The court further reasoned that reading the release together with the settlement's indemnification provision (as required under contract interpretation principles) confirmed the Pierringer nature of the agreement, and that Janvrin and Olson's interpretation would render the indemnification clause superfluous. The court also noted that even if Toomey had tried to release Janvrin's and Olson's claims, such an attempt would likely be unenforceable because a third party's rights generally cannot be adversely altered by an agreement to which that party is not a party. Finally, the settlement expressly stated it was to be construed in accordance with the Pierringer and Frey decisions, which the Eighth Circuit has said 'conclusively establishes' a Pierringer release structure. The court expressly stated it would not construe paragraph 5 to impair the rights, defenses, or claims of Janvrin, Reiman, and Olson consistent with an ordinary Pierringer release.

Second Objection — Timing of Approval: Janvrin and Olson asked the court to delay approving the settlement until after the completion of fact discovery in March 2026, arguing that once the County was dismissed as a party, they would lose the ability to serve written interrogatories (formal written questions that parties—but not non-parties—must answer under oath). They acknowledged that subpoenas could still be used to obtain documents and testimony from the County as a non-party.

The court overruled this objection as well, finding that the tactical disadvantage of losing one discovery mechanism does not constitute 'formal legal prejudice,' which is the standard a non-settling defendant must meet to have standing to object to a partial settlement. See Alumax Mill Prods., Inc. v. Congress Fin. Corp., 912 F.2d 996, 1001–02 (8th Cir. 1990). The court also observed that this objection could apply to any Pierringer release, since such settlements routinely result in dismissal of the settling party and the consequent loss of party-discovery tools. Additionally, fact discovery had been open for over nine months and was near its end, so the failure to serve interrogatories was attributed to the defendants' own litigation choices rather than the settlement.