Silva-Vidinha v. United States of America
Rylee Silva-Vidinha, as personal representative of the Estate of Starsha Silva, and on her own behalf v. United States of America; Federal Bureau of Prisons; Michael Segal, Warden (FCI Waseca) in his individual capacity; Sheila Johnson, in her individual capacity; Ms. Koziolek, in her individual capacity; Syed Fateh Hyder, MD, in his individual capacity; Benjamin Rice, MD, in his individual capacity; Linda Lindner, MD, in her individual capacity; S. Taylor, PA-C, in their individual capacity; C. Mead, NRP, in their individual capacity; J. Peterson, BSN, in their individual capacity; Holly Sietsma, NRP, in their individual capacity; T. Weiser, R.
- John Tunheim
- 0:25-cv-02137
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 14
In Silva-Vidinha v. United States of America, Judge Tunheim denied the United States' motion to dismiss the federal wrongful death and medical malpractice claim (Count I) brought on behalf of Starsha Silva, a 36-year-old woman who died in federal prison, finding that the plaintiff properly completed the required pre-lawsuit administrative process and adequately stated a claim, while granting dismissal of all other counts against the United States and all counts against the Federal Bureau of Prisons.
Personal representatives of estates of incarcerated individuals who die in federal custody, and their families seeking to bring Federal Tort Claims Act suits against the United States for alleged medical negligence; also practitioners navigating FTCA administrative presentment requirements in the Eighth Circuit.
What happened
In Silva-Vidinha v. United States of America, Rylee Silva-Vidinha sues as the personal representative of her mother Starsha Silva's estate and on her own behalf, alleging that staff at FCI Waseca (a federal prison in Minnesota) provided negligent and inadequate medical care that led to Starsha Silva's death from complications of severe congenital heart disease on May 24, 2023, when she was 36 years old. The lawsuit asserts claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act (a law that allows people to sue the federal government for certain wrongful acts by federal employees), a constitutional remedy known as Bivens, and Minnesota state law. The United States and the Federal Bureau of Prisons moved to have the claims against them thrown out.
The central dispute the court had to resolve was whether the plaintiff had properly gone through the required administrative process before filing suit — specifically, whether she had submitted a complete administrative claim to the Bureau of Prisons before coming to court. The United States argued she had not properly identified herself or proven her authority to bring the claim. The plaintiff countered that she and her attorneys had submitted the required standard government form (an SF-95), corrected it when the Bureau of Prisons flagged only two missing items (a signature and date), and that the Bureau of Prisons subsequently denied the claim on its merits without raising any further procedural objections. The United States also argued that the plaintiff had not been formally appointed as a wrongful-death trustee under Minnesota law as required to bring a wrongful death action.
Judge Tunheim denied the motion to dismiss Count I — the Federal Tort Claims Act medical malpractice and wrongful death claim against the United States — finding that the plaintiff had properly completed the administrative process by responding to every specific request the Bureau of Prisons made, and that the agency then denied her claim on the merits, distinguishing this case from prior cases where claimants ignored repeated agency requests for information. The court also found that the complaint's allegation that Silva-Vidinha was the 'duly appointed Special Administrator' of her mother's estate was sufficient at this early stage to state a plausible claim, even if further proceedings might explore whether her appointment satisfies Minnesota's wrongful death statute. However, the court granted dismissal without prejudice (meaning those claims could potentially be refiled) of all counts against the Federal Bureau of Prisons directly, and of Counts II through V against the United States.
The detailed version
- Silva-Vidinha v. United States of America et al., Civil No. 25-2137 (JRT/DTS)
- John R. Tunheim, United States District Judge. **Decision date:** March 23, 2026
Background and Parties
Starsha Silva, age 36, died on May 24, 2023, from complications of severe congenital heart disease while incarcerated at FCI Waseca, a federal prison in Minnesota operated by the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP). Her daughter, Rylee Silva-Vidinha, filed suit as personal representative of Starsha Silva's estate and on her own behalf against the United States, the BOP, the warden, and numerous individual medical and custodial staff members. The complaint alleges that BOP officials failed to allow a heart surgery recommended by Mayo Clinic physicians, cancelled preoperative appointments, and planned to transfer Silva to another facility shortly before her death.
