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U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
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Procedural orderFiled June 10, 2026

El, Souradji Tunkashila v. Baxter Credit Union

Judge
Katherine Menendez
Docket
0:26-cv-00320
Court
U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
Pages
11
Consumer CreditMotion to DismissPro SeCivil Procedure
In one sentence

In El, Souradji Tunkashila v. Baxter Credit Union, Judge Menendez dismissed a self-represented plaintiff's Truth in Lending Act claims as time-barred by the one-year statute of limitations.

Who this affects

Consumers who believe a creditor violated federal credit disclosure laws (Truth in Lending Act) but waited more than one year to file suit, and self-represented plaintiffs who may need to allege specific facts — not just conclusions — to justify extending a filing deadline based on equitable tolling.

What happened

In El, Souradji Tunkashila v. Baxter Credit Union (No. 26-cv-320), a self-represented plaintiff sued Baxter Credit Union alleging that when he opened two credit card accounts — one in May 2017 and one in June 2021 — Baxter failed to disclose required credit terms such as the annual percentage rate and finance charges before he became obligated on the accounts, in violation of the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA). Baxter moved to dismiss the case, arguing that TILA requires lawsuits to be filed within one year of the violation, and that Mr. Tunkashila waited until January 2026 — roughly eight years after the first violation and nearly five years after the second — to sue.

Mr. Tunkashila argued that the one-year deadline should be extended (a legal concept called "equitable tolling") because he did not discover the violations until 2025. He offered three arguments: that he could not have discovered the violations sooner through reasonable diligence; that Baxter's disclosure of credit terms only after he was already obligated justified tolling; and that he only learned TILA required these disclosures upon studying the law in 2025. The court found none of these arguments sufficient. Mr. Tunkashila alleged no facts showing that Baxter engaged in fraud or concealment, his conclusory statement that he could not have discovered the violation sooner lacked any factual explanation, and a plaintiff cannot use the same nondisclosure that constitutes the violation as the basis for tolling the limitations period.

Judge Katherine Menendez granted Baxter's motion to dismiss and dismissed Mr. Tunkashila's Second Amended Complaint with prejudice, meaning the case is closed and cannot be refiled. The court also rejected the argument that ignorance of TILA's legal requirements — as opposed to concealment of facts by the defendant — can justify extending the filing deadline.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
El, Souradji Tunkashila v. Baxter Credit Union · No. 0:26-cv-00320
Judge
Katherine Menendez
Date
June 10, 2026

Background

Plaintiff El, Souradji Tunkashila, representing himself, filed this lawsuit on January 14, 2026, against Defendant Baxter Credit Union (Baxter) under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. TILA is a federal consumer-protection statute enacted in 1968 that requires creditors to make meaningful disclosures of credit terms before consumers become obligated on credit accounts. Mr. Tunkashila's operative pleading — his Second Amended Complaint — alleged that he applied for and received two consumer credit card accounts from Baxter: one in May 2017 and one in June 2021. He alleged that in connection with both accounts, Baxter failed to disclose material credit terms — including the annual percentage rate (APR), finance charges, and the method for calculating balances — before he opened the accounts, as required by TILA. He alleged that Baxter provided card-member agreements disclosing those terms only after he was already contractually obligated. He further alleged that he performed under both account agreements through May 2025, and that he did not discover and could not have discovered the absence of the required disclosures until approximately 2025.

Legal Standard

Baxter moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Under this standard, the complaint must contain enough facts to make a claim "plausible on its face" (Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)). The court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true but does not accept conclusory statements or bare recitals of legal elements (Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)). Because Mr. Tunkashila is self-represented (pro se), the court applied the more lenient pleading standard appropriate for pro se litigants, though he was still required to allege sufficient facts to support his claims.

A statute-of-limitations defense is normally an affirmative defense that a defendant must plead and prove; it is ordinarily not a basis for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) unless the face of the complaint itself makes clear that the claims are untimely.

TILA's One-Year Statute of Limitations

TILA requires that civil claims for damages based on disclosure violations be filed "within one year from the date of the occurrence of the violation." 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e). Under Eighth Circuit precedent (Dryden v. Lou Budke's Arrow Finance Co., 630 F.2d 641 (8th Cir. 1980)), the one-year period begins when the parties' credit contract is formed — that is, when the consumer becomes contractually obligated.

Here, the alleged violations occurred when Mr. Tunkashila opened the credit card accounts: May 2017 and June 2021. He therefore had until May 2018 to file his claim related to the first account and until June 2022 for the second. He did not file until January 14, 2026 — approximately eight years after the first violation and nearly five years after the second. The court found that the face of the Second Amended Complaint itself established the limitations defense.

Equitable Tolling Arguments

The court recognized that a plaintiff may avoid dismissal on limitations grounds by alleging facts sufficient to invoke equitable tolling — a doctrine that can pause (toll) the running of a deadline under appropriate circumstances. Courts have found that TILA's limitations period may be tolled when a defendant engaged in fraud or concealment that prevented the plaintiff from discovering the violation.

Argument 1 — Conclusory Discovery Allegation

Mr. Tunkashila alleged that he could not have discovered Baxter's failure to make required disclosures until 2025 through the exercise of reasonable diligence. The court found this a bare conclusory assertion: he provided no explanation of why discovery was impossible or delayed. The court noted that conclusory allegations of this kind are insufficient to defeat a limitations defense at the pleading stage, particularly where the complaint alleges no facts showing concealment or fraud by Baxter.

Argument 2 — Post-Commitment Disclosure

Mr. Tunkashila argued that because Baxter's disclosures were buried in post-approval documents provided only after he was already obligated, this should toll the limitations period. The court rejected this argument on a foundational legal ground: a plaintiff cannot rely on the same factual allegations that establish the underlying statutory violation to also invoke equitable tolling. Tolling requires fraudulent conduct beyond the nondisclosure itself. Furthermore, even if this theory were valid, any tolling would extend the period only by the days or weeks between account opening and receipt of documents — not by the four-to-eight years at issue.

Argument 3 — Ignorance of the Law

Mr. Tunkashila indicated that he only learned of TILA's disclosure requirements through his own later legal study in 2025. The court rejected this as a basis for tolling. Ignorance of the law — as distinct from a defendant's concealment of facts — does not justify equitable tolling. Multiple courts have held that a plaintiff's own lack of knowledge about a legal requirement does not toll a statute of limitations.

Disposition

The court granted Baxter's motion to dismiss. The Second Amended Complaint was dismissed with prejudice, meaning the case is closed and Mr. Tunkashila may not refile these claims. The court ordered that judgment be entered accordingly.

Note on Scope

The court's ruling rested entirely on the statute of limitations and did not reach the underlying merits of whether Baxter actually violated TILA's disclosure requirements.

The authoritative version

Read the full 11-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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