Welsh v. Perrier
Katie Sue Welsh v. Seth Perrier; Fred Radde; Michael J. Groh; Alexander G. McDonald; Paula Duggan Vraa; Colleen G. King; Charles Webber; Caroline H. Lennon; Andrew Lawrence Harris; City of Shakopee, Minnesota; Scott County, Minnesota; Shakopee Police Department; Scott County Sheriff’s Office; and John Doe 1–10
- John Tunheim
- 0:25-cv-04609
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 19
In Welsh v. Perrier et al., Judge Tunheim dismissed most of Katie Sue Welsh's civil rights lawsuit arising from a 2025 traffic stop and dismissed prosecution, allowing only her claims against two Shakopee police officers and the City of Shakopee to proceed.
Pro se civil rights plaintiffs bringing Section 1983 suits arising from criminal prosecutions, particularly those suing judges, prosecutors, public defenders, or municipal police departments and sheriff's offices as separate entities. Also relevant to anyone seeking injunctive or declaratory relief against government officials after a criminal case has already been dismissed.
What happened
In Welsh v. Perrier et al. (Civil No. 25-4609), Katie Sue Welsh, a self-represented litigant, sued 13 named defendants — including police officers, assistant county attorneys, four state court judges, a public defender, and various government entities — alleging a broad conspiracy to violate her constitutional rights during and after an April 2025 traffic stop and subsequent criminal prosecution that was dismissed without conviction in August 2025. She filed 16 causes of action under a federal civil rights law (42 U.S.C. § 1983), other federal statutes, and Minnesota state law, seeking money damages and court orders to stop certain conduct. She also asked the court to waive the filing fee because she cannot afford it.
The court conducted a required screening of the lawsuit because Welsh asked to proceed without paying the filing fee. It dismissed the claims against the four judges (Paula Duggan Vraa, Colleen G. King, Charles Webber, and Caroline H. Lennon) because judges are absolutely immune from civil lawsuits for actions taken in their judicial role. It dismissed the claims against the two assistant county attorneys (Michael J. Groh and Alexander G. McDonald) because prosecutors are absolutely immune from damages suits for actions taken as advocates in the criminal process, and Welsh lacked a legal basis to seek court orders or declarations against them given the prosecution was already over. It dismissed the claims against public defender Andrew Lawrence Harris because a public defender performing standard defense work does not act on behalf of the government in the way required to sue under Section 1983, and Welsh did not plausibly allege a conspiracy. It dismissed the Shakopee Police Department and Scott County Sheriff's Office because those agencies are not legally separate entities that can be sued — only the city and county themselves can be. It dismissed Welsh's municipal liability claims against the City of Shakopee and Scott County under federal law because Welsh offered only vague, boilerplate assertions of unconstitutional policies rather than concrete facts. It also dismissed Welsh's claim that unnamed court reporters violated her right to access the courts by requiring payment for transcripts, finding no actual, concrete harm to a real legal claim.
Judge Tunheim granted Welsh's application to proceed without paying the filing fee. The dismissals of claims against the judges, prosecutors, public defender, the Shakopee Police Department, and the Scott County Sheriff's Office are with prejudice — meaning Welsh cannot refile those claims. The dismissals of claims against Scott County, the federal law claims against the City of Shakopee, the official-capacity claims against Officers Seth Perrier and Fred Radde, and the court-access claim are without prejudice — meaning Welsh may refile if she can correct the identified deficiencies. The case continues only against Officers Perrier and Radde (in their personal capacities) and the City of Shakopee (solely for potential responsibility under Minnesota state law for the officers' conduct), on Counts alleging false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, fabrication of evidence, conspiracy, spoliation of evidence, a computer fraud claim, and Minnesota state law claims.
