Sao v. Mullin
- Eric Tostrud
- 0:26-cv-02520
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 11
Counsel of record per CourtListener. Firm names are approximate.
In Sao V. v. Mullin, Magistrate Judge Docherty recommends granting a Laotian immigrant's petition for release because ICE arrested him before revoking his supervision order and failed to comply with federal regulations governing revocation.
Noncitizens subject to final removal orders who have been released on immigration supervision orders and are subsequently re-detained by ICE, particularly those whose re-detention preceded formal revocation of their supervision or whose revocation was based on conclusory assertions of changed circumstances.
What happened
In Sao V. v. Mullin (Case No. 26-CV-2520), a citizen of Laos who had been living under an immigration supervision order since 2019 was re-arrested by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) on April 27, 2026, after being encountered at a county jail on a drunk-driving charge. ICE formally revoked his supervision order the following day, April 28. Petitioner filed a federal habeas petition — a legal request asking a court to order his release from custody — arguing his detention was unlawful on multiple grounds.
The court analyzed five claims: that the detention violated the federal immigration detention statute (8 U.S.C. § 1231), that it violated the Supreme Court's Zadvydas ruling on prolonged detention, that it violated due process, that it violated the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable seizures, and that it violated the federal regulation governing revocation of immigration supervision orders (8 C.F.R. § 241.13). The court rejected the claims based on § 1231 and Zadvydas as inapplicable to someone re-detained after a supervision order, and rejected the Fourth Amendment claim, finding that ICE's use of a Form I-200 rather than a Form I-205 warrant, and the date discrepancies on the forms, did not make the arrest constitutionally unreasonable.
Magistrate Judge John F. Docherty recommended granting the petition on due process and regulatory grounds. The court found that ICE arrested Petitioner on April 27 — one day before his supervision order was formally revoked on April 28 — meaning there was no valid legal basis for the arrest at the time it occurred. The court further found that ICE's assertion of 'changed circumstances' justifying revocation was insufficient under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2), because merely asserting that a travel document had been applied for does not satisfy the regulation's requirements. The court recommended that Petitioner be released subject to the conditions of his prior supervision order, rejecting the government's argument that a procedural 'do-over' while keeping Petitioner detained would be the appropriate remedy.
The detailed version
- Sao v. Mullin · No. 0:26-cv-02520
- Eric Tostrud
- May 28, 2026
This is a Report and Recommendation — a magistrate judge's proposed ruling that must be adopted, modified, or rejected by the assigned district judge before it becomes a final order. Magistrate Judge Docherty recommends granting Sao V.'s petition for a writ of habeas corpus (a legal proceeding used to challenge the lawfulness of a person's detention) and ordering his release subject to his prior supervision conditions. The case arises from ICE's re-detention of a Laotian citizen who had been living under an order of supervision since 2019.
Background
Petitioner Sao V. is a citizen of Laos who entered the United States as a refugee in 1987. In 2018, an immigration judge ordered him removed from the United States due to a criminal conviction making him subject to removal. His appeal was dismissed. Because Laos was not issuing travel documents and removal was not likely in the reasonably foreseeable future, ICE released Petitioner on April 10, 2019, under an order of supervision pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 241.13.
On April 27, 2026, ICE encountered Petitioner at the Anoka County Jail, where he had been booked on a charge of Driving While Intoxicated. That same evening, a deportation officer arrested Petitioner using a Form I-200 (Warrant for Arrest of Alien). ICE formally revoked Petitioner's order of supervision the next day, April 28, 2026, citing changed circumstances — specifically, that there was now a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future and that ICE was seeking a travel document for removal to Laos. The revocation documents contained several date inconsistencies, including a discrepancy between the date of the informal interview typed on the revocation notice (April 27) and the date reflected on the Alien Informal Interview form (April 28), and a discrepancy in the proof of service section. ICE submitted a formal travel document request to its Enforcement and Removal Operations Headquarters on May 13, 2026 — more than two weeks after the arrest and revocation.
