Sullivan v. Amazon.com

Background

Plaintiff David Sullivan filed this products liability action in Minnesota state court on December 18, 2025, as trustee under the Minnesota Wrongful Death Act for the next of kin of his infant daughter S. S. In 2020, Sullivan purchased a "Mika Micky" bassinet on Amazon.com. The bassinet was allegedly manufactured, sold, and/or distributed by defendant Redline Commerce Inc. (doing business as Mika Micky) through Amazon, and Amazon shipped it via Amazon's Prime Delivery. On February 16, 2023, S. S. suffocated and died while sleeping in the bassinet. Sullivan alleges the bassinet was defectively designed because it had an area that increased suffocation risks for infants.

Amazon removed the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (the statute allowing federal courts to hear lawsuits between citizens of different states involving amounts above a threshold). Sullivan filed an amended complaint asserting eight counts, all premised on the theory that the bassinet was defectively designed: - Count 1: Strict product liability against Amazon as seller/distributor. - Count 2: Strict product liability for design defect against Redline. - Count 3: Failure to warn against Redline. - Count 4: General negligence against Amazon. - Count 5: Breach of express and implied warranties against Amazon. - Counts 6 and 7: General negligence and breach of warranties against Redline. - Count 8: Joint enterprise against both Amazon and Redline.

Redline was served with the amended complaint but has not appeared in the litigation. Amazon has appeared and is defending itself.

Procedural Posture

Because Redline failed to appear, Sullivan obtained a Clerk's entry of default against Redline under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a) — the procedural mechanism by which a court formally recognizes that a defendant has failed to respond. Sullivan then moved for default judgment against Redline under Rule 55(b), which is the next step allowing the court to enter an actual enforceable judgment against a defaulting party.

Sullivan acknowledged, however, that damages could not be determined from the pleadings alone and asked the court to defer the damages determination until the claims against Amazon are resolved — whether by jury trial or other means. Amazon opposed the motion, arguing that entering default judgment now would be premature, create the risk of inconsistent judgments, and prejudice Amazon as the only appearing defendant.

Legal Standard

Securing a default judgment requires two steps: (1) the Clerk of Court enters default under Rule 55(a), and (2) the court enters judgment under Rule 55(b) if the unchallenged facts in the complaint establish a legitimate cause of action. The court cited Murray v. Lene, 595 F.3d 868 (8th Cir. 2010).

However, courts in the Eighth Circuit (the federal appellate circuit that includes Minnesota) disfavor default judgments and treat them as a last resort, preferring decisions on the merits. Whether and when to enter default judgment is within the court's discretion. Critically, a court should not enter default judgment when co-defendants are "similarly situated" — meaning their defenses are closely related — because if the appearing defendant successfully defends on the merits, a prior default judgment against the non-appearing defendant would be irreconcilable with that outcome, an outcome courts have called an "absurdity." Frow v. De La Vega, 82 U.S. 552 (1872); Angelo Iafrate Constr., LLC v. Potashnick Constr., Inc., 370 F.3d 715 (8th Cir. 2004).

Analysis and Ruling

Judge Provinzino denied Sullivan's motion for default judgment without prejudice.

The court found that Amazon and Redline are "similarly situated" because all eight counts against them rest on a single shared predicate — that the bassinet was defectively designed. If Amazon proves at trial that the bassinet was not defectively designed, that finding would logically preclude liability for Redline on the same claims. A default judgment against Redline could then not be reconciled with a defense verdict for Amazon, creating exactly the kind of inconsistent outcome the law seeks to prevent. The court cited Farzetta v. Turner & Newall, Ltd., 797 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1986), for the principle that a proven fact exonerating one defendant can collaterally estop (legally bar) a judgment against a co-defendant whose liability depends on the same fact.

The court also noted that, as Sullivan himself acknowledged, damages cannot be determined at this stage and would need to be addressed after the Amazon litigation concludes. This further supported deferring any judgment against Redline.

Sullivan argued in his reply that the court should enter default judgment now but withhold its "finality" as to Redline's liability. The court rejected this framing, finding no meaningful difference between entering a judgment and deferring its finality versus simply deferring the judgment until the merits are resolved. The court also corrected Sullivan's characterization of the Rankin v. Direct Recovery Servs. decision, noting that the court in that case did not enter default judgment and then defer its effect — rather, it held the entry of default judgment in "abeyance" until resolution of the merits, which is functionally the same as deferring the judgment.

Practical Consequence

The Clerk's entry of default against Redline remains in place. This means that if Redline later tries to appear and participate in the lawsuit, it cannot simply enter the case and defend itself freely. Instead, it would need to file a motion to vacate the entry of default under Rule 55(c) and show "good cause" for why the default should be lifted. Sullivan's motion for default judgment is denied without prejudice, meaning Sullivan may re-raise the motion at a later stage of the proceedings.