Olson v. Union Pacific Railroad Company

Background

Plaintiff Troy Olson and his son Jonathan Olson, both Union Pacific Railroad Company employees, were working at a track-removal site in Albert Lea, Minnesota on December 10, 2021. Olson was pulling rail spikes with a hydraulic spike puller while Jonathan operated a "speed swing" — a large machine with a boom arm used to lift and move sections of rail. At some point, Jonathan began exiting the speed swing to help Olson, but did not stop the machine's engine or lower the piece of rail attached to the boom arm before doing so. While exiting, Jonathan's jacket or arm moved the joystick, causing the boom arm to swing unexpectedly. The moving rail struck Olson in the back, knocked him down, was dragged over him, and was ultimately released onto the back of his knee. Olson suffered injuries to his shoulder (a hairline fracture was confirmed by X-ray) and knee, and was discharged from the emergency room with a sling and instructions for light duty.

Following the accident, Union Pacific Work Equipment Manager Greg Porter inspected the speed swing and found that its armrest safety mechanism — designed to stop the boom arm from moving when the armrest is lifted (as it must be when entering or exiting the machine) — had been "broken and disabled" and deliberately rewired so the boom arm would operate continuously regardless of armrest position. Jonathan was unaware the mechanism had been bypassed. Porter investigated but was unable to identify who had bypassed the mechanism. The speed swing had been inspected in April 2021 and found safe, and no problems had been reported in the intervening months.

Olson filed this lawsuit on November 20, 2024, alleging negligence under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60, which imposes on railroads a duty to provide employees with a reasonably safe workplace and equipment, and gives employees a federal cause of action for injuries caused in whole or in part by the railroad's or its employees' negligence. Olson alleged severe and permanent injuries, diminished earning capacity, and past and future medical expenses.

Legal Standard

Summary Judgment

Summary judgment (a ruling by the judge without a trial) is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute about any material fact and the moving party is entitled to win as a matter of law. In evaluating the motion, the court must view all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party (here, Olson) and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor. The court may not weigh evidence or make credibility determinations at this stage.

FELA Framework

FELA was enacted in 1908 to shift part of the costs of railroad injuries from workers to their employers. Courts construe it liberally to further its remedial, worker-protective purpose, but it is not a no-fault workers' compensation statute — the railroad's negligence must actually cause the injury. A railroad is liable if its negligence or the negligence of any of its officers, agents, or employees "played any part, even the slightest" in causing the employee's injury.

To survive summary judgment on a FELA negligence claim, a plaintiff must show by direct or circumstantial evidence that: (1) a railroad officer, employee, or agent was responsible through negligence for creating the unsafe condition; or (2) at least one such person had actual knowledge of the unsafe condition before the accident; or (3) the condition existed long enough that a properly careful employer should have discovered and remedied it. Reasonable foreseeability of harm is an essential element and is a question of fact for the jury.

Ruling on Theory 1: Bypassed Safety Mechanism (Rule 1.23)

The Parties' Positions

Olson argued that a Union Pacific employee bypassed the speed swing's armrest safety mechanism in violation of Union Pacific's own Rule 1.23 (which prohibits employees from altering, disabling, or interfering with the normal function of equipment except in emergencies, and requires reporting any emergency changes to a supervisor). This bypassing, Olson argued, constituted negligence attributable to Union Pacific.

Union Pacific countered that there was no direct evidence showing who bypassed the mechanism, no evidence it had notice the mechanism was broken, and no evidence the person responsible was a Union Pacific employee (rather than, for example, a third party).

Admissibility of Porter's Testimony

Union Pacific challenged as inadmissible Porter's deposition opinion that it was "more than likely" a Union Pacific employee bypassed the mechanism. The court declined to exclude this testimony at the summary judgment stage, finding that — as a lay (non-expert) witness with extensive personal knowledge from his years as a Work Equipment Manager and his post-accident investigation — Porter's opinion appeared capable of being presented in admissible form at trial. The court noted that this ruling does not foreclose renewed admissibility challenges at trial.

