Mayte Adriana Fuentes Juarez v. Marisol Gonzalez Velasquez
- Douglas Micko
- 0:25-cv-02583
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 9
In Fuentes Juarez v. Gonzalez Velasquez, Judge Micko denied the respondent mother's emergency motion to stay a court order requiring a child's return to Mexico pending appeal.
Parents and custodians involved in international child custody disputes under the Hague Convention, particularly parties seeking to stay a federal court's child-return order while appealing it. Also relevant to self-represented litigants who try to raise new evidence or arguments not presented at trial.
What happened
In Fuentes Juarez v. Gonzalez Velasquez (No. 25-cv-2583), a petitioner who held court-ordered custody of her great nephew — a young child identified as I.G.F.G. — sought the child's return to Mexico under an international treaty called the Hague Convention on Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, after the child's mother brought him to the United States without consent. Following a three-day trial, the court ordered the child returned to Mexico City no later than 14 days after the end of his school year. The child's mother, now representing herself, filed an emergency motion asking the court to put that return order on hold while she appeals.
The court evaluated the motion using a four-part test: whether the mother showed a strong likelihood of winning on appeal; whether she would suffer irreparable harm without a stay; whether the stay would harm the other party; and whether the public interest favored a stay. On likelihood of success, the court found her arguments weak — the parties had previously agreed the child's habitual residence was Mexico, custody was established by both a Mexican court order and a written agreement the mother herself signed, and a document the mother submitted as new evidence postdated the trial and had never been properly presented to the court. The court also noted the mother had been represented by counsel until very recently, so her pro se status did not excuse the failure to present available evidence.
Judge Micko denied the motion on all four factors. The court found no irreparable harm to the mother, noting that an appeal can proceed even after a child is returned and that the risk of mootness does not justify a stay under governing law. The court found that the child's extended separation from his custodial caregiver caused ongoing harm to the petitioner, and that the public interest — reflected in both the Hague Convention and the federal law implementing it — favors prompt return of wrongfully removed children, not delay. The court also declined to amend its removal order to require delivery of the child to an airport by a specific date, but noted the petitioner may seek further relief by motion if circumstances warrant.
The detailed version
- Mayte Adriana Fuentes Juarez v. Marisol Gonzalez Velasquez · No. 0:25-cv-02583
- Douglas L. Micko
- June 5, 2026
Background
On June 20, 2025, Petitioner Mayte Adriana Fuentes Juarez filed a Verified Petition for Return of Child under the Hague Convention on Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction ("Hague Convention") and its U.S. implementing statute, the International Child Abduction Remedies Act ("ICARA"). She alleged that she was the custodian and legal ward of I.G.F.G., a five-year-old child who is her great nephew, and that Respondent Marisol Gonzalez Velasquez — the child's mother — wrongfully removed I.G.F.G. from Mexico without Petitioner's consent and brought him to the United States.
The court held a three-day bench trial from March 16 through March 18, 2026. On May 4, 2026, the court issued an order granting the Petition for Return of Child and directing that I.G.F.G. be returned to Mexico City, Mexico no later than 14 days after the end of his current school year.
On June 1, 2026, Respondent — who was then still represented by counsel — filed several pro se (self-represented) documents, including a Notice of Appeal, an application to proceed without paying court fees (in forma pauperis), and the present Emergency Pro Se Motion to Stay Return of Child Pending Appeal. The court solicited input on how to treat these pro se filings given that Respondent had counsel; this prompted counsel to move to withdraw. The court granted the withdrawal and accepted Respondent's pro se submissions. Petitioner then filed a memorandum and declaration in opposition to the stay motion.
Jurisdiction to Consider the Motion
The court first addressed whether it retained authority to rule on the stay motion after Respondent filed a Notice of Appeal. Ordinarily, filing a notice of appeal transfers jurisdiction to the appellate court and divests the district court of control over matters involved in the appeal. However, the court noted that under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(c), district courts retain jurisdiction to stay their own orders granting equitable (non-monetary) relief while an appeal is pending. Because Hague Convention cases involve equitable remedies, the court held it had jurisdiction to consider the motion, citing prior decisions in this district and the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165 (2013).
