Gary L. v. Bisignano
- Eric Tostrud
- 0:24-cv-03955
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 12
In Gary L. v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security, No. 24-cv-3955-EMB, Magistrate Judge Elsa M. Bullard denied Gary L.'s challenge to the Social Security Administration's denial of his Supplemental Security Income benefits, finding that the administrative law judge did not commit legal error when reformulating the psychologists' social-interaction limitations into different but equivalent language in the residual functional capacity assessment.
Individuals who have been denied Social Security Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits and are challenging an ALJ's residual functional capacity determination, particularly where the ALJ reformulated medical opinion language about social-interaction limitations rather than adopting it verbatim.
What happened
In Gary L. v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security, Gary L. sought federal court review of an administrative law judge's (ALJ's) decision denying him Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits — monthly payments for people with limited income and resources who are disabled. This case had already been sent back to the ALJ once before, after a prior federal court found the ALJ needed to clarify how he handled social-interaction limitations and the opinion of a psychiatric nurse practitioner. On remand, the ALJ again found Gary L. not disabled, concluding he could perform jobs such as laundry worker, store laborer, and industrial cleaner despite his bipolar disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, and primary insomnia.
Gary L.'s sole argument was that the ALJ made a legal error by rejecting the state agency psychologists' specific language — that he could only handle 'brief, infrequent, and superficial' contact with coworkers, supervisors, and the public — on the grounds that those terms were not defined in Social Security vocational standards. Gary L. argued this was disingenuous because 'superficial' is widely understood to describe the quality of interactions, and that by substituting different language, the ALJ improperly blended quality and quantity restrictions. He also argued that a Social Security Ruling issued in December 2024 (SSR 24-3p) required the vocational expert, not the ALJ, to make judgments about whether terms like 'superficial' have vocational meaning.
Magistrate Judge Bullard rejected both arguments and dismissed the complaint with prejudice, meaning Gary L. cannot refile this claim. The judge found that the ALJ's RFC language — limiting Gary L. to 'occasional interactions' focused on 'taking instructions from supervisors' and barring work around crowds or in customer-facing roles — adequately captured both the quantity and quality of social limitations the psychologists described, without impermissibly conflating them. As for SSR 24-3p, Judge Bullard found it did not apply because it did not take effect until January 6, 2025, several months after the ALJ issued his August 2024 decision, and the ruling itself states that federal courts should apply the rules in effect at the time of the agency's decision.
The detailed version
- Gary L. v. Bisignano · No. 0:24-cv-03955
- Eric Tostrud
- Mar. 31, 2026
Background
Gary L. applied for Title XVI Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits under the Social Security Act. His application was denied initially and on reconsideration. An ALJ held a hearing and issued an unfavorable decision. Gary L. then sought federal court review, and Magistrate Judge Elizabeth Cowan Wright recommended remand for two reasons: (1) the ALJ found the state agency psychologists' limitations did not go far enough, yet failed to include any restriction on the quality (as opposed to duration) of contact with supervisors and coworkers in the residual functional capacity (RFC) — the assessment of the most a claimant can do despite impairments; and (2) the ALJ needed to reconsider the supportability and consistency of the opinion of psychiatric nurse practitioner Jenny Bliss. District Judge Katherine Menendez adopted that recommendation and remanded the case.
On remand, the Appeals Council sent the case back to the ALJ, who consolidated Gary L.'s claim files (a new claim had been filed in the interim) and held a telephonic hearing on July 12, 2024. Gary L. and vocational expert (VE) Glee Ann Kehr testified. The ALJ issued a new unfavorable decision on August 5, 2024, applying the standard five-step sequential evaluation under 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4). The ALJ found severe impairments at step two — bipolar disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and primary insomnia — but concluded Gary L. was not disabled at step five.
The RFC Determination
The ALJ determined that Gary L. retained the RFC to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels, subject to the following nonexertional limitations: simple, routine, and repetitive tasks not performed at a fast production-rate pace; occasional interactions with coworkers and supervisors, where the primary job is taking and executing instructions; and no work around crowds where the primary task involves direct communication with the public (such as customer service or cashiering).
Based on this RFC, the ALJ found Gary L. unable to perform past relevant work but determined — relying on VE testimony — that he could perform jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy, including laundry worker, store laborer, and industrial cleaner. The ALJ therefore found Gary L. not disabled.
Gary L.'s Arguments
Gary L. raised a single issue: that the ALJ legally erred by rejecting the state agency psychologists' specific language. Two state agency psychologists — Dr. Mary Sullivan and Dr. Jeffrey Boyd — opined that Gary L. retained capacity for only "brief, infrequent, and superficial contact" with the public, coworkers, and supervisors, and could handle ordinary supervision in a reasonably supportive, non-over-the-shoulder environment. The ALJ found those terms — including "superficial," "3–4 step tasks," and "reduced supervision but adequate for ordinary levels" — to be "not vocationally defined" and thus inadequate for direct use in an RFC. The ALJ found the psychologists' opinions "partially persuasive" only insofar as they confirmed limitations in social interaction, concentration, and adaptation.
Gary L. made two arguments:
1. Conflation of quality and quantity: Gary L. argued that "superficial" describes the quality of interactions (their depth or nature), while "occasional" describes quantity (how often). By substituting "occasional interactions" for "brief, superficial and infrequent interactions," Gary L. contended the ALJ impermissibly collapsed a qualitative restriction into a purely quantitative one.
2. Social Security Ruling 24-3p: Gary L. argued that this ruling, issued December 6, 2024, required the VE — not the ALJ — to determine whether terms like "superficial" have vocational meaning, and that the ALJ exceeded his authority by making that determination himself.
The Court's Analysis
Quality vs. Quantity
Judge Bullard found no legal error. The court noted that an ALJ is not required to adopt the specific wording used by medical experts, so long as the RFC appropriately captures those limitations. Julie P. v. O'Malley, 2024 WL 4880375 (D. Minn. Nov. 25, 2024). The ALJ's RFC expressly acknowledged the psychologists' terms related to "both the quantity and quality of interactions." The limitation to "occasional interactions" addressed quantity, and the restriction that interactions be limited to "taking instructions from supervisors and performing tasks consistent with those instructions" addressed quality — receipt of instructions is consistent with superficial interaction. The limitation excluding work where the primary task involves direct public communication further reinforced qualitative restrictions. Nothing in the record supported Gary L.'s claim that the ALJ impermissibly conflated "superficial" and "occasional."
The court also found the RFC supported by substantial evidence — i.e., "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019). Mental status examinations generally showed Gary L. was well-groomed, had normal speech, appropriate affect, a cooperative attitude, normal mood, good insight, and intact concentration. His mood was sometimes depressed, anxious, or irritable, and his affect occasionally flat, blunted, or worrisome, but these findings did not undermine the RFC. The ALJ also found nurse practitioner Bliss's opinion unpersuasive given evidence of symptom improvement over time, Gary L.'s cessation of treatment in January 2022 for no clear reason, and his choice to stop taking medications despite improvement.
Social Security Ruling 24-3p
Judge Bullard held that SSR 24-3p does not apply to this case. The ruling did not take effect until January 6, 2025 — several months after the ALJ's August 5, 2024 decision. Moreover, SSR 24-3p itself states that federal courts should review agency decisions using the rules in effect at the time the decisions were issued. Accordingly, Gary L.'s arguments based on SSR 24-3p were inapplicable.
Disposition
Judge Bullard denied Gary L.'s request for relief, granted the Commissioner's motion, and dismissed the complaint with prejudice — meaning the claim cannot be refiled.
Reviewer note from the AI+
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