The detailed version
- Welsh v. Perrier et al., Civil No. 25-4609 (JRT/LIB)
- John R. Tunheim, United States District Judge
- March 11, 2026
Background
Pro se plaintiff Katie Sue Welsh filed a 48-page complaint on December 11, 2025, accompanied by an application to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP — a request to waive the filing fee based on financial hardship). She sued 13 named defendants and 10 unnamed 'John Doe' defendants, alleging a wide-ranging conspiracy among Shakopee police officers, Scott County prosecutors, four Minnesota district court judges, and a public defender to violate her constitutional rights in connection with an April 2025 traffic stop, a subsequent criminal prosecution, and events through at least July 2025. The criminal case was dismissed without a conviction in August 2025. Welsh alleged 16 causes of action, including: false arrest (Count I); false imprisonment (Count II); malicious prosecution (Count III); fabrication of evidence (Count IV); Brady violations — withholding of evidence favorable to the defense (Count V); denial of speedy trial (Count VI); ineffective assistance of counsel (Count VII); conspiracy to deprive civil rights (Count VIII); denial of access to courts (Count IX); spoliation of evidence — alleged destruction or concealment of evidence (Count X); violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242 (criminal deprivation of rights under color of law) (Count XI); violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (Computer Fraud and Abuse Act) (Count XII); Monell municipal liability claims — under Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), which allows suits against municipalities for unconstitutional policies or customs — against the City of Shakopee and Scott County (Count XIII); and three Minnesota state law claims (false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, or IIED) (Count XIV).
Standards Applied
Because Welsh sought IFP status, the court was required under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) to screen the complaint and dismiss any claims that fail to state a claim for relief or seek money from a defendant who is immune. The court applied the standard from Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), requiring factual allegations that raise a plausible — not merely speculative — right to relief. Pro se complaints are construed liberally but must still allege sufficient facts.
Judicial Immunity (Defendants Vraa, King, Webber, Lennon)
All § 1983 claims against the four state court judges were dismissed with prejudice. Under the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity, judges cannot be sued for civil damages for actions taken in their judicial capacity and within their jurisdiction, even if the plaintiff alleges malice, corruption, or error. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11–12 (1991). The conduct attributed to these judges — ruling on motions, denying substitute counsel, continuing proceedings, presiding over plea discussions, and setting bail — was plainly judicial in nature. The § 1983 statute itself bars injunctive relief against judges for judicial acts absent a violated declaratory decree or unavailability of declaratory relief, neither of which Welsh alleged. Retrospective declaratory relief against judges was also barred under Eighth Circuit precedent. State law claims against the judges were dismissed under Minnesota judicial immunity, which mirrors the federal standard. See Myers ex rel. Myers v. Price, 463 N.W.2d 773, 775 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990); Minn. Stat. § 3.736, subd. 1.
Prosecutorial Immunity (Defendants Groh, McDonald)
All claims against the two assistant county attorneys were dismissed with prejudice as to damages, and dismissed without prejudice as to injunctive and declaratory relief. Absolute prosecutorial immunity bars civil damages claims against prosecutors for acts 'intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process,' including initiating charges, approving charging documents, litigating a prosecution, negotiating pleas, and dismissing charges. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269 (1993); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976). Prosecutorial immunity does not cover purely investigative conduct, but none of Welsh's allegations fell into that category. Injunctive relief against the prosecutors was barred because Welsh lacked Article III standing — the constitutional minimum requiring a concrete injury that is actual or imminent, traceable to the defendant, and redressable by a court order. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). Because the prosecution was dismissed and no reintroduction of charges was alleged to be likely, any injury from future prosecution was speculative. Declaratory relief was barred because the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a), requires an 'actual controversy' involving present legal relations, not retrospective pronouncements about past conduct. Minnesota prosecutorial immunity also barred the state tort claims against Groh and McDonald. See Stresemann v. Jesson, 868 N.W.2d 32, 34 (Minn. 2015); Brown v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 314 N.W.2d 210, 213 (Minn. 1981). Groh and McDonald were dismissed from the action.
