Sloan-Brown v. Westlake Financial Services

Background

On February 17, 2026, Marcel Alan Sloan-Brown, proceeding without a lawyer (pro se), filed suit against Westlake Financial Services, LLC — noted by Westlake to be properly identified as Westlake Services, LLC d/b/a Westlake Financial — alleging that Westlake's repossession of his car violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., and state law.

According to the complaint and attached exhibits, Sloan-Brown and Westlake entered a security agreement on July 8, 2023, under which Westlake financed Sloan-Brown's purchase of a car from a dealer in Burnsville, Minnesota. The dealer immediately assigned the contract to Westlake, which took a security interest in the car. Sloan-Brown was required to make 60 monthly payments beginning August 11, 2023. Fine print at the bottom of each page of the agreement stated that the 'original document' was owned by Westlake 'and is held by it, as Custodian, on behalf of Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, as Agent and Secured Party.'

From September to December 2025, Sloan-Brown sent Westlake a series of letters and emails purporting to establish himself as power-of-attorney and claiming his obligations were discharged. Westlake responded with notices of delinquency and default, warning that failure to pay could result in repossession. Sloan-Brown never made a payment, and Westlake repossessed the car on February 1, 2026.

Sloan-Brown filed this action on February 17, 2026, along with four motions: (1) an emergency motion for expedited hearing; (2) an emergency motion to stay arbitration; (3) an emergency motion for replevin (return of the car); and (4) a Rule 12(e) motion for a more definite statement. Westlake moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which allows dismissal when a complaint fails to state a legally sufficient claim.

FDCPA Claim

Sloan-Brown argued that Westlake violated the FDCPA by misrepresenting its authority to enforce the security interest and repossess the vehicle, pointing to the 'custodian' language in the agreement as evidence that Westlake was not the true owner of the debt.

The court held that the FDCPA only applies to 'debt collectors,' defined under 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) by two alternative tests: (1) the 'principal purpose' test — an entity whose principal business purpose is collecting debts — and (2) the 'regularly collects' test — an entity that regularly collects debts owed to another person or entity.

On the 'regularly collects' definition: The court found that Westlake, as assignee and owner of the security agreement, is a creditor. Under the Supreme Court's decision in Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 582 U.S. 79 (2017), a debt owner — whether original or by assignment — qualifies as a creditor, and the 'regularly collects' definition excludes creditors collecting their own debts. Even if Sloan-Brown's 'custodian' theory meant Westlake was not the true owner, the complaint alleged only a single instance of debt collection against Sloan-Brown, which courts have consistently held is insufficient to establish that a party 'regularly' collects debts.

On the 'principal purpose' definition: The court noted that Henson did not foreclose this definition as a basis for creditor liability, and the Eighth Circuit has confirmed that a creditor could qualify as a debt collector if its principal purpose is debt collection. However, Sloan-Brown provided no factual allegations about Westlake's business at all — not a single allegation establishing that Westlake's primary business is collecting debts — making this definition unavailable on the pleadings.

Because Sloan-Brown failed to plead facts establishing that Westlake qualifies as a 'debt collector' under either definition, the FDCPA claim failed as a matter of law and was dismissed.

State-Law Claims

Sloan-Brown also asserted state-law claims for violations of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) as adopted by Minnesota, conversion (unlawful taking of property), and unjust enrichment.

For a federal court to hear state-law claims on their own, it must have either diversity jurisdiction (complete diversity of citizenship among the parties and more than $75,000 at stake, under 28 U.S.C. § 1332) or supplemental jurisdiction (state claims closely related to a valid federal claim, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367).

On diversity jurisdiction: The complaint plausibly alleged that Sloan-Brown is a citizen of Minnesota. But for an LLC, citizenship is determined by the citizenship of each of its members — not by its address or headquarters. Sloan-Brown provided only a California address for Westlake, which is legally insufficient. Because Sloan-Brown did not plead the citizenship of Westlake's members, the court had no basis to conclude that Westlake was not also a citizen of Minnesota, which would destroy complete diversity. The burden to plead jurisdictional facts rests with the plaintiff, and Sloan-Brown did not meet it.

On supplemental jurisdiction: Because the federal FDCPA claim was dismissed, supplemental jurisdiction was no longer automatic. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction when it has dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction. Applying the standard factors — judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity — the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and dismissed the state-law claims without prejudice so they may be pursued, if at all, in Minnesota state courts.

Disposition of Motions

With the FDCPA claim dismissed and supplemental jurisdiction declined, the court denied all four of Sloan-Brown's pending motions as moot.

Order

The dismissal without prejudice means Sloan-Brown is not barred from refiling — he could potentially refile the state-law claims in Minnesota state court, or refile a federal action if he can plead sufficient facts to satisfy one of the jurisdictional or merits deficiencies identified by the court.