Claims at Issue
The complaint asserted five counts. Count I alleged medical malpractice and wrongful death under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a), which waives the federal government's sovereign immunity (its general protection from being sued) under specific conditions. Count II alleged Eighth Amendment violations under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), a doctrine allowing suits against individual federal officers for constitutional violations. Counts III-V alleged supervisory/policy claims against the United States and state law medical malpractice and wrongful death claims under Minnesota law. At a January 14, 2026 hearing, plaintiff's counsel clarified that only Count I is alleged against the United States; plaintiff did not oppose dismissal of Counts II-V as to the United States or dismissal of any count directly against the BOP.
Motion to Dismiss — Two Grounds
Ground 1: Rule 12(b)(1) — Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction (Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies) Before suing under the FTCA, a claimant must present the claim to the relevant federal agency and either receive a final written denial or wait six months with no agency decision. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a); 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a). Under Mader v. United States, 654 F.3d 794 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc), the Eighth Circuit held that a properly presented FTCA claim must include evidence of the representative's authority to act on behalf of all beneficiaries under applicable state law, and that failure to satisfy this requirement is a jurisdictional defect.
The United States argued Silva-Vidinha: (1) failed to identify herself as the claimant on the SF-95 forms, and (2) failed to supply adequate documentation of her authority to bring the claim.
The court rejected both arguments and distinguished Mader. In Mader, the agency had made repeated requests — including a formal letter and at least four telephone calls — for evidence of the claimant's status as personal representative, and the claimant and her attorney were entirely unresponsive. Here, by contrast: (a) after the initial SF-95 was filed, the BOP identified only two deficiencies — missing signature (Box 13a) and missing signature date (Box 14) — and plaintiff corrected both; (b) the BOP then denied the claim on the merits with no mention of remaining procedural defects; and (c) multiple prior communications had identified Rylee Silva-Vidinha as Starsha Silva's daughter and estate administrator, including a June 2023 preservation letter from Loevy & Loevy and a January 2024 FOIA request stating the claim was 'made on behalf of Rylee Silva-Vidinha, daughter and administrator of the estate of Starsha Silva.' The court concluded Silva-Vidinha had given the BOP a fair opportunity to meaningfully consider the claim and had provided sufficient evidence of her representative authority. The court found subject matter jurisdiction was established by a preponderance of the evidence under the factual challenge standard from Moss v. United States, 895 F.3d 1091 (8th Cir. 2018).
Ground 2: Rule 12(b)(6) — Failure to State a Claim The United States argued that under Minnesota law, only a court-appointed wrongful-death trustee may bring a wrongful death action (Minn. Stat. § 573.02, subd. 3), and that Silva-Vidinha had not been appointed as such. See Rollo-Carlson ex rel. Flackus-Carlson v. United States, 971 F.3d 768 (8th Cir. 2020) (FTCA actions are governed by the law of the state where the alleged acts occurred).
The court denied dismissal on this ground. Under Rule 12(b)(6), the court looks only to the complaint and materials it necessarily embraces. The complaint alleges that Silva-Vidinha is 'the duly appointed Special Administrator of the Estate of Starsha Silva.' The court found this allegation sufficient to state a plausible claim at the motion-to-dismiss stage under the Iqbal/Twombly standard, while noting that subsequent proceedings may further examine whether her particular appointment satisfies Minnesota's wrongful death statute.
Ruling
- The motion to dismiss is DENIED as to Count I against the United States of America. - The motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and Counts II-V are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to the United States of America. - The motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and all counts are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to the Federal Bureau of Prisons.
The case proceeds on Count I (FTCA medical malpractice and wrongful death) against the United States, and all counts remain pending against the individual defendants (Warden Michael Segal, Sheila Johnson, and the named medical and custodial staff), who were not parties to this motion.
Reviewer note from the AI+
Read the full 14-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.