M. v. Blanche

Background

Petitioner Felix Alberto J. M. is a native and citizen of Mexico who, according to the record, has lived in the United States since 2012. On June 11, 2026, he was working at a construction site in Bemidji, Minnesota, when ICE agents conducted what they described as a "targeted enforcement operation" targeting workers they believed to be present without legal authorization. When ICE officers began surveillance near the worksite, the workers — including Felix — "scattered and ran." ICE agents "chased down and apprehended" Felix and others. After the apprehension, officers issued and served an I-200 administrative arrest warrant on Felix and transported him to the Kandiyohi County Jail in Willmar, Minnesota, where he remained detained.

On June 13, 2026, Felix filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus (a court order requiring that a detained person be brought before a court to determine if the detention is lawful) under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. He alleged that his arrest violated federal statutes and regulations governing warrantless arrests, and that his continued detention without a bond hearing violated his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. He sought either immediate release or a bond hearing. The court set a briefing schedule; neither party requested an evidentiary hearing.

Legal Framework

Federal courts have jurisdiction to consider habeas petitions from individuals held in immigration detention. The core statutory provision at issue is 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2), which authorizes ICE to make a warrantless arrest only when an officer has "reason to believe" that a noncitizen (1) is violating immigration laws and (2) is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained. The Eighth Circuit has interpreted "reason to believe" in this context to mean constitutionally required probable cause — the same standard that applies to warrantless arrests in criminal cases. United States v. Quintana, 623 F.3d 1237, 1239 (8th Cir. 2010). Probable cause must be particularized to the specific person being arrested, not merely to a group of people nearby.

Was the Arrest Warrantless?

The government argued that Felix's arrest was effectuated "concurrent" with a warrant. The court rejected this, finding the record showed that no administrative warrant existed at the time of Felix's physical apprehension. The court noted that the I-200 warrant itself cited "statements made voluntarily" by Felix and/or "other reliable evidence" as the basis for probable cause — meaning the warrant logically could not have been issued before Felix was apprehended and spoken to. The court therefore analyzed the arrest under the warrantless-arrest framework of § 1357(a)(2).

Was There Probable Cause?

The court found the government's record — consisting essentially of a single paragraph in the I-213 form (the official ICE record of a deportable alien) — was insufficient to establish probable cause particularized to Felix. The government's showing was that ICE believed "multiple subjects" at the worksite were unauthorized, but provided no evidence that officers had individualized reason to believe Felix specifically was one of those subjects. The court cited Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979), for the principle that mere proximity to other suspected individuals does not establish probable cause as to any particular person.

The only piece of evidence arguably specific to Felix was that he "scattered and ran" when officers arrived. The court acknowledged that unprovoked flight in certain contexts may justify a Terry stop (a brief, investigatory detention based on reasonable suspicion, a lower standard than probable cause, authorized by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)), but held that flight alone does not establish probable cause for a full arrest. The court cited cases from multiple federal circuits and the Supreme Court supporting this principle.

Was Felix Arrested or Merely Subject to a Terry Stop?

The government argued that Felix was subjected only to a Terry stop, while Felix argued he was arrested outright. The court sided with Felix. It reasoned that ICE's own use of the word "apprehended" — which courts and legal authorities treat as synonymous with "arrest" — indicated a full custodial detention, not a brief investigatory stop. The court further noted that a Terry stop is ordinarily used to briefly question a suspect, but here ICE's account showed no questioning occurred after officers caught Felix; instead, they immediately handed him an arrest warrant and transported him to jail. This chain of events, the court found, indicated that ICE treated Felix's detention as a completed arrest from the outset, not as a preliminary investigation.

The court acknowledged this might have been a case where an evidentiary hearing would have clarified the facts, but the government itself declined to request one, and the court held the government to that position.

Holding and Order

Because ICE arrested Felix without the probable cause required by 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2), the court held that Felix is entitled to habeas relief in the form of release from custody. The court granted the petition and ordered the government to release Felix without conditions and with all personal property by no later than 5:00 p.m. on July 3, 2026. The government was further ordered to file a status report certifying compliance by July 6, 2026. If the government sought to impose any conditions of release or retain Felix's property, it was required to explain the legal basis for doing so in the status report.

The court expressly declined to reach Felix's Fifth Amendment due process arguments or his regulatory arguments, having resolved the case on the statutory probable-cause ground alone.