Court, Explained
U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
Back to docket
Procedural orderFiled Mar. 20, 2026

Strickland v. Rueger

Full caption

Kellye Strickland v. Nicole Rueger, in her individual and official capacities also known as Nikki; Elizabeth Clysdale, Referee, in her individual capacity; Corina Loya, Deputy, in her official capacity only; Ramsey County, a local government entity; Barna, Guzy & Steffen, Ltd., a Minnesota professional corporation; Jenese Larmouth, Referee, in her individual capacity; Rebecca Rossow, Referee, in her individual and official capacities; Victoria Elsmore, Referee, in her individual capacity; Kyle Manderfeld, in his individual capacity only; and John and Jane Does 5-10, in their individual capacities.

Judge
Donovan Frank
Docket
0:25-cv-02056
Court
U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
Pages
2
Civil ProcedureCivil RightsSection 1983Qualified Immunity
In one sentence

In Kellye Strickland v. Nicole Rueger et al., Judge Frank denied plaintiff Kellye Strickland's motion asking the court to reconsider its earlier dismissal of most of her claims, finding she failed to follow local court rules requiring permission before filing such a motion and also failed to show the legal errors or new evidence required to change the judgment.

Who this affects

Plaintiff Kellye Strickland, who is attempting to revive dismissed federal civil rights claims against county officials, court referees, a law firm, and other defendants in Minnesota. Litigants in the District of Minnesota more broadly are reminded that local rules require court permission before filing motions to reconsider.

What happened

In Kellye Strickland v. Nicole Rueger et al. (Civil No. 25-2056), plaintiff Kellye Strickland had previously had most of her claims (Counts I and IV through XIII) dismissed with prejudice — meaning she cannot refile them — by the federal district court in Minnesota. The court dismissed those counts primarily because the defendants were entitled to immunity from suit, and also because of repeated problems with how Strickland had written her legal complaints and because the court found the claims could not succeed even if rewritten.

Strickland then filed a motion asking the court either to reconsider that dismissal and change it from a 'with prejudice' dismissal to a 'without prejudice' dismissal (which would allow her to refile), or alternatively to pause the federal case while related proceedings played out in state appellate court. She argued that if given the chance to file a revised complaint, she could fix certain problems, such as correctly identifying which government officials were responsible for which actions.

Judge Frank denied both requests. First, the court noted that under local rules for the District of Minnesota, a party must get the court's permission before filing a motion to reconsider, and Strickland never sought that permission, making her motion procedurally improper. Even setting that problem aside, Judge Frank found that Strickland had not shown the kind of clear legal or factual mistake, or newly discovered evidence, that is required to change a judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). The court also found no good reason to pause the case pending state court action.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

This order addresses a motion to reconsider filed by plaintiff Kellye Strickland in a civil lawsuit she brought in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota against multiple defendants including Nicole Rueger, several court referees (Elizabeth Clysdale, Jenese Larmouth, Rebecca Rossow, Victoria Elsmore), a county deputy (Corina Loya), Ramsey County, the law firm Barna, Guzy & Steffen, Ltd., Kyle Manderfeld, and unnamed 'John and Jane Does.'

Background

A prior order (Doc. No. 103) dismissed Counts I and IV through XIII of Strickland's complaint with prejudice. The court's stated reasons for that dismissal were: (1) the defendants were entitled to immunity (likely judicial or governmental immunity, though the opinion does not specify the precise type in this order); (2) persistent pleading failures by the plaintiff; and (3) a finding that the claims could not conceivably be repleaded successfully.

The Motion at Issue

Strickland filed a motion (Doc. No. 107) invoking Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), which allows a court to alter or amend a judgment in limited circumstances. She asked the court to: (a) modify the dismissal from 'with prejudice' to 'without prejudice,' which would allow her to refile; and (b) grant her leave to file a second amended complaint. As an alternative, she asked for a stay (a pause) of the federal proceedings pending resolution of related proceedings in state appellate court.

Strickland argued she could cure 'procedural defects' in her complaint, specifically citing 'misidentification of governmental actors' and 'characterization of challenged conduct as discretionary,' if permitted to amend.

The Court's Analysis and Ruling

Judge Donovan W. Frank denied the motion on two independent grounds.

First, the court noted a procedural defect in the motion itself: District of Minnesota Local Rule 7.1(j) requires a party to obtain court permission before filing a motion to reconsider. Strickland did not file the required letter requesting permission, making her motion procedurally improper from the outset.

Second, even on the merits, the court found the motion failed. Rule 59(e) has a narrow purpose: it is limited to correcting 'manifest errors of law or fact' or presenting 'newly discovered evidence.' (Citing Ryan v. Ryan, 889 F.3d 499, 507 (8th Cir. 2018).) The court found that Strickland's arguments did not demonstrate any such manifest error in the prior analysis or any newly discovered evidence. Because the prior dismissal was grounded in immunity and a finding that successful repleading was not conceivable, the court found the arguments about fixing pleading defects unpersuasive.

The court also denied the alternative request for a stay pending state appellate action, finding no reason to pause the federal proceedings.

Outcome

Strickland's motion to reconsider or, in the alternative, to stay (Doc. No. 107) is DENIED in its entirety. The prior dismissal of Counts I and IV through XIII with prejudice stands.

Reviewer note from the AI+
The opinion does not specify the exact nature of the underlying claims (e.g., whether they are Section 1983 civil rights claims, state law claims, or both), nor does it detail the specific type of immunity granted to defendants in the prior order. The topics selected (civil-rights, section-1983, qualified-immunity) are reasonable inferences given the nature of the defendants (government officials and referees) and the immunity discussion, but the opinion text itself does not confirm these labels. A reviewer should check the underlying dismissal order (Doc. No. 103) to verify. Self-confidence is reduced accordingly.
The authoritative version

Read the full 2-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

Open opinion PDF →
Summary written with AI assistance. See how summaries are made. Spot something wrong? Tell us.