Smith v. Stenseth

Background

Jamal Lindsey Smith is incarcerated at MCF–Rush City in Minnesota, serving a life sentence with the possibility of release following a jury conviction for first-degree intentional murder while committing a drive-by shooting (Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(3)), along with a concurrent 120-month sentence for possession of ammunition or a firearm after a prior conviction for a crime of violence (Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2)). The charges arose from the July 6, 2021, shooting death of Jay Boughton, who was killed while driving his teenage son home from a baseball game.

A Hennepin County grand jury indicted Smith on three counts. A jury convicted him on all three; the trial court entered convictions on the murder count and the firearm count and sentenced Smith accordingly. Smith appealed directly to the Minnesota Supreme Court — which has mandatory jurisdiction over first-degree murder appeals under Minn. Stat. § 632.14 — raising four arguments through both his public defender and a pro se supplemental brief: (1) judicial bias, (2) ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), (3) error in denying his challenge to the racial composition of the grand and petit jury pools, and (4) error in admitting evidence of prior bad acts. The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected all four arguments and affirmed the conviction. State v. Smith, 9 N.W.3d 543 (Minn. 2024).

The Federal Habeas Petition

On April 16, 2025, Smith, representing himself (pro se), filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A writ of habeas corpus is a court order requiring the government to justify why it is holding someone in custody; under § 2254, a federal court may grant such relief to a state prisoner only if the imprisonment violates the U.S. Constitution or federal law. Smith raised 26 grounds, including claims labeled as Due Process, Improper Grand Jury Indictment, Selective Prosecution, Prosecutorial Misconduct, Insufficient Evidence, Reasonable Doubt, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, Judicial Misconduct, and others.

The Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation

United States Magistrate Judge Elsa M. Bullard issued a Report and Recommendation (R&R) on August 28, 2025. The R&R recommended rejecting 22 of the 26 grounds (Grounds 1–11, 14, and 17–26) as procedurally defaulted under the Minnesota rule announced in State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737 (Minn. 1976). The Knaffla rule bars post-conviction review of any claim the defendant knew or should have known about at the time of direct appeal but did not raise. Because Smith knew or should have known of these claims and failed to present them to the Minnesota Supreme Court, they were permanently barred from state court review and therefore could not support federal habeas relief absent a showing of cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

The Magistrate Judge concluded that Grounds 12 (Insufficient Evidence), 13 (Reasonable Doubt), 15 (Ineffective Assistance of Counsel), and 16 (Judicial Misconduct) had been fairly presented to the Minnesota Supreme Court and were therefore properly exhausted. Rather than recommending a disposition on those four grounds, the R&R directed Respondents to file a memorandum explaining why the writ should not be granted. Smith objected to the R&R in its entirety on September 22, 2025. Respondents filed their memorandum on September 25, 2025, and Smith filed a reply on October 23, 2025.

Standard of Review

Because Smith is a pro se litigant, the court was required to construe his filings liberally. The district court conducted de novo (independent, from scratch) review of Smith's objections and of the R&R. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), federal habeas relief is available on claims that were decided on the merits by a state court only if that court's decision (1) was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the U.S. Supreme Court, or (2) was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. A state prisoner must also exhaust available state court remedies before seeking federal habeas relief, meaning the claim must be "fairly presented" — including reference to a specific federal constitutional right or provision — in each level of the state court system.

Analysis: Exhaustion and Procedural Default (22 Grounds)

Judge Tunheim agreed with the Magistrate Judge that 22 of Smith's 26 grounds were procedurally defaulted. Smith had not raised those claims before the Minnesota Supreme Court on direct appeal, and the Knaffla rule permanently bars their consideration in subsequent state proceedings. Smith did not demonstrate cause and prejudice for the default, nor did he show that failure to consider the claims would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, federal habeas review of Grounds 1–11, 14, and 17–26 is barred.

Analysis: The Four Exhausted Grounds

Ground 12 & 13: Insufficient Evidence and Reasonable Doubt

Smith argued the state did not present sufficient evidence to convict him of first-degree murder. The Minnesota Supreme Court had conducted a detailed sufficiency-of-the-evidence analysis, citing gunshot residue found inside the car and on Smith's bag (inconsistent with the shots being fired by a rear passenger), phone records showing a backseat passenger was texting near the time of the shooting, and other circumstantial evidence pointing to Smith as the shooter. The Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that the circumstances proved were consistent with Smith firing the shot and inconsistent with the theory that another passenger did so.

Judge Tunheim found that Smith failed to identify any federal constitutional provision or case law showing the Minnesota Supreme Court's analysis was contrary to federal law or unreasonably applied it. The petition was denied on these grounds.

Ground 15: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Smith argued his trial attorneys performed deficiently by refusing to move for a change of venue despite pretrial publicity and his repeated requests, by failing to investigate witnesses he identified, and by refusing to withdraw from the case. The Minnesota Supreme Court applied the two-part Strickland test — requiring a showing that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the deficient performance changed the outcome — and rejected the claim on both prongs. The court found that jurors had only minimal awareness of the case from news coverage, that voir dire (the jury selection process) was conducted carefully, and that Smith had not shown a venue change would have altered the result.

Judge Tunheim found that Smith again failed to identify any federal law contradicted by the Minnesota Supreme Court's Strickland analysis or to show the analysis was unreasonable. The petition was denied on this ground.

Ground 16: Judicial Misconduct

Smith argued the trial judge was biased against him, citing adverse rulings on bail, jail phone privileges, and the motion to dismiss the indictment. The Minnesota Supreme Court applied an objective standard — whether a reasonable observer with full knowledge of the facts would question the judge's impartiality — and found no bias. The court noted that adverse rulings alone are insufficient to show bias, and that the trial judge provided reasoned explanations for the challenged decisions.

Judge Tunheim again found that Smith did not point to any federal law inconsistent with the Minnesota Supreme Court's analysis or show the analysis was unreasonable. The petition was denied on this ground.

Disposition

Judge Tunheim adopted the R&R in full, overruled Smith's objections, and denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus in its entirety. Smith's application to proceed without prepaying court fees and his motion for appointment of counsel were denied as moot (meaning there was nothing left for them to affect). The court entered judgment accordingly.