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U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
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Procedural orderFiled June 18, 2026

Adams v. Independent School District No. 885

Judge
Katherine Menendez
Docket
0:26-cv-02437
Court
U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
Pages
14

Counsel of record
PLAINTIFF
Winter Adams
DEFENDANT
Squires, Waldspurger, & Mace, P.A
Jordan Kleinschmidt
Rupp, Anderson, Squires & Waldspurger
Michael J. Waldspurger

Counsel of record per CourtListener. Firm names are approximate.

Civil RightsFirst AmendmentADA / DisabilityPreliminary Injunction
In one sentence

In Winter Adams v. Independent School District No. 885, Judge Menendez denied a parent's motion for a preliminary injunction against a school district's no-trespass order.

Who this affects

Parents of public school students who have been issued no-trespass orders or communication restrictions by school districts, and school districts seeking to manage disruptive parental communications.

What happened

In Winter Adams v. Independent School District No. 885 (No. 26-cv-2437), a parent sued a Minnesota school district after it issued a no-trespass order barring her from school property and restricting her communications with school staff, following months of what the district described as antagonistic and harassing emails. Ms. Adams sought emergency court orders to block the no-trespass order and related restrictions while the lawsuit proceeded, arguing the district violated her constitutional rights to due process and free speech, and retaliated against her for seeking a disability accommodation for her child.

The court evaluated Ms. Adams's three claims — procedural due process, First Amendment retaliation, and disability retaliation under federal disability law — to determine whether she had a fair chance of winning on any of them. On the due process claim, the court found no established constitutional right to visit schools or communicate with teachers. On the First Amendment claim, the court found she could not show the no-trespass order was caused by her filing of complaints, especially since she had been filing complaint threats for months before the order and the district explicitly encouraged her to continue filing complaints. On the disability retaliation claim, while her request for a disability accommodation and the no-trespass order were close in time, the court found the overall record undermined any causal connection, particularly because the district continued to assist her with the accommodation process after issuing the order.

Judge Menendez denied the motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that Ms. Adams failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits of any of her claims and also failed to show a risk of irreparable harm — either of which was independently sufficient to deny the motion. The court also noted that Ms. Adams retained multiple ways to contact the district and had not been fully shut out of her child's education.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Adams v. Independent School District No. 885 · No. 0:26-cv-02437
Judge
Katherine Menendez
Date
June 18, 2026

Background

During the 2025–26 school year, plaintiff Winter Adams's child attended St. Michael Albertville (STMA) High School, within defendant Independent School District No. 885. Between November 2025 and April 2026, Ms. Adams communicated with district staff by email, but the messages escalated into what the court described as frequent and antagonistic emails to administrators, office staff, and individual instructors, which were often personally condemning.

On April 7, 2026, the district issued a No-Trespass Order prohibiting Ms. Adams from entering any district property through September 1, 2026, including for school events, athletic competitions, and parent-teacher conferences, unless she received prior written authorization from the superintendent's office. The order also restricted her communication with the district to a designated email address or phone number and stated that the principal would not respond to further emails or calls unless they concerned new and consequential information needed to meet her child's educational needs. The order cited her "extreme and relentless barrage of emails" as interfering with the educational environment and staff safety.

On April 26, 2026, district counsel sent Ms. Adams a letter clarifying and modifying the order. The letter created a narrow exception allowing her to drive into the school's front parking lot to drop off or pick up her child on instructional days, but prohibited her from exiting her vehicle or entering the building. The letter also blocked her email address effective April 27 and directed her to communicate via U.S. mail to designated officials, with an exception if she filed a formal complaint under a law or district policy requiring contact with a specific person. The district explicitly stated it would not retaliate against her for filing complaints and encouraged her to do so if she had a good-faith basis.

Separately, around April and May 2026, Ms. Adams sought a Section 504 disability accommodation for her child under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act (RA). The district provided information, Ms. Adams signed a consent form on April 13, and a Section 504 evaluation was scheduled for May 19, 2026.

