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U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
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Procedural orderFiled Mar. 6, 2026

Thompson v. Clay County Sheriffs

Judge
Katherine Menendez
Docket
0:25-cv-02398
Court
U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
Pages
2
Pro SeCivil ProcedureHabeas
In one sentence

In Thompson v. Clay County Sheriffs, et al., Judge Menendez granted plaintiff Joshua Thompson's application to proceed without prepaying appellate filing fees, requiring him instead to pay an initial partial fee of $6.99 with the remainder in monthly installments.

Who this affects

Joshua Thompson, a prisoner and pro se plaintiff who filed a civil complaint against Clay County Sheriffs and others, and who is seeking to appeal the dismissal of his case without paying the full filing fee upfront.

What happened

In Thompson v. Clay County Sheriffs, et al. (No. 25-cv-2398), Joshua Thompson, a prisoner, filed an appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit challenging this court's December 23, 2025 order that dismissed his complaint without prejudice. To pursue that appeal, he asked the court to let him proceed without paying the full $605 appellate filing fee upfront — a request known as proceeding without prepayment of fees (commonly called 'IFP' status).

Under federal law — specifically the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 — prisoners who are granted IFP status are not excused from paying filing fees entirely, unlike non-prisoner IFP litigants. Instead, prisoners must pay the full fee over time, beginning with an initial partial payment calculated as 20% of the average monthly deposits in their prison trust account over the prior six months. For Mr. Thompson, that initial payment comes to $6.99.

Judge Menendez granted Thompson's IFP application, finding that his appeal is taken in good faith, even while noting that the court stands by its earlier dismissal order. Thompson must pay the initial $6.99 partial fee, with the remaining balance of the appellate filing fee to be paid in monthly installments as required by statute.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

This order concerns Joshua Thompson's application to proceed without prepayment of the appellate filing fee (in forma pauperis, or IFP) in connection with his appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Thompson had filed a Notice of Appeal on February 2, 2026, challenging the district court's December 23, 2025 Order, which dismissed his complaint without prejudice and denied his IFP applications and motions to appoint counsel as moot.

The governing statute is 28 U.S.C. § 1915, part of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA). Under the PLRA, a prisoner granted IFP status is not relieved of the obligation to pay filing fees in full; rather, the prisoner is permitted to pay the fee in installments rather than all at once upfront. The court cited Ashley v. Dilworth, 147 F.3d 715, 716 (8th Cir. 1998), for this principle.

To calculate the initial partial payment, the court applied 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)(A), which sets the initial fee at 20% of the average monthly deposits in the prisoner's trust account over the six months preceding the notice of appeal. Based on Thompson's trust account records (Dkt. 41 at 6), this amount was calculated at $6.99. The court relied on Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 484 (8th Cir. 1997), as authority for this calculation methodology.

On the question of whether the appeal is taken in good faith — a statutory requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(3)(A) — Judge Menendez found that it is, even while expressly stating that the notice of appeal does not cause the court to question the correctness of its prior dismissal order.

The court's order: (1) GRANTED Thompson's IFP application on appeal; and (2) required Thompson to pay an initial partial appellate filing fee of $6.99, with the remainder to be paid in monthly installments pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The order was signed by United States District Judge Katherine Menendez on March 6, 2026.

Reviewer note from the AI+
The opinion uses the term 'habeas corpus' nowhere, and the underlying case nature is not described in detail — only that the complaint was dismissed without prejudice. The 'habeas' topic tag was removed in final consideration; topics selected are 'pro-se' and 'civil-procedure' as clearly supported. The underlying claim type (civil rights, tort, etc.) is unknown from this order alone. Also, the opinion mentions the IFP statute is part of the PLRA, which applies to prisoner civil suits broadly, not just habeas petitions. Self-confidence is reduced slightly because the nature of the underlying complaint is not described in the opinion text.
The authoritative version

Read the full 2-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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