The Four-Factor Stay Analysis
Courts evaluating whether to stay an order pending appeal apply four factors from Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770 (1987): (1) likelihood of success on the merits of the appeal; (2) irreparable harm to the movant absent a stay; (3) substantial harm to the opposing party from a stay; and (4) the public interest. The court identified likelihood of success as the most important factor.
Factor 1: Likelihood of Success on the Merits
Respondent's motion identified four "substantial issues" for appeal: (1) whether the child's habitual residence was correctly found to be Mexico; (2) whether Petitioner established custody rights; (3) whether the court's factual findings were supported by the record; and (4) whether the court properly considered ongoing proceedings in Mexico.
The court disposed of the first three issues quickly. On habitual residence, the parties had stipulated — that is, formally agreed — that Mexico was the child's habitual residence, and Respondent cannot claim the court erred on a point she conceded. On custody rights, the record included an August 16, 2023 order from a Mexican court transferring custody of I.G.F.G. to Petitioner, and a written agreement signed by Respondent memorializing that transfer. On factual findings, Respondent offered only a general challenge without identifying any specific unsupported finding.
On the fourth issue — the Mexican proceedings — Respondent submitted a document dated March 27, 2026, which she claimed suspended the underlying Mexican custody order. The court noted that this document postdated the trial (which ended March 18, 2026) and was never presented to the court during trial or in any motion to supplement the record. The court held that Respondent cannot claim error for the court's failure to consider evidence she never submitted, and that her representation by counsel until very recently precluded any pro se excuse. In a footnote, the court also noted that Petitioner had submitted evidence suggesting the March 27 order was interim and had been overturned by a subsequent May 14, 2026 order, expressing concern about what appeared to be a lack of candor by Respondent in cherry-picking documents.
The court found this factor favored Petitioner.
Factor 2: Irreparable Harm to the Movant
Respondent argued that executing the return order would moot her appeal and cause irreversible disruption to the child's life. The court rejected the mootness argument, citing Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 180 (2013), which held that an appeal of a Hague Convention return order is not mooted when the order is carried out, and which specifically rejected the argument that mootness risk supports a stay.
On disruption to the child, the court acknowledged sensitivity to the child's wellbeing but attributed much of the instability in his life to Respondent's own actions: removing him from Mexico in the middle of the night, leading to his placement in a foster setting in the United States, and a subsequent school change. The court also observed that if the return order were ultimately reversed on appeal, any additional disruption from a second move would be attributable to the original wrongful removal.
The court found this factor did not support a stay.
Factor 3: Harm to Petitioner from a Stay
The court found that staying the order would extend I.G.F.G.'s separation from his custodial caregiver by months or longer — time that, for a child as young as I.G.F.G., represents a meaningful fraction of his life. The court found this factor favored Petitioner.
Factor 4: Public Interest
Respondent argued the public interest in fair adjudication of international custody disputes favored a stay. The court disagreed, citing Chafin, 568 U.S. at 178, for the principle that both the Hague Convention and ICARA emphasize prompt return of wrongfully removed children. A stay would impede, not advance, those goals. The court found the public interest factor also favored denying the stay.
Refusal to Amend the Removal Order
Petitioner separately requested that the court amend its removal order to require Respondent to deliver I.G.F.G. to the Minneapolis-St. Paul Airport on June 7, 2026, expressing concern that Respondent — now self-represented — might not comply with the order or might flee with the child. The court declined to amend the removal order at this time, stating it presumed that Respondent's recently withdrawn counsel would continue to assist Respondent in complying. The court noted Petitioner may seek further relief by motion if circumstances warrant.
Disposition
Respondent's Emergency Pro Se Motion to Stay Return of Child Pending Appeal (Doc. 65) was denied.
Read the full 9-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.