This case was originally filed in Minnesota state court and removed to federal court on May 1, 2026. Ms. Adams filed the present motion seeking a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order on May 14, 2026.

Legal Standard

A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy that a moving party must clearly show entitlement to. Courts in the Eighth Circuit apply the four Dataphase factors: (1) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant; (2) the balance of harms between the parties; (3) the probability of success on the merits; and (4) the public interest. The court noted that the standard for a temporary restraining order is the same as for a preliminary injunction. The likelihood of success on the merits is considered the most important factor. The movant need not show greater than fifty percent likelihood of success, only a fair chance of prevailing.

Analysis: Likelihood of Success on the Merits

Procedural Due Process

To succeed on a procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must first identify a protected liberty or property interest of which she was deprived. Ms. Adams argued she had a protected liberty interest in parental participation in her child's education, including access to school property, communication with officials, attendance at conferences, and involvement in disability-related decisions. The court found she cited no supporting caselaw.

The court surveyed existing precedent and concluded that while parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of their children, this right does not extend to controlling every aspect of a child's education or overriding state authority. The court cited several district court decisions holding that there is no constitutional right to visit schools, attend school events, or receive a particular quantity or quality of communications with school staff. The court acknowledged the Eighth Circuit has not squarely addressed this issue but found the weight of authority undermined Ms. Adams's position. The likelihood-of-success factor weighed against her on this claim.

First Amendment Retaliation

A First Amendment retaliation claim requires showing: (1) protected activity; (2) an adverse action that would chill a person of ordinary firmness; and (3) a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action.

Ms. Adams argued her communications with district staff and threats or filings of complaints were protected speech. The court found that her general communications with the district — about attendance, grades, and related matters — were likely not protected under the First Amendment, citing caselaw holding parents have no constitutional right to unfettered access to teachers and that speech materially disrupting school operations is not protected.

The court found that filing formal complaints against the district was likely protected activity. However, it concluded Ms. Adams failed to establish causation. The record showed she had been threatening to file complaints since as early as November 2025 — five months before the no-trespass order — and had actually filed complaints at various points during that period. The court found that with such a long period of overlap, temporal proximity alone was insufficient to establish a causal link. The court also noted that both the no-trespass order and the letter explicitly stated Ms. Adams retained the right to file complaints and encouraged her to do so. The likelihood-of-success factor weighed against her on this claim.

Disability Retaliation

Under both the ADA and Section 504 of the RA (which the court analyzed together), a disability retaliation claim requires showing: (1) protected activity; (2) an adverse action; and (3) a causal connection between the two.

The court found Ms. Adams likely satisfied the first two elements: she engaged in protected activity by seeking a Section 504 accommodation on April 2, 2026, and the no-trespass order issued on April 7 constituted an adverse action. However, the court concluded she failed to establish causation. Although the short time between events could suggest a connection, the court found the full record undermined that inference. The district had been communicating with Ms. Adams for nearly six months before the order; the order and letter expressly preserved her right to continue seeking a disability accommodation; and the district continued to engage in the Section 504 process with her afterward, providing information and scheduling the evaluation. The court found only temporal overlap, which it held was insufficient under Eighth Circuit precedent. The likelihood-of-success factor weighed against her on this claim.

Analysis: Other Dataphase Factors

The court also found Ms. Adams failed to establish irreparable harm — a showing that the harm is certain, great, and imminent, with no adequate remedy at law. The court noted Ms. Adams retained multiple channels to contact the district, was permitted to access school property in limited circumstances (vehicle drop-off), and continued to receive communications about her child's education. The court stated the failure to show irreparable harm was independently sufficient to deny the motion.

The court further found that the balance of harms and public interest factors did not outweigh the two independently sufficient bases for denial.

Disposition

Ms. Adams's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order was denied.

The authoritative version

Read the full 14-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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