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U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
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MixedFiled Mar. 23, 2026

Mohammad O. Sabri and Mona Sabri v. Chubb Indemnity Ins. Co.

Judge
Donovan Frank
Docket
0:26-cv-01689
Court
U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
Pages
3
Civil ProcedureInsurancePro SeContract
In one sentence

In Sabri v. Chubb Indemnity Ins. Co., Magistrate Judge Elkins granted the plaintiffs permission to file an amended complaint (which they already had the right to do under court rules) but denied their request to freeze any insurance policy deadlines, finding it too early in the case to address that issue before the defendant has even appeared.

Who this affects

Pro se plaintiffs who filed an insurance claim lawsuit after a house fire and sought to expand their damages and freeze policy deadlines; also relevant to self-represented litigants generally regarding amendment rights and the obligation to serve defendants.

What happened

In Sabri v. Chubb Indemnity Ins. Co. (Case No. 26-cv-1689), Mohammad O. Sabri and Mona Sabri sued their insurer, Chubb Indemnity Insurance Co., seeking money they say is owed after a house fire. They then filed a motion asking the court to (1) allow them to add newly discovered losses to their damages claim, and (2) freeze, or 'toll,' any deadlines in their insurance policy that might otherwise cut off their ability to claim those additional losses.

The court found that the plaintiffs did not actually need the court's permission to update their complaint at this stage. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure — the rules that govern how federal lawsuits are conducted — a party can amend their complaint once on their own, without asking the court, as long as they do so within 21 days of the defendant being served or filing a response. Because Chubb has not yet been served or responded, that 21-day window has not even started, so the plaintiffs are free to file an amended complaint on their own. On the deadline-freezing request, the court declined to act, explaining that it would be improper to decide such a request before the defendant has had a chance to appear and weigh in.

Magistrate Judge Elkins granted the motion in part and denied it in part. The plaintiffs may file an amended complaint under the applicable rule, but their request to toll (freeze) any insurance policy limitations periods was denied without prejudice to raising it again later. The court also warned the plaintiffs — who are representing themselves without a lawyer — that they must formally serve Chubb with the lawsuit within 90 days of filing the complaint or risk having the case dismissed for failing to move it forward.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Mohammad O. Sabri and Mona Sabri v. Chubb Indemnity Ins. Co., No. 26-cv-1689 (PJS/SGE)
Judge
Magistrate Judge Shannon G. Elkins
Date
March 23, 2026

Background

Plaintiffs Mohammad O. Sabri and Mona Sabri, proceeding pro se (representing themselves without an attorney), filed a complaint on March 2, 2026, against Chubb Indemnity Insurance Co. seeking damages under an insurance contract following a house fire. They subsequently filed a motion (Dkt. 7) requesting two things: (1) leave to supplement their damages to include losses discovered after their initial insurance claim submission, and (2) equitable tolling — a legal doctrine that pauses the running of a deadline — of any contractual or policy limitations periods relating to those supplemental damages.

Amendment Issue

The court found the request for leave to amend unnecessary at this stage. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1)(A), a party may amend a pleading once as a matter of course — meaning without the court's permission — within 21 days of serving it or within 21 days after a responsive pleading is served, whichever is earlier. Because no proof of service and no answer had been filed as of the date of the order, the 21-day clock had not begun. The court therefore confirmed that the plaintiffs may file an amended complaint under Rule 15(a)(1)(A) without further court authorization.

Equitable Tolling Issue

The court declined to address the equitable tolling request, explaining that equitable tolling is a doctrine premised on excusable neglect by the filing party that preserves a claim after a filing period has already expired. The court cited Eighth Circuit precedent (Shempert v. Harwick Chem. Corp., 151 F.3d 793 (8th Cir. 1998); Jackson v. Hennepin Healthcare Sys., Inc., 134 F.4th 1262 (8th Cir. 2025)) identifying circumstances where tolling may be appropriate — such as inadequate notice, pending counsel appointment, court-induced belief that all requirements were met, or affirmative misconduct by the defendant. The court found it inappropriate to rule on this issue before the defendant has appeared, as the question is better addressed once all parties have weighed in. The tolling request was therefore denied.

Service Warning

The court noted that there was no certificate of service or other indication that Chubb had been served with the complaint. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m), a defendant must be served within 90 days of the complaint being filed. The court reminded the pro se plaintiffs that self-representation does not excuse compliance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, citing Eighth Circuit authority, and warned that failure to serve Chubb could result in dismissal for failure to prosecute under Rules 4(m) and 41(b).

Disposition

Motion granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiffs may file an amended complaint pursuant to Rule 15(a)(1)(A). The equitable tolling request was denied. The denial of the tolling request appears to be without prejudice to raising the issue again after Chubb appears, though the order does not use that specific phrase.

Reviewer note from the AI+
The opinion does not explicitly state whether the denial of the equitable tolling request is with or without prejudice. The summary characterizes it as effectively without prejudice (since the court says the issue is 'best reserved' for later) but this is an inference from the court's reasoning, not an explicit statement. Additionally, the case caption lists 'PJS/SGE' as the judge codes, suggesting a district judge (PJS) is also assigned; the order is signed by Magistrate Judge Shannon G. Elkins (SGE). This appears to be a magistrate judge ruling on a non-dispositive motion, which is consistent with the order format. No concern about accuracy of the ruling itself.
The authoritative version

Read the full 3-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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