Claims Against Public Defender (Defendant Harris)
All claims against Harris were dismissed with prejudice. A threshold requirement for liability under § 1983 is that the defendant acted 'under color of' state law — meaning as a government actor. A public defender performing traditional defense functions does not act under color of state law because the defender's obligations run to the client, not the state. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 50 (1988); Holbird v. Armstrong-Wright, 949 F.2d 1019, 1020 (8th Cir. 1991). The court acknowledged that a private party can be treated as a state actor if the party willfully participated in a joint plan with state officials to deprive someone of rights, but found the conspiracy allegations in the complaint were conclusory and not supported by concrete facts showing an actual agreement. The IIED state law claim against Harris also failed because the complaint did not allege facts showing 'extreme and outrageous' conduct or 'severe' distress attributable to Harris as required under Minnesota law. See Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 438–39 (Minn. 1983). Harris was dismissed from the action.
Claims Against Shakopee Police Department and Scott County Sheriff's Office
Both entities were dismissed because under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, police departments and sheriff's offices are not separate legal 'persons' subject to suit — they are subdivisions of the relevant city or county. See Ketchum v. City of W. Memphis, 974 F.2d 81, 82 (8th Cir. 1992). The same result applied under Minnesota law. See Minn. Stat. § 373.01, subd. 1(a)(1); Maras v. City of Brainerd, 502 N.W.2d 69, 79 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
Municipal Liability Under § 1983 (Count XIII — City of Shakopee and Scott County)
The Monell municipal liability claims were dismissed without prejudice. While municipalities can be sued under § 1983 for their own unconstitutional policies or customs, they cannot be held vicariously liable for individual employees' conduct. See Monell, 436 U.S. 658; Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011). To state such a claim, a plaintiff must allege facts showing an official policy, a widespread persistent custom, or a failure to train reflecting deliberate indifference to constitutional rights that directly caused the violation. Welsh's Count XIII consisted almost entirely of boilerplate assertions with no concrete factual support for any identified policy, pattern of similar misconduct, or policymaker decision. The court rejected Welsh's suggestion that a 'pattern' would be discoverable through litigation, citing Iqbal's holding that conclusory allegations do not unlock discovery. Official-capacity claims against Perrier and Radde — which are legally equivalent to claims against the city — were also dismissed without prejudice on the same grounds. Note: The City of Shakopee was not dismissed entirely; it remains a defendant for purposes of potential vicarious (respondeat superior) liability under Minnesota state law for any torts Perrier and Radde may have committed within the scope of their employment.
Denial of Access to Courts (Count IX)
Dismissed without prejudice. To state such a claim, a plaintiff must allege actual injury in the form of hindrance to a nonfrivolous and arguably meritorious underlying legal claim. See White v. Katuzky, 494 F.3d 677, 680 (8th Cir. 2007). Welsh alleged that unnamed court reporters refused to provide transcripts without payment. The court found no actual injury to a nonfrivolous legal claim — Welsh had already accessed the courts by filing this lawsuit, and any injury was speculative.
Claims That Survive
The following claims continue against Defendants Seth Perrier and Fred Radde (in their individual capacities) and the City of Shakopee (for state law vicarious liability only): Count I (false arrest), Count II (false imprisonment), Count III (malicious prosecution), Count IV (fabrication of evidence), Count VIII (conspiracy to deprive civil rights), Count X (spoliation of evidence), Count XII (Computer Fraud and Abuse Act claim), and Count XIV (Minnesota state law claims for false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and IIED).
IFP Application
Granted. Welsh must submit completed Marshal Service Forms (Form USM-285) for Perrier, Radde, and the City of Shakopee within 30 days or face dismissal for failure to prosecute. The court ordered service procedures accordingly.
Dismissal With Prejudice vs. Without Prejudice
Claims against the Judicial Defendants (Vraa, King, Webber, Lennon), the prosecutors (Groh, McDonald), the public defender (Harris), the Shakopee Police Department, and the Scott County Sheriff's Office are dismissed with prejudice — Welsh may not refile them. Claims against Scott County, federal law claims against the City of Shakopee, official-capacity claims against Perrier and Radde, and Count IX are dismissed without prejudice — Welsh may refile if she corrects the identified deficiencies.
Reviewer note from the AI+
Read the full 19-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.