Chay T. v. Mullin

Background

Chay T. is a native and citizen of Laos who entered the United States in 1979 and became a legal permanent resident in 1981. After being convicted of having sexual relations with a minor, he was ordered removed from the United States in October 2012. Because the government was unable to effectuate removal to Laos at that time, Chay was released on an order of supervision (OSUP).

On December 11, 2025, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) arrested Chay at his home. Three days later, ICE served him with notice that his OSUP had been revoked. ICE obtained a Laotian travel document for Chay on February 2, 2026, and began planning a removal charter flight.

Prior Litigation

This is Chay's third habeas corpus petition (a legal action in which a detained person asks a court to order the government to justify the detention). In February 2026 ("Chay I"), he filed his first petition alleging Fourth Amendment violations, failure to comply with federal statutes and regulations governing OSUP revocation, and a due process claim. That petition was denied by Judge Daniel M. Traynor on March 3, 2026. Two days later, Chay filed a second petition ("Chay II"), adding a claim under Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). Judge Traynor denied that petition on April 1, 2026.

Each petition had been accompanied by a court injunction barring Chay's removal from the District of Minnesota while the petition was pending. Due to these injunctions, ICE was unable to remove Chay before his travel documents expired on April 30, 2026. ICE submitted renewal requests for travel documents on April 19 and June 8, 2026.

On June 10, 2026, Chay filed this third habeas petition, again raising a Zadvydas claim — that his continued detention violates the Due Process Clause because his removal is not significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future.

Legal Framework

Federal courts have authority to consider habeas corpus petitions from individuals held in immigration detention. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)(A), a noncitizen ordered removed must be detained during the period necessary to carry out the removal. However, the Supreme Court held in Zadvydas v. Davis that the Due Process Clause does not permit indefinite detention. Under that standard, the government has a presumptively reasonable six-month period after a removal order becomes final to carry out removal. After that period, if the detained person can provide "good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future," the government must rebut that showing with sufficient evidence. If it cannot, the noncitizen must be released subject to conditions and supervision set by ICE.

The burden of proof in habeas proceedings falls on the petitioner to prove illegal detention by a preponderance of the evidence.

Ruling and Reasoning

The court first found that the threshold six-month detention period had passed: Chay's removal order became final in 2012, and his current detention began December 11, 2025, meaning the six-month period ended no later than June 11, 2026.

However, the court found that Chay failed to provide "good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future." The government had already obtained Laotian travel documents for Chay and had been prepared to remove him as early as March 20, 2026. The court determined that the failure to carry out removal in recent months was attributable not to conditions in Laos or operational barriers faced by ICE, but to judicial injunctions entered in connection with Chay's own successive habeas petitions. The court concluded that Chay could not rely on delays of his own making to demonstrate that removal is not reasonably foreseeable.

The court also rejected Chay's argument that the government had never actually procured Laotian travel documents, finding that assertion was nothing but unsupported conjecture, which is insufficient to meet the habeas petitioner's burden.

The court noted that it did not fault Chay for bringing successive habeas petitions — stating he is lawfully entitled to do so — but held that a petitioner cannot indefinitely delay removal by filing successive petitions and then pointing to the resulting injunctions as evidence that removal is unlikely. The court also warned Chay that any future habeas petitions will be assigned to this court and that this court will no longer enter an injunction barring removal during the pendency of the petition.

Disposition

Judge Provinzino denied Chay's habeas petition and dismissed the case without prejudice.