Wright v. Swift County
Treasure Wright v. Swift County, Minnesota and Katie Foley, in her official capacity as Swift County Treasurer/Auditor
- Eric Tostrud
- 0:25-cv-03376
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 6
In Wright v. Swift County, Minnesota and Katie Foley, Judge Tostrud granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed without prejudice the civil rights lawsuit filed by pro se plaintiff Treasure Wright, who claimed county officials unconstitutionally blocked her from purchasing tax-forfeited property, because she failed to show her alleged injuries resulted from any government policy or custom as required to sue a municipality under federal civil rights law.
Pro se individuals who attempt to bring federal civil rights (Section 1983) lawsuits against local governments or government officials in their official capacity; the ruling reinforces that such plaintiffs must allege and show evidence that their injury was caused by an official government policy or custom, not merely by the conduct of individual employees. It also affects parties seeking to delay summary judgment rulings by requesting discovery, who must identify specific facts and their connection to claims rather than describing desired evidence in general terms.
What happened
In Wright v. Swift County, Minnesota and Katie Foley (File No. 25-cv-3376), pro se plaintiff Treasure Wright sued Swift County and county Treasurer/Auditor Katie Foley after she tried to purchase tax-forfeited real property in the summer of 2025 and alleged that county officials ignored some of her inquiries, responded too slowly to others, gave her inaccurate information, and ultimately prevented her from bidding on or buying the property. Ms. Wright brought four claims under the federal civil rights statute (42 U.S.C. § 1983): that the county violated her right to fair procedures under the Fourteenth Amendment, violated her right to equal treatment under the Fourteenth Amendment, retaliated against her for exercising First Amendment rights, and committed government misconduct generally. She sought $3 million in damages, a declaration that her constitutional rights were violated, and court orders requiring the county to restore its tax-forfeited land webpage and give her a fair opportunity to purchase property.
The defendants moved for summary judgment — asking the court to rule in their favor based on the existing record without a trial — arguing that Ms. Wright could not prove the essential elements of any of her claims. The defendants explained that delays and miscommunications resulted from administrative challenges caused by the combination of the county's auditor and treasurer offices, not from any official policy. In response, Ms. Wright argued that the motion was premature because no discovery (the pre-trial exchange of evidence between parties) had taken place, and she filed a declaration listing broad categories of documents she wanted to obtain from the defendants.
Judge Tostrud granted summary judgment for the defendants and dismissed Ms. Wright's complaint without prejudice, meaning she is not permanently barred from refiling. The court held that to sue a municipality or a government official in their official capacity under federal civil rights law, a plaintiff must show that the injury was caused by a government policy or custom — a requirement established by a case called Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York — and Ms. Wright's complaint contained no such facts and her response to the motion identified none. The court also found that her individual claims independently failed: she did not identify what process she was denied, did not identify a basis or comparator for her equal protection claim, and did not identify what First Amendment activity she was allegedly punished for. Finally, Judge Tostrud rejected her request to delay the ruling for discovery, finding that her declaration described desired evidence only in vague, general terms without connecting specific documents to specific claims or showing those facts actually existed.
The detailed version
- Wright v. Swift County, Minnesota and Katie Foley, File No. 25-cv-3376 (ECT/DTS)
- Eric C. Tostrud, United States District Judge
- March 17, 2026
Background and Claims Pro se (self-represented) plaintiff Treasure Wright contacted Swift County multiple times between May and July 2025 seeking to purchase tax-forfeited real property. Ms. Wright alleged that the county and its then-Treasurer/Auditor Katie Foley failed to respond to some inquiries, responded too slowly to others, provided inaccurate information, and ultimately prevented her from bidding on or purchasing tax-forfeited property. She brought four claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the federal statute that allows individuals to sue state and local government actors for constitutional violations: (1) deprivation of procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) denial of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment; (3) First Amendment retaliation; and (4) a general government misconduct claim. Ms. Wright sued Swift County and Ms. Foley solely in Ms. Foley's official capacity as Treasurer/Auditor. She sought $3 million in compensatory damages, declaratory relief, injunctive relief (requiring the county to restore its tax-forfeited land webpage, offer her a fair opportunity to purchase property, and provide legal easement access), and attorney's fees if she retained counsel.
Defendants' Motion and the Monell Requirement Defendants moved for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, which allows a court to rule in favor of a party when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court granted the motion.
The threshold obstacle to all of Ms. Wright's claims was the rule from Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978): civil rights plaintiffs suing a municipal entity (or a government official in their official capacity, which is treated as a suit against the entity itself) under § 1983 must prove that their injury was caused by a municipal policy or custom. A municipality cannot be held liable simply because it employed the person who allegedly acted unlawfully. The court found that Ms. Wright's complaint pleaded no facts suggesting any such policy or custom. Defendants explained that the delays and miscommunications resulted from administrative challenges stemming from the combination of the county auditor and treasurer offices — not from any official policy — and Ms. Wright's response neither addressed nor rebutted those explanations.
Individual Claim Deficiencies The court also found each claim independently unsupported: - Procedural due process: Ms. Wright did not identify what liberty or property interest she was deprived of or what procedures the Fourteenth Amendment required that she did not receive. - Equal protection: Ms. Wright did not identify the basis for differential treatment (e.g., race, sex, or other classification) and named no similarly situated comparator who was treated more favorably. - First Amendment retaliation: Ms. Wright did not identify what protected activity she engaged in or connect any protected activity to an adverse action by the defendants. - General government misconduct: Ms. Wright cited no legal authority supporting a standalone 'government misconduct' claim under § 1983.
Rule 56(d) Discovery Argument Ms. Wright argued under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) that the summary judgment motion was premature because discovery had not yet occurred. The court rejected this argument. Rule 56(d) allows a court to defer a summary judgment ruling if the non-moving party shows by affidavit that, for specific reasons, it cannot yet present facts essential to oppose the motion. The court found that Ms. Wright's declaration described desired discovery — internal emails, memoranda, policies, directives, and similar documents — only in broad, general terms. She did not identify with reasonable precision what specific discovery was needed, did not connect the requested materials to specific claims, and did not show that the sought-after facts actually exist. The court held that vague assertions about hoped-for evidence are insufficient to justify deferring consideration of a summary judgment motion.
Disposition Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 16) was GRANTED. Ms. Wright's Complaint (ECF No. 1) was DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, meaning the dismissal does not permanently bar her from refiling. Judgment was entered accordingly.
Reviewer note from the AI+
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