Pittman v. Federal Bureau of Prisons

Background

Petitioner Earnest Lee Pittman, Jr. is a federal prisoner serving a 120-month sentence imposed by U.S. District Judge Robert D. Mariani of the Middle District of Pennsylvania in December 2021. He is currently housed at the Federal Medical Center in Rochester, Minnesota. Pittman filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 — a federal statute allowing prisoners to challenge the execution of their sentences — along with an application to proceed without paying filing fees (in forma pauperis).

The First Step Act Framework

The First Step Act of 2018 (FSA) directed the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to assess each prisoner's risk of reoffending and to award "earned time credits" (ETCs) to prisoners who complete approved recidivism-reduction programs. Prisoners who accumulate sufficient ETCs may be eligible for transfer to prerelease custody, such as home confinement or a residential reentry center. As of the BOP's last calculation, Pittman had earned 795 ETCs.

Pittman's Claims

Pittman's Unit Team recommended him for six months of home confinement under the Second Chance Act of 2007 in September 2025. The U.S. Probation Office approved his proposed release residence. Under the BOP's own projections, his earliest transfer date was June 18, 2026. However, in February 2026, Pittman was told the June 2026 placement would not occur because the regional Residential Reentry Management office had determined he was not medically appropriate for home confinement; his referral would instead be considered closer to a later date of December 15, 2026.

Pittman raised two legal claims: (1) that 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(C) of the FSA imposes a mandatory, nondiscretionary duty on the BOP to transfer eligible prisoners to prerelease custody, and that the BOP's refusal violated federal law; and (2) that the court has jurisdiction to review that claim. He sought a court order directing the BOP to transfer him to home confinement on June 18, 2026. He also argued that the Supreme Court's decision in Trump v. J.G.G., 604 U.S. 670 (2025), supports his jurisdictional theory.

Jurisdictional Analysis: Is This a Proper Habeas Claim?

The court began with the threshold question of whether Pittman's challenge falls within the proper scope of habeas corpus. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, habeas relief is available to prisoners challenging the execution — not the validity — of their sentence. But the core of habeas, as established by the Supreme Court in Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), is a challenge to the "fact or duration" of confinement — where a prisoner seeks immediate or speedier release.

The court found that Pittman is not challenging how long he will be confined. He does not claim the BOP miscalculated his sentence or wrongly withheld ETCs. He seeks only to serve part of his undisputed sentence at a different location — his mother's home — beginning on a particular date. The court characterized this as a challenge to the place of confinement, not its fact or duration.

Under Eighth Circuit precedent — Kruger v. Erickson, 77 F.3d 1071 (8th Cir. 1996), and Spencer v. Haynes, 774 F.3d 467 (8th Cir. 2014) — conditions-of-confinement claims, including where a prisoner serves his sentence, must be brought in a civil lawsuit, not a habeas petition. Courts within the District of Minnesota have repeatedly applied this rule to FSA transfer disputes.

Pittman's Argument Based on Trump v. J.G.G.

Pittman argued that the Supreme Court's 2025 decision in Trump v. J.G.G. displaced this precedent. That case held that challenges to the government's attempt to remove Venezuelan nationals to a foreign prison under the Alien Enemies Act are core habeas claims. Pittman pointed to Justice Kavanaugh's concurrence, which stated that habeas has historically been the vehicle for "claims seeking to bar their transfers."

The court rejected this argument. J.G.G. involved detainees contesting the very lawfulness of their confinement and the government's authority to hold and expel them — a paradigmatic core-habeas situation. Pittman, by contrast, concedes the lawfulness and duration of his confinement and seeks only a preferred location. The court concluded that J.G.G. does not overrule Spencer or Kruger, does not disturb the Preiser fact-or-duration framework, and does not convert every transfer dispute into a core habeas claim. The court also noted that a prior magistrate judge recommendation in this district that had found jurisdiction over a similar FSA claim was later rejected by the district judge on jurisdictional grounds.

Alternative Merits Analysis: Is the BOP's Duty Truly Mandatory?

Even assuming the court had jurisdiction, the court addressed Pittman's substantive claim that the FSA imposes an unconditional, nondiscretionary transfer obligation. The court found this argument fails on the merits.

While 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(C) states that the BOP "shall" transfer eligible prisoners to prerelease custody, the duty applies only to prisoners determined to be eligible "under [§] 3624(g)." Section 3624(g) conditions eligibility on individualized determinations — including risk level — that are committed to the BOP's judgment. Similarly, the Second Chance Act's home-confinement provision directs placement only "to the extent practicable" and within specific time limits. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(2). The court concluded that accepting Pittman's reading would require excising the statutory phrase "as determined under section 3624(g)" and disregarding the discretionary "to the extent practicable" framework — an interpretation the court declined to adopt.

The court also rejected Pittman's reliance on Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024) — a Supreme Court decision requiring courts to exercise independent statutory judgment rather than simply deferring to agencies. The court found that exercising such independent judgment leads to the same conclusion: the BOP retains discretion over the individualized eligibility and appropriateness determinations that must precede any transfer. The court also noted that 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) expressly provides that BOP designation decisions are "not reviewable by any court."

Disposition

Because this is a Report and Recommendation from a magistrate judge, it is subject to objection and review by a district judge before becoming a final order. The court excused any failure to exhaust administrative remedies, given the time-sensitive nature of the projected prerelease date and the legal character of the dispute.