The Court's Analysis

The court found genuine issues of material fact (disputes that must go to a jury) on the bypassed-mechanism theory. While acknowledging that no one was directly identified as the person who bypassed the safety feature, the court found that Porter's testimony constituted sufficient circumstantial evidence to permit the inference that a Union Pacific employee was responsible. Porter testified that, to his knowledge, only Union Pacific mechanics or employees had worked on that speed swing, and that the tampering was most likely done by someone who needed the machine to work but failed to report the problem.

The court rejected Union Pacific's agency-law argument that the unknown employee's knowledge could not be imputed to Union Pacific because the tampering was "adverse" to company interests. The court reasoned that the "adverse interests" exception to imputing knowledge applies only when the agent acted "solely for their own benefit" — and here, Porter's testimony suggested the tampering was done for work purposes (keeping the machine operational), not solely for personal benefit.

The court also rejected Union Pacific's argument that the employee lacked sufficient control over company affairs to impute knowledge, noting that FELA expressly covers negligence by any officer, agent, or employee — not just supervisors — and that Union Pacific could not conclusively establish the person lacked such control when it did not even know who the person was.

The court distinguished the Eighth Circuit's decision in Miller v. Union Pacific Railroad, 972 F.3d 979 (8th Cir. 2020), where no evidence pointed to a railroad employee (rather than a third party) as the cause of the unsafe condition. Here, by contrast, there was affirmative testimony from a management-level Union Pacific employee that a company employee most likely created the unsafe condition — and that the tampering was intentional, for a work-related purpose.

The court analogized to Hemling v. Soo Line Railroad, 2021 WL 534892 (W.D. Wis. 2021), where a similar FELA claim survived summary judgment based on circumstantial evidence that a railroad employee knew of (but failed to report) an unsafe condition.

Finally, the court rejected Union Pacific's concern that denying summary judgment would effectively hold railroads strictly liable (liable without requiring proof of negligence) whenever an unknown employee is assumed to have caused an unsafe condition. The court emphasized that denial of summary judgment is not a finding of liability — that determination is for the jury — and noted that Union Pacific, not Olson, was better positioned to investigate and identify the responsible employee.

Ruling on Theory 2: Jonathan's Failure to Stop the Machine (Rule 43.5)

Olson raised a second theory in his summary judgment response: that Jonathan violated Union Pacific's Rule 43.5 by failing to stop the speed swing's engine and lower the suspended rail before exiting the machine, and that this violation was an independent basis for Union Pacific's FELA liability.

The court agreed with Union Pacific that this theory was improperly raised for the first time at the summary judgment stage. Olson's complaint specifically referenced the bypassed safety mechanism and Union Pacific's Rule 1.23, but made no mention of Rule 43.5, Jonathan's conduct as a separate negligence theory, or any allegation that Jonathan's rule violations were a basis for Union Pacific's liability. The complaint did not even hint at this theory. Olson also never sought to amend his complaint to add it.

The court held that under the notice-pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff may not introduce a brand-new theory of liability in response to a summary judgment motion. The complaint serves to guide discovery and give the defendant fair notice of the claims it must defend. Allowing such a late-stage theory shift would unfairly surprise defendants and undermine the purpose of the pleading rules. The fact that Olson explored Jonathan's Rule 43.5 conduct in discovery depositions was insufficient — discovery activity does not substitute for proper pleading.

Additional Procedural Matters

Motion to Strike Union Pacific's Brief

Olson asked the court to strike Union Pacific's opening summary judgment brief for failing to include a certificate of compliance with the District of Minnesota's Local Rule 7.1(f) governing word-count limits. The court declined, finding that Union Pacific's brief actually complied with the applicable word-count limit itself (Local Rule 7.1(f)(1)) even though it omitted the compliance certificate (required by Local Rule 7.1(f)(2)). The court exercised its discretion to overlook this technical deficiency and denied Olson's request to strike the brief.

Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony

Union Pacific had filed a motion to exclude certain opinions from one of Olson's expert witnesses (Jesse Ogren). At the summary judgment hearing, neither party relied on this expert's opinions, and the parties agreed the motion should be treated as a motion in limine (a pretrial evidentiary motion) to be addressed if the case proceeds to trial. The court denied this motion without prejudice as moot, meaning it may be re-raised as a pretrial motion before trial.