Petitioner filed his habeas petition on May 6, 2026, raising five grounds: (1) the detention is not authorized under 8 U.S.C. § 1231; (2) it violates Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001); (3) it violates his Fifth Amendment due process rights; (4) it violates the Fourth Amendment; and (5) ICE failed to comply with 8 C.F.R. § 241.13. Petitioner sought immediate release. Respondents opposed, characterizing Petitioner's arguments as complaints about a 'paperwork problem.'
Legal Framework
Federal courts have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to order release of a person held in federal custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 241.13 governs the release and re-detention of noncitizens subject to final removal orders when ICE has determined that removal is not significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. Subsection (i) permits revocation of such release in two circumstances: (1) if the individual violates release conditions, or (2) if, due to changed circumstances, ICE determines there is now a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. Subsection (i)(3) requires that upon revocation, ICE notify the alien of the reasons, conduct a prompt initial informal interview, and evaluate contested facts before making a final revocation determination.
Analysis of Each Claim
Claim 1: 8 U.S.C. § 1231
The court found this claim inapplicable. Because Petitioner was re-detained after being released under an order of supervision, his detention is governed by 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i), not § 1231. This claim did not succeed.
Claim 2: Zadvydas
The court rejected this claim as well, citing multiple district court decisions holding that Zadvydas does not apply to noncitizens subject to orders of supervision, where a prior determination of unlikely removal has already been made. Petitioner himself conceded this point in his reply.
Claim 3: Fourth Amendment
Petitioner argued that ICE used the wrong administrative warrant form — a Form I-200 (used when no final removal order exists) rather than a Form I-205 (used when a final removal order exists) — and that date discrepancies on the warrant rendered his seizure unreasonable. The court rejected both arguments. It found that Petitioner cited no authority establishing that use of the wrong administrative form invalidates a detention. The court reviewed the I-200 Form used and found it contained a probable cause finding signed by an authorized supervisory deportation officer. Petitioner conceded that such officers are authorized to issue administrative warrants and cited no authority that a redacted or illegible signature renders a seizure unreasonable. The court also found the date discrepancy to be a typographical error consistent with other clerical errors in the paperwork. The court recommended denial of the petition on Fourth Amendment grounds.
Claims 4 and 5: 8 C.F.R. § 241.13 and Due Process
This is where the court found Petitioner's strongest arguments and recommended relief.
Arrest before revocation
Respondents did not dispute that ICE arrested Petitioner on April 27, 2026 — one day before his order of supervision was formally revoked on April 28, 2026. The court found that arresting a noncitizen before properly revoking his release violates due process and entitles him to habeas relief, citing Ge Y. v. Noem, No. 26-CV-1700 (D. Minn. 2026).
Insufficiency of changed-circumstances claim
The court also found that ICE's assertion of changed circumstances was legally insufficient under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2). An assertion by ICE that it has applied for a travel document does not, by itself, establish a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. The court also noted that the formal travel document request was not even submitted until May 13, 2026 — fifteen days after the April 28 revocation notice — raising a question about whether ICE had actually begun seeking a travel document when the revocation was issued.
Other arguments addressed
The court declined to credit Petitioner's argument that the absence of a checked 'violation of release conditions' box was itself a ground for relief, because that box was not the stated reason for revocation. The court also rejected Petitioner's claim that the informal interview was a sham, distinguishing the cited case authority because Petitioner had been detained for only one day, not three years.
Respondents' remedial argument rejected
Respondents argued that the appropriate remedy should be for ICE to redo the revocation process while keeping Petitioner detained. The court rejected this, finding no legal authority for that position, and concluded that release is the appropriate remedy.
Post-arrest travel document request immaterial
The court found that a travel document request submitted after Petitioner's arrest and detention cannot cure the government's failure to comply with the due process requirements of § 241.13(i).
Recommendation
Magistrate Judge Docherty recommended that Petitioner Sao V.'s petition for a writ of habeas corpus be granted and that Petitioner be released from custody, subject to the conditions in his prior order of supervision. The court set an expedited objection deadline of May 29, 2026, with responses due by June 1, 2026. This Report and Recommendation is not itself a final order and is not directly appealable; it must be acted upon by the district judge.
Read